Checkride procedure turn question

rookie1255

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rookie1255
RNAV (GPS) RWY 15 approach for KRME. Coming from the NW when enroute I have a complete radio failure. TURYN would appear to be the IAF to use.

Common sense says to just go straight in and do the approach without the PT. Why make more turns than needed when in the clouds?

Rules say always do the PT unless SHARPTT and ATC is also sequencing assuming that you WILL do the PT since it's required.

What would you tell the examiner?
 
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Coming from NE is a little vague, that could be anything from 001 to 089. In my mind, if the turn inbound is less than 90 degrees, there is less need for a course reversal. If you have to turn more than 90 degrees, the hold entry or PT turn are much more important.
 
Im just getting started in instrument training, so you shouldn't put much weight in my opinion... but it appears to me that you are required to fly one lap of the hold unless atc says otherwise, which obviously they can't if you're NORDO.
 
RNAV (GPS) RWY 15 approach for KRME. Coming from the NE when enroute I have a complete radio failure. TURYN would appear to be the IAF to use.

Common sense says to just go straight in and do the approach without the PT. Why make more turns than needed when in the clouds?

Rules say always do the PT unless SHARPTT and ATC is also sequencing assuming that you WILL do the PT since it's required.

What would you tell the examiner?

SHARPTT ???
 
Unless you can point to a rule which says you don’t need to go around the hold once, there is no choice.
 
The general rule for check rides is don’t violate regulations.

if you don’t want to do the PT, and have a choice of IAF, pick the one that says NoPT.

if you fly one that requires a PT, fly the PT.
 
Easy. There is only one feeder route into TURYN. If you are not on that NoPT or at 3500 feet, the approach begins at the hold in lieu of procedure turn at TURYN.

You turn outbound and fly the 4 NM pattern.

You have the option to consider your situation an emergency and deviate from the rules and descend to 3500 prior to TURYN and fly straight in. Considering the MSA is 3800, I would not do that.

That's what I would tell an examiner.
 
You have the option to consider your situation an emergency and deviate from the rules and descend to 3500 prior to TURYN and fly straight in.
I disagree...a simple NORDO situation doesn’t meet the letter of the reg for deviating from the PT requirement...
(b) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.
I can’t see where skipping a procedure turn would be an “immediate action” “requir(ed)” by the emergency.
 
I disagree...a simple NORDO situation doesn’t meet the letter of the reg for deviating from the PT requirement...

I can’t see where skipping a procedure turn would be an “immediate action” “requir(ed)” by the emergency.

Its all in the eye of the beholder. As long as you don't bend metal or hurt anyone in your emergency, probably not going to raise too many eyebrows.
 
Its all in the eye of the beholder. As long as you don't bend metal or hurt anyone in your emergency, probably not going to raise too many eyebrows.
That goes for non-emergency violations as well. Not raising too many eyebrows is nowhere near the same thing as legal.
 
You can justify an emergency depending on the circumstances. NORDO by itself is not a good justification. NORDO in combination with other factors that individually don’t warrant declaring an emergency may be all you need. For a hypothetical with no information other than NORDO I would default to most likely not needing to deviate from the regs.
 
If you are being separated by ATC, won’t they expect a PT from you? Then if you lose comm, aren’t you expected to fly the procedure so that you’re predictable? That would seem to continue to guarantee some sort of safe separation distance that ATC would have intended when the radios still worked. No difference from an “EFC”in a hold, or “climb 2k, expect 5k in 10 minutes”?

-IFR student
 
I was thinking about the plane I'm currently renting.... if I was NORDO.... than pretty high odds I'm also "NO-RNAV".....
I suppose a bird strike that takes out the comm antenna for that one radio might be a circumstance where I suppose I'd still have the GPS

sorry for derail....just a side thought
I'm very rusty with my instrument stuff...but I'm thinking the correct answer is to do a turn....
real world though, unless I had some altitude to loose I think I'd probably go straight in...why get myself into a real emergency screwing something up in the turn?...
 
I was thinking about the plane I'm currently renting.... if I was NORDO.... than pretty high odds I'm also "NO-RNAV".....
I suppose a bird strike that takes out the comm antenna for that one radio might be a circumstance where I suppose I'd still have the GPS
I think I was the one who started using he term “NORDO” in this discussion, probably inappropriately to the OP’s question.

but another example of losing comms without losing any nav capability would be an audio panel malfunction...don’t ask me how I thought that up. ;)
 
I'm going to be the outlier on this one. If I fail the checkride, so be it.

TURYN is not only an IAF, it is an IF. That means ATC can clear you straight in. If you were not lost com and were at an appropriate altitude coming in off-airway from the northwest the odds are nearly 100% ATC would be clearing you straight in and I would absolutely be asking for straight in if the controller forgot and didn't offer it.

Here's what the AIM says in the very first paragraph of its discussion of lost comm:

It is virtually impossible to provide regulations and procedures applicable to all possible situations associated with two‐way radio communications failure. During two‐way radio communications failure, when confronted by a situation not covered in the regulation, pilots are expected to exercise good judgment in whatever action they elect to take.​

My best judgment is to fly the straight-in which (a) I would have requested, (b) ATC is authorized to give me, and (c) would have been given if I had communications.


upload_2020-2-26_15-45-51.png
 
Is that even if they’re not giving you radar vectors?
Yes. Actually, they would be clearing you straight in. But even without that, ATC would expect an airplane coming in from the northwest to that fix on appreciably less than a 90 degree angle and an appropriate altitude to o straight in. I almost "failed" an IPC many years ago because I disagree with the controller CFII and insisted the PT was required. Part of the reason for the AIM change authorizing a straight-in clearance in this situation was that pilot-controller disconnect.
 
I'm going to be the outlier on this one. If I fail the checkride, so be it.

TURYN is not only an IAF, it is an IF. That means ATC can clear you straight in. If you were not lost com and were at an appropriate altitude coming in off-airway from the northwest the odds are nearly 100% ATC would be clearing you straight in and I would absolutely be asking for straight in if the controller forgot and didn't offer it.

Here's what the AIM says in the very first paragraph of its discussion of lost comm:

It is virtually impossible to provide regulations and procedures applicable to all possible situations associated with two‐way radio communications failure. During two‐way radio communications failure, when confronted by a situation not covered in the regulation, pilots are expected to exercise good judgment in whatever action they elect to take.​

My best judgment is to fly the straight-in which (a) I would have requested, (b) ATC is authorized to give me, and (c) would have been given if I had communications.


View attachment 83091
I guess my question, related more to the letter of the reg than the real world...is an IF “a fix from which an approach begins”?
 
I'm going to be the outlier on this one. If I fail the checkride, so be it.

Thank you, sir, for reinforcing my premise.

The OP phrased his question as a question to an examiner during a flight test. The PIC of an aircraft in a lost communication scenario may have options deemed unacceptable to anyone not in that (possibly panic ridden) cockpit.

That's why I stated my answer as:

That's what I would tell an examiner.

What I would do in that scenario is not germane to the question and I don't know what I would do until the situation presented anyway. :cool:
 
The OP phrased his question as a question to an examiner during a flight test. The PIC of an aircraft in a lost communication scenario may have options deemed unacceptable to anyone not in that (possibly panic ridden) cockpit.
While we don’t know how we’ll react until we’re in the situation, I would argue that a loss of communication shouldn’t (as opposed to won’t) cause a panicked reaction.
 
I guess my question, related more to the letter of the reg than the real world...is an IF “a fix from which an approach begins”?
There might be a few things missing from the scenario, like exact where coming from. I read it as an off-airway routing before loss of com, so the expectation would be straight in from the IF. Obviously a judgement call. The answer would be, "I know that a strict reading would require the PT but in this situation..."

lost com is funny that way. I wouldn't be panicked but the other reality is lost com without being concerned it is a sign of other problems is unusual, so I am getting on the ground as expeditiously as safety allows.
 
While we don’t know how we’ll react until we’re in the situation, I would argue that a loss of communication shouldn’t (as opposed to won’t) cause a panicked reaction.

That's my point. I went through flight school with a guy who would panic if he didn't hear something on the radio for more than a minute or so. No kidding.

He would rather be on fire than lose commo. He eventually transferred to the Air Force and flew KC-XX tankers and the C-5.
 
My instrument rating is pretty dated, but I was taught that in the event of a loss of radio communications you fly the rest of the route as cleared or filed. That's clear cut in terms of getting to the destination airport and the applicable IAF. Once there it's still clear cut, based on the current winds and the active runway when you were cleared as filed. And I was also taught that you want a complete clearance all the way to the airport in the event you lose radio contact. That then leaves the only uncertainty in the clearance as the precise approach you'll fly, and that should be based on the most recent destination weather and forecast you got before losing radio contact.

In line with that same "cleared as filed" reasoning, if I am selecting the RNAV GPS RWY 15 approach, based on most recently known conditions at KRME, I'm going to fly the approach as published. I'll approach TURYN at 3800', enter the holding pattern and descend to 3500' on the outbound leg, then turn inbound in the holding pattern, cross TURYN, intercept the glideslope and fly the approach.

ATC will have figured out that I'm "no radio" as I am 1) not responding, and 2) flying as filed. If there is a potential conflict with an aircraft in holding or inbound for the approach they will have either have him maintain the holding pattern and climb to maintain at least 1000' vertical separation well before I arrive at TURYN, or stay at or above that 1000' separation altitude while inbound to TURYN, or if time allows have him start the approach before I get to TURYN. In the latter case, the last place I want to be is at 3500' when I arrive at TURYN.

At no point do I want to become unpredictable. I want to descend to, but not below, the 3800' MSA when just less than 25 miles out from TURYN so there is no guessing what my intentions are regarding altitude. I then want to enter the holding pattern and do one turn in holding before continuing with the approach.

Unless I'm on fire, out of gas, carrying a bunch of ice, etc, there is no reason and no benefit to flying directly down the approach, when the normal approach would involved entering the holding pattern, getting established at 3500' and then turning inbound and shooting the approach. I want to be predictable so that I don't cause a cascade of traffic calls from ATC to keep other aircraft out of my way, when I do something unexpected/stupid. That kind of behavior ends in a "please call the tower after you park" message from ATC.
 
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I like the idea of descending to 3800 as a signal that I have lost comms...

Ummm....7600 on the squawk is a pretty clear hint. In real life, if you lose transmit, but can still receive, the ident button is how you communicate. ATC's been there before, they know the drill.
 
Ummm....7600 on the squawk is a pretty clear hint. In real life, if you lose transmit, but can still receive, the ident button is how you communicate. ATC's been there before, they know the drill.

You are assuming any of that stuff works.
 
Keep in mind that one purpose of the HILPT is to lose altitude to get properly established on the approach course at an appropriate altitude prior to the IAF. In an emergent condition, you can probably defend doing anything reasonable, but making up your own transition might get you behind the curve on a stabilized approach. If not on the transition from WEEPY, you will have some altitude to lose before crossing the IAF, and how will you do that with expected safety margins without flying the HILPT?
 
You are assuming any of that stuff works.

If you've lost comms and transponder, you've probably lost your electrical system. That qualifies as an emergency. Do what you need to do to get it on the ground.

Speaking as one who's lost comms in IMC, it ain't fun. Invest in a handheld. Chances are you won't be able to xmit, but you'll be able to rcv, and acknowledge with the ident.
 
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If you've lost comms and transponder, you've probably lost your electrical system. That qualifies as an emergency. Do what you need to do to get it on the ground.

Speaking as one who's lost comms in IMC, it ain't fun. Invest in a handheld. Chances are you won't be able to xmit, but you'll be able to rcv, and acknowledge with the ident.

I agree with you completely on the handheld, and while you are at it get one with VOR and Localizer capability.

However, let's discuss what you might be flying, whether it's an emergency and whether skipping the holding pattern segment of the approach is a good idea just because you have an "emergency".

Steam Gauges?

Com, Nav, and transponder aside, if you are flying an aircraft with traditional steam gauges in a customary six pack, you'll lose the electrically operated turn coordinator in a total electrical failure. That's not too a big a deal. You've still got bank information from the AH to let you very closely approximate a standard rate turn at your normal approach speed. I'm just not seeing an emergency here.

A vacuum system failure that results in the loss of the artificial horizon and directional gyro is more burdensome in terms of a partial panel approach and you now have only the TC for gyro instruments. That's a lot more work as you are using the VSI, ASI and altimeter to monitor pitch attitude, and the TC and compass to monitor and manage bank and heading. That's a lot more work with a lot more cross checking.

However, intercepting the IAF with no transition and then immediately starting down the glide slope partial panel is going to massively increase your workload. Even if it is just the dead TC, you've got more than usual on your plate. Entering the holding pattern gives you time to change altitude, stabilize the altitude, turn in bound and stabilize the heading, cross the fix, and then establish a descent on the glideslope.

Glass panel?

If you have a glass panel, and you've had a primary electrical failure AND the battery back up has also failed, you're left with a standby vacuum driven artificial horizon, an altimeter, an airspeed indicator, and a compass. That's also higher workload, and the main challenge is accurately maintaining heading, especially in turbulence where the whiskey compass is spinning around.

Again, this is not a situation where I want to be crossing the fix, while dropping from 3800 to 3500 while intercepting the glide slope based on a swinging compass.

Now, how about adding in a total radio failure?

I fly with a handheld nav/com as backup and I have a mount that lets me put it where it can be part of the scan. It has both VOR and ILS capability. However, it doesn't have the same smooth needle sweep as a regular CDI, but rather gives me information in 1 degree increments. It's harder to fly a good approach with one, especially if you don't practice with it now and then .

But, it will let me fly and ILS or VOR approach in an emergency in a total electrical failure with no operable installed navs or coms- it's massively better than nothing at all.

Here again though, I'll be transitioning to the approach and doing it with a single combined nav/com that will do one or the other, and is perhaps less familiar and more cumbersome to set up for each segment. Again, skipping the holding pattern is going to hurt, rather than help.


A caveat here is that if I was flying glass panel IFR, I had a primary electrical system failure and had battery backup, BUT had reason to be concerned that it would not last long, I *might* consider skipping the holding pattern. But again there's also the risk of losing the backup in the middle of a transition to the localizer and glideslope, while changing altitude and heading and having to then transition to the back up instruments in the middle of that mess.

----

A basic premise in an emergency is never act in haste and make a bad situation worse, or use an option just because you have it.

There's a more or less local pilot in the area with a Cirrus. He pulled the parachute handle once after a rather routine problem that he decided was an *emergency*. He landed on six cars, totalled them, totalled the plane and injured his back. Fast forward a year or so down the road in a flight in his replacement Cirrus retrieving the aircraft after some regular maintenance, with an instructor and passenger on board.

The instructor noted he was getting nervous and asked him why. He indicated he thought he was going to have to deploy the parachute as he had a mechanical problem. The instructor inquired and learned the "problem" was and oil pressure needle that was twitching between normal and 0. The instructor noted the oil temp was fine and that the engine was running perfectly normally. He noted the aircraft was just out of maintenance and explained that oil pressure loss occurs as either a sudden and permanent drop, or slowly and steadily declines, depending on the failure. He pointed out that the twitchy needle symptom was almost certainly an instrumentation issue, not a loss of oil pressure issue. He advised that he needed to just keep monitoring the oil temp and at worst, divert to a closer airport - one with maintenance services available - and make a normal landing.

At this point the pilot, totally unconvinced, started to reach for the parachute lever and had to be physically restrained from pulling it by the instructor. It's the last time that instructor ever flew with that pilot.

The key points here are that with a little effort you can catastrophize pretty much anything into an emergency and then use that emergency to try to justify doing something truly stupid. But being able to do something in an emergency does not by itself make it a good idea to do that particular something in an emergency.

It's an extreme example with a truly stupid action on the part of the pilot. But IMHO, the only difference between that gloriously stupid action and skipping the holding pattern segment of an approach just because you lost coms is just a matter of degree.

4vau9xp9t6s11.jpg
 
A basic premise in an emergency is never act in haste and make a bad situation worse, or use an option just because you have it.

There's a more or less local pilot in the area with a Cirrus. He pulled the parachute handle once after a rather routine problem that he decided was an *emergency*. He landed on six cars, totalled them, totalled the plane and injured his back. Fast forward a year or so down the road in a flight in his replacement Cirrus retrieving the aircraft after some regular maintenance, with an instructor and passenger on board.

The instructor noted he was getting nervous and asked him why. He indicated he thought he was going to have to deploy the parachute as he had a mechanical problem. The instructor inquired and learned the "problem" was and oil pressure needle that was twitching between normal and 0. The instructor noted the oil temp was fine and that the engine was running perfectly normally. He noted the aircraft was just out of maintenance and explained that oil pressure loss occurs as either a sudden and permanent drop, or slowly and steadily declines, depending on the failure. He pointed out that the twitchy needle symptom was almost certainly an instrumentation issue, not a loss of oil pressure issue. He advised that he needed to just keep monitoring the oil temp and at worst, divert to a closer airport - one with maintenance services available - and make a normal landing.

At this point the pilot, totally unconvinced, started to reach for the parachute lever and had to be physically restrained from pulling it by the instructor. It's the last time that instructor ever flew with that pilot.

The key points here are that with a little effort you can catastrophize pretty much anything into an emergency and then use that emergency to try to justify doing something truly stupid. But being able to do something in an emergency does not by itself make it a good idea to do that particular something in an emergency.

It's an extreme example with a truly stupid action on the part of the pilot. But IMHO, the only difference between that gloriously stupid action and skipping the holding pattern segment of an approach just because you lost coms is just a matter of degree.

That is certainly an extreme example, but on the other side are many accidents where the pilot didn't decide they had an emergency until it was too late, or at all. I'm guessing the recent King Air crash in Texas may have been one of the latter.
 
There might be a few things missing from the scenario, like exact where coming from. I read it as an off-airway routing before loss of com
I got curious because approaches are always in the context of the enroute environment. You can't answer a question like this in a vacuum. So I looked. I see three ways of getting to the approach from the northwest. One is on V29 (sorry I cut it off) toward SYR. The second is V145. If either routing were your clearance (aside from the time to start issue) I would fly to WEEPY and follow the NoPT routing from there and the procedure turn at TURYN would be prohibited.

The third is what I assumed from the original post - off route direct to TURYN or to the airport.

TempApch.png
 
At this point the pilot, totally unconvinced, started to reach for the parachute lever and had to be physically restrained from pulling it by the instructor. It's the last time that instructor ever flew with that pilot.

Does pulling the chute on a Cirrus automatically kill the engine? Just thinking how fun the ride would be on the chute with full power.
 
I want to descend to, but not below, the 3800' MSA when just less than 25 miles out from TURYN

A small but important point - the MSA is based on 25 nm from RW15. Since TURYN is already 12.5 nm from the runway, you'll need to wait a little longer before safely descending.
 
I agree with you completely on the handheld, and while you are at it get one with VOR and Localizer capability.

However, let's discuss what you might be flying, whether it's an emergency and whether skipping the holding pattern segment of the approach is a good idea just because you have an "emergency".

Steam Gauges?

Com, Nav, and transponder aside, if you are flying an aircraft with traditional steam gauges in a customary six pack, you'll lose the electrically operated turn coordinator in a total electrical failure. That's not too a big a deal. You've still got bank information from the AH to let you very closely approximate a standard rate turn at your normal approach speed. I'm just not seeing an emergency here.

A vacuum system failure that results in the loss of the artificial horizon and directional gyro is more burdensome in terms of a partial panel approach and you now have only the TC for gyro instruments. That's a lot more work as you are using the VSI, ASI and altimeter to monitor pitch attitude, and the TC and compass to monitor and manage bank and heading. That's a lot more work with a lot more cross checking.

However, intercepting the IAF with no transition and then immediately starting down the glide slope partial panel is going to massively increase your workload. Even if it is just the dead TC, you've got more than usual on your plate. Entering the holding pattern gives you time to change altitude, stabilize the altitude, turn in bound and stabilize the heading, cross the fix, and then establish a descent on the glideslope.

Glass panel?

If you have a glass panel, and you've had a primary electrical failure AND the battery back up has also failed, you're left with a standby vacuum driven artificial horizon, an altimeter, an airspeed indicator, and a compass. That's also higher workload, and the main challenge is accurately maintaining heading, especially in turbulence where the whiskey compass is spinning around.

Again, this is not a situation where I want to be crossing the fix, while dropping from 3800 to 3500 while intercepting the glide slope based on a swinging compass.

Now, how about adding in a total radio failure?

I fly with a handheld nav/com as backup and I have a mount that lets me put it where it can be part of the scan. It has both VOR and ILS capability. However, it doesn't have the same smooth needle sweep as a regular CDI, but rather gives me information in 1 degree increments. It's harder to fly a good approach with one, especially if you don't practice with it now and then .

But, it will let me fly and ILS or VOR approach in an emergency in a total electrical failure with no operable installed navs or coms- it's massively better than nothing at all.

Here again though, I'll be transitioning to the approach and doing it with a single combined nav/com that will do one or the other, and is perhaps less familiar and more cumbersome to set up for each segment. Again, skipping the holding pattern is going to hurt, rather than help.


A caveat here is that if I was flying glass panel IFR, I had a primary electrical system failure and had battery backup, BUT had reason to be concerned that it would not last long, I *might* consider skipping the holding pattern. But again there's also the risk of losing the backup in the middle of a transition to the localizer and glideslope, while changing altitude and heading and having to then transition to the back up instruments in the middle of that mess.

----

A basic premise in an emergency is never act in haste and make a bad situation worse, or use an option just because you have it.

There's a more or less local pilot in the area with a Cirrus. He pulled the parachute handle once after a rather routine problem that he decided was an *emergency*. He landed on six cars, totalled them, totalled the plane and injured his back. Fast forward a year or so down the road in a flight in his replacement Cirrus retrieving the aircraft after some regular maintenance, with an instructor and passenger on board.

The instructor noted he was getting nervous and asked him why. He indicated he thought he was going to have to deploy the parachute as he had a mechanical problem. The instructor inquired and learned the "problem" was and oil pressure needle that was twitching between normal and 0. The instructor noted the oil temp was fine and that the engine was running perfectly normally. He noted the aircraft was just out of maintenance and explained that oil pressure loss occurs as either a sudden and permanent drop, or slowly and steadily declines, depending on the failure. He pointed out that the twitchy needle symptom was almost certainly an instrumentation issue, not a loss of oil pressure issue. He advised that he needed to just keep monitoring the oil temp and at worst, divert to a closer airport - one with maintenance services available - and make a normal landing.

At this point the pilot, totally unconvinced, started to reach for the parachute lever and had to be physically restrained from pulling it by the instructor. It's the last time that instructor ever flew with that pilot.

The key points here are that with a little effort you can catastrophize pretty much anything into an emergency and then use that emergency to try to justify doing something truly stupid. But being able to do something in an emergency does not by itself make it a good idea to do that particular something in an emergency.

It's an extreme example with a truly stupid action on the part of the pilot. But IMHO, the only difference between that gloriously stupid action and skipping the holding pattern segment of an approach just because you lost coms is just a matter of degree.

View attachment 83112

All the points you make are good ones, but if the radios are dead and the transponder quit, but I still have navs for some reason and I'm IMC on an approach, I would not dilly dally around. I'd use what battery life I still have to get vmc. If that means cutting the corner on an hilpt to join the GS to get under the deck, I'm doing it. If the battery happens to quit on the turn outbound, sure I still have vac instruments, but I am reliant solely on my mag compass, clock and gyros to complete the approach. Not a place I want to be.
 
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A small but important point - the MSA is based on 25 nm from RW15. Since TURYN is already 12.5 nm from the runway, you'll need to wait a little longer before safely descending.

Also depending on the route you are on you may have to ascend. V145 MEA is 3000.
 
Does pulling the chute on a Cirrus automatically kill the engine? Just thinking how fun the ride would be on the chute with full power.

Unless he was rated for powered parachutes, he'd have to shut the engine down or risk FAA wrath. ;)
 
If anyone cares I can walk upstairs and ask the ATC guys what they would prefer you do in this situation.
 
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