That was also mentioned on several other forums. Unfortunately that item was ommitted in the court filing as they only state "pilots" as a collective term in flying the aircraft.
BOEING 767F crash near Houston in the bay Atlas cargo
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donjohnston
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hindsight2020
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hindsight2020
Funny you mention that. The RUMINT on the CVR has it that the noise signature at the beginning of the upset was consistent with large and/or heavy objects violently crashing onto the ceiling and thumping back down. The inference of course being that was the jumpseater hitting the ceiling. Good bad or indifferent, it would not be beyond the realm of possibility that the jump wasn't properly strapped in during that portion, nor do we know beyond doubt that the collateral noise was other cockpit items and not a body of course. So who knows.
We all like to believe we would fight to help regain control as a matter of self preservation, but theres just so much one could do if the anecdote that the FO was that paralyzed into an improper control input and response to stress, to the degree the other pilot broke the control column holds true.
Captain.
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Zeldman
Touchdown! Greaser!
Ok, thanks, I was not aware of that. Yep, little could be done if the jumpseater was pinned to the ceiling.
flyingcheesehead
Touchdown! Greaser!
Not to mention, the time from the very start of the "incident" to the time they were in little pieces in the bay was eighteen seconds. That's not a lot of time to see something start to develop, understand the situation, get over your disbelief, see that the captain's yoke is broken, realize you're in mortal danger, realize that the FO is not as well trained/prepared for the situation as he should be, unstrap, overpower the FO, and recover.
I think if I were in that situation (jumpseating on an unfamiliar airplane that's bigger than I've ever flown before), I'd have had the expectation that the FO would be better trained and prepared for the situation than I was, and that he was not the cause of the situation. Eighteen seconds really isn't enough time to completely change those expectations and be the hero.
Jim_R
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Jim
Especially if you just had your head bounced off the ceiling and now you're unconscious.
denverpilot
Tied Down
I’ll say this gingerly since we don’t know what we don’t know on this one yet, but...
IF this turns out to be one massively inappropriate response by the FO...
There’s been a lot of rah-rah-ing of the article saying foreign carriers have crap training programs...
But somehow both Air France and now these guys...
Flew perfectly good airplanes into water.
There’s a HINT there that our training still has some significant Swiss cheese holes someone can slip through, if a 767 FO has indications of high power settings and pushes the nose DOWN.
Everyone said in @flyingcheesehead ‘s thread about “how do you learn the stuff you don’t experience” that there were too many checks and too many people involved in those checks for someone to make it to the cockpit of a 121 with these sorts of gaping knowledge holes.
I’m just gingerly testing that assertion with a very low voltage cattle prod here. If this dude did what the rumor mill is saying he did... a whole hell of a lot of people missed that he had a MASSIVE knowledge gap in basic airmanship. Pitch, power, performance.
And I’m kinda, not buying it.
....
Okay that said, there’s a lot of info that still needs to come out on this thing. Heck, for all we know the jumpseater hit the ceiling and landed on the FO, pinning him forward. (Just to make up an alternate story nicer to the FO, here. Maybe it doesn’t match info we have. I’m just being alternatively nice after being critical.) The FOs initial mistake could have had consequences we don’t know yet.
I wonder VERY hard if the FO saw... or believed he saw... something that indicated he was slow. Shoving the nose down after making it that far into a commercial aviation gig, just doesn’t make any damn sense to me, really.
AIr France, makes some sense, they had indications they didn’t REALLY understand.
So I have to wonder aloud, what in the world did this pilot see that would indicate a nose down attitude at high power made any sense whatsoever? So much so that he fought the Captain over it to the point of breaking the controls......?
The question itself tells me we really don’t have all of the info.
Okay. Now for the real controversial thought I had today... cockpit video would make all doubt disappear.
I know there’s a LOT of pushback against that concept... but with the right rules MAYBE it wouldn’t be abused by companies... encrypted and only accessible to accident investigators... whatever... it COULD be done... but nobody wants it... for a lot of legitimate reasons...
Just tossing thought hand grenades tonight.
Some of these came to mind while driving today. This accident has held my interest more than many since the beginning... no particular reason. The more than comes out about it, the more totally screwed up it seems.
And no love for cargo pilots, as mentioned before. There’d be all sorts of pressure to release more info if passengers had gone in the drink with these poor souls.
The shear pin thing is interesting to me also, from one tiny engineering point. If you’re going to design in a shear pin, wouldn’t you want the left side yoke to be the one that stayed connected and the right side to go limp? Or is there a pin on both sides? Probably is.
I haven’t seen an exploded diagram of the linkages. Was just another idle thought...
Something still doesn’t “ring” right with the rumored story yet. Something critical still feels like it’s missing. Even 18 seconds is long enough to yell “get off the controls NOW, MY AIRPLANE!” Maybe even smack the guy if you can reach him from the left seat...
Official sources dead quiet, rumor mill churning overtime, this one feels like damage control is involved to me. And usually when I get that sense, the reality is shocking and not what the rumor mill said exactly, but even weirder in the end.
If the rumor mill IS correct and this pilot made it all the way to that cockpit with a real sense that high power and nose down was some sort of good idea, I hope the report seriously digs into the training background. Something went severely wrong, training-wise and LOTS of people didn’t notice. That would be very ugly news.
IF this turns out to be one massively inappropriate response by the FO...
There’s been a lot of rah-rah-ing of the article saying foreign carriers have crap training programs...
But somehow both Air France and now these guys...
Flew perfectly good airplanes into water.
There’s a HINT there that our training still has some significant Swiss cheese holes someone can slip through, if a 767 FO has indications of high power settings and pushes the nose DOWN.
Everyone said in @flyingcheesehead ‘s thread about “how do you learn the stuff you don’t experience” that there were too many checks and too many people involved in those checks for someone to make it to the cockpit of a 121 with these sorts of gaping knowledge holes.
I’m just gingerly testing that assertion with a very low voltage cattle prod here. If this dude did what the rumor mill is saying he did... a whole hell of a lot of people missed that he had a MASSIVE knowledge gap in basic airmanship. Pitch, power, performance.
And I’m kinda, not buying it.
....
Okay that said, there’s a lot of info that still needs to come out on this thing. Heck, for all we know the jumpseater hit the ceiling and landed on the FO, pinning him forward. (Just to make up an alternate story nicer to the FO, here. Maybe it doesn’t match info we have. I’m just being alternatively nice after being critical.) The FOs initial mistake could have had consequences we don’t know yet.
I wonder VERY hard if the FO saw... or believed he saw... something that indicated he was slow. Shoving the nose down after making it that far into a commercial aviation gig, just doesn’t make any damn sense to me, really.
AIr France, makes some sense, they had indications they didn’t REALLY understand.
So I have to wonder aloud, what in the world did this pilot see that would indicate a nose down attitude at high power made any sense whatsoever? So much so that he fought the Captain over it to the point of breaking the controls......?
The question itself tells me we really don’t have all of the info.
Okay. Now for the real controversial thought I had today... cockpit video would make all doubt disappear.
I know there’s a LOT of pushback against that concept... but with the right rules MAYBE it wouldn’t be abused by companies... encrypted and only accessible to accident investigators... whatever... it COULD be done... but nobody wants it... for a lot of legitimate reasons...
Just tossing thought hand grenades tonight.
Some of these came to mind while driving today. This accident has held my interest more than many since the beginning... no particular reason. The more than comes out about it, the more totally screwed up it seems.
And no love for cargo pilots, as mentioned before. There’d be all sorts of pressure to release more info if passengers had gone in the drink with these poor souls.
The shear pin thing is interesting to me also, from one tiny engineering point. If you’re going to design in a shear pin, wouldn’t you want the left side yoke to be the one that stayed connected and the right side to go limp? Or is there a pin on both sides? Probably is.
I haven’t seen an exploded diagram of the linkages. Was just another idle thought...
Something still doesn’t “ring” right with the rumored story yet. Something critical still feels like it’s missing. Even 18 seconds is long enough to yell “get off the controls NOW, MY AIRPLANE!” Maybe even smack the guy if you can reach him from the left seat...
Official sources dead quiet, rumor mill churning overtime, this one feels like damage control is involved to me. And usually when I get that sense, the reality is shocking and not what the rumor mill said exactly, but even weirder in the end.
If the rumor mill IS correct and this pilot made it all the way to that cockpit with a real sense that high power and nose down was some sort of good idea, I hope the report seriously digs into the training background. Something went severely wrong, training-wise and LOTS of people didn’t notice. That would be very ugly news.
Kritchlow
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Should have been strapped in...?
Kritchlow
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I have no clue if this accident is what caused it, but at the airline we now do MAJOR stall training. Truly unprecedented. Like full stalls at 30,000 feet. Very radical stuff.
sourdough44
En-Route
I can’t help but ‘think’ this airplane was flyable, regardless of any mechanical or weather event. If it was flyable, why wasn’t it flown to a landing? I don’t care about some approach to stall, a bit slow, or a modest weather event or turbulence.
I don’t buy it was ‘inadvertently’ stalled or ‘accidentally’ screwed up power, controls, or recovery. If the flying was that bad, they shouldn’t be flying a Piper Cherokee. I say ‘they’ because the other crew member would intervene before things got critical. No way someone could be so incompetent in the seat, wasn’t an AF 447 event.
That just leaves me back at the rumors, hard to believe too. Those rumors are enough to get one’s dander up. The final report will come out, shouldn’t be ambiguous.
I don’t buy it was ‘inadvertently’ stalled or ‘accidentally’ screwed up power, controls, or recovery. If the flying was that bad, they shouldn’t be flying a Piper Cherokee. I say ‘they’ because the other crew member would intervene before things got critical. No way someone could be so incompetent in the seat, wasn’t an AF 447 event.
That just leaves me back at the rumors, hard to believe too. Those rumors are enough to get one’s dander up. The final report will come out, shouldn’t be ambiguous.
hindsight2020
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Again, to those who don't "believe" this buffoonery can happen in 121, I offer Colgan 3407. If y'all wanna wait for daddy NTSB to say it in order to allow that 'appeal to authority' placebo to soothe one's brain into accepting the fact we have much less assurances in life when dealing with other human beings, that's cool. We're just opining on the internet. Go read Colgan's NTSB report or watch the hearings while you wait.
Just because it's a 76 doesn't mean s--t on an experience level. People really need to get over the aircraft size fetishism thing in this industry. ACMI is just like the rest of life...a box of chocolates, to pick a euphemism without profanity. And btw, I'm not casting aspersions on ACMI as some sort of "regional repository" equivalent to cargo, though it is very much treated as such. UPS 1354 illustrates that this happens to the "grown ups" in the room as well.
Just because it's a 76 doesn't mean s--t on an experience level. People really need to get over the aircraft size fetishism thing in this industry. ACMI is just like the rest of life...a box of chocolates, to pick a euphemism without profanity. And btw, I'm not casting aspersions on ACMI as some sort of "regional repository" equivalent to cargo, though it is very much treated as such. UPS 1354 illustrates that this happens to the "grown ups" in the room as well.
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jsstevens
In the simulators or in actual aircraft? (Or both?)
luvflyin
Touchdown! Greaser!
I’m having trouble getting my head wrapped around the yoke shear pin thing. Are they literally designed that way, to shear at a certain amount of force? If so, is it because of the possibility of left and right seat fighting each other? Whoever is strongest wins, obviously absurd, but. What is the shear pin thing about? To disable horizontal stabilizer control input by design isn’t passing the logic check with me.
Larry in TN
En-Route
Nobody is immune from poor training and skills. We, and other western countries, have done better than most but we aren't perfect. A big part of our success has been analysing incidents that didn't result in accidents to identify threats and trends then adapting training, systems, and procedures to mitigate those risks. ASAP, FOQA, LOSA, and similar programs, collect the data that, in the past, was never brought to light.
A big problem that we're facing today in the US is one that many eastern and developing countries have been facing for some time and that's the lack of experienced pilots to hire. The US airlines at the top of the industry still have a long list of well qualified applicants but, as you move down the ladder, the airlines are struggling to keep their aircraft staffed.
In 2014 I briefly flew for one of the regional airlines in the AAL system. My new-hire class of 25 lost five pilots to training failures even though they put in a significant effort to give additional training and opportunities. One failed the type ride three times before being released. He eventually went to Mesa and succeeded. He's now flying corporate.
Atlas is having quite a bit of trouble keeping their airplanes staffed. They are in an extended, and very contentious, contract negotiation with a management/labor environment that is not pleasant to work within. Their pay, working conditions, and benefits lag many other airlines even those in their ACMI segment of the industry which isn't know for great pay and benefits. This creates a lot of pressure to get people through training, even when it requires a significant amount of additional training.
Information on the training records and experience of the accident crewmembers will be released in the final NTSB report.
If that scenario proves to be correct, he was likely reacting to the sudden, and unexpected, pitch-up caused by the inadvertent activation of the GA mode and subsequent increase in engine power. If this is what happened, it wasn't a 'huge gap' in his knowledge, it was a lack of situational awareness. i.e. Reach over and pull back the power levers. You don't learn situational awareness from a book. You gain it with experience.
The NTSB will be able to figure out what happened without cockpit video.
I haven't flown the B767 since 2013 so the details are no longer fresh. The reason the controls separate under high force is as a backup for a situation where one of the control columns jam. Some aircraft have handles which allow the pilots to separate the controls. Others, like Boeings, have a system where excessive force separates the columns to allow the non-jammed column to operate the controls.
IIRC, the B767's system has two parallel systems for elevator control. The Captain's control column operates the hydraulic actuator (PCA) for the left elevator (the two elevator panels are separate) and the First Officer's control column operates the PCA for the right elevator. If one column jams, the columns would separate and the other pilot would have control via his respector elevator. In this case, without a jam, the separation would allow one pilot to push up to full nose-down with his elevator while the other pilot pulls up to full nose-up with his.
The preliminary information I've seen indicates that the Captain never verbalized a transfer of control. We'll know for sure when the report is released.
That is as expected, isn't it? The NTSB doesn't conduct its investigations in the public domain.
Tantalum
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San_Diego_Pilot
Cool stuff. You fly an Airbus, right? What kind of events would it take to get it into a stall at 30,000 ft? Is this in response to the Air France crash? I imagine you'd have to be in direct law.. and have a series of other things go dramatically sideways to stall an airliner at cruise altitude.
Skip Miller
Final Approach
@luvflyin Maybe the design is to prevent disabling the aircraft if the (CA or FO, your choice) drops his beer can and it gets jammed in the linkage somehow. Just spitballing here...
denverpilot
Tied Down
Not as much as in the past. The trend today seems to be release early info if the news is good and it’s something “fixable”, less or none if it’s something “not easily fixed”.
Good and bad being relative of course, since it’s a fatal accident.
Trend is also to release more for passenger ops than cargo, but I’ve already mentioned that.
Undoubtedly the influence of professional PR people involved in the overall process and much less direct media access to investigators and such than when I was much younger.
Sluggo63
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midwestpa24
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midwestpa24
It is just the CVR report. The airplane apparently stalled for some reason unknown at this point. Perhaps was depending on the automation and not monitoring?
This is the first thing I thought, though I didn't hear any mention of the sound of a stick shaker, or anything.
hindsight2020
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hindsight2020
You mean like Colgan 3407? Nah that would never happen.... again.
I'm telling ya, the best thing that happened to the industry was they planted 3 souls in Trinity Bay and not 160 on The Woodlands. Otherwise, we'd be in for another doozy. Better lucky than good.
The prelim info months ago didn't indicate the aircraft got slow. It indicated that there were abrupt pitch ups and pitch downs commanded that led to the loss of control. Just because the FO verbalized they were in a stalled condition doesn't mean that's the scenario they were in at all. If anything, it could be evidence of loss of situational awareness on the part of the PF. The FDR will tell the tale, it largely already has as far the industry is concerned, internally.
Sluggo63
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I must have grabbed the wrong link. Try this one:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdmss/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=63168
FYI: Technically the full factual report has not been released yet as shown by this search: https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb....?queryId=d771f7b3-2804-4efa-8ae4-74fca1201fab
A "GROUP CHAIRMAN’S FACTUAL REPORT" are typically specific intermediate reports issued in high profile cases. The 2nd link is to the docket which is opened when an investigation starts but doesn't become public until some form of "factual" report is released. It's not an actual report but supportive data to that report. As mentioned above, once the entire factual is released with the FDR recordings, I think the CVR portion will become more relevant based on my experience. Regardless, it must have been a sad moment to see one's own death.
Fearless Tower
Touchdown! Greaser!
No, the airplane did not stall, but for some reason, it appears that the FO thought it was stalling and pushed the nose down. And then he pretty much froze while the Captain was trying to figure out what the heck was going on.
Fearless Tower
Touchdown! Greaser!
Did you read the FOs training history?You mean like Colgan 3407? Nah that would never happen.... again.
.
This was Colgan 3407 all over again, but without a plane full of paying pax.
Sinistar
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Brad
Interesting (and unfortnately sad) reading the report. It wasn't exactly going smoothly
1836Z - FO reports a PFD failure and transfers controls to the captain
1836:24 - ATC requests a expedited descent to 3000. No reply from the plane so ATC asked them to hustle.
???????? - FO reports potential failure of ADI/HSI, some switch is changed and Captain is talking about getting displays back
1837:18 Captain transfers controls back to FO
??????? Flaps 1, FDR records lateral acceleration fluctations, go around mode engaved and thrust of engines.
1838:37 Speedbrakes retracted to near zero, ATC talks and Captain responds
about a second after that exchange FO makes expression of surprise followed by comment regarding airspeed. Captain then responds to previous ATC request with "OK" - the last recorded ATC communications. The plane was descending through 6000ft
about 3 seconds later FO makes comment regarding stalling
1839:39 ATC loses radar contact at 5800ft
about 16 seconds from the previous Captain's "OK" to ATC the FDR stoppped at airspeed of 433.5kts and the autopilot engaged.
....so display / instrument failures. ATC is trying to get them down quickly. Not sure what that "lateral acceleration" event means? Some kind of attempts to get the display working. And makes me wonder why the autopilot was engaged at the time of the crash even though all the earlier speculation of the pilots fighting to fly the plane.
1836Z - FO reports a PFD failure and transfers controls to the captain
1836:24 - ATC requests a expedited descent to 3000. No reply from the plane so ATC asked them to hustle.
???????? - FO reports potential failure of ADI/HSI, some switch is changed and Captain is talking about getting displays back
1837:18 Captain transfers controls back to FO
??????? Flaps 1, FDR records lateral acceleration fluctations, go around mode engaved and thrust of engines.
1838:37 Speedbrakes retracted to near zero, ATC talks and Captain responds
about a second after that exchange FO makes expression of surprise followed by comment regarding airspeed. Captain then responds to previous ATC request with "OK" - the last recorded ATC communications. The plane was descending through 6000ft
about 3 seconds later FO makes comment regarding stalling
1839:39 ATC loses radar contact at 5800ft
about 16 seconds from the previous Captain's "OK" to ATC the FDR stoppped at airspeed of 433.5kts and the autopilot engaged.
....so display / instrument failures. ATC is trying to get them down quickly. Not sure what that "lateral acceleration" event means? Some kind of attempts to get the display working. And makes me wonder why the autopilot was engaged at the time of the crash even though all the earlier speculation of the pilots fighting to fly the plane.
Sluggo63
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We don’t have it on the 757, so I’m not really familiar with it, but I wonder if CWS (Control Wheel Steering) was engaged.
flyingcheesehead
Touchdown! Greaser!
First, to clarify some links...
Full Docket
Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript
Cockpit Voice Recorder Sound Spectrum Study (mentioned a few times in the transcript, and very interesting IMO)
Flight Data Recorder Specialist's Report - Page 14 of this is the most interesting part of the entire docket.
FO Training History
I'm not sure what "Normal" is for training, but both the captain and FO had required some extra training at times. Captain was relatively new, only about 4 months into his experience as a captain. The previous captain to fly with the FO was interviewed and actually rated the FO as being above average. So, not sure I buy this whole "FO screwed the pooch" thing. Looking at the transcript vs. the FDR, it appears that the captain didn't seem aware of the gravity of the situation, as his last "OK" radio transmission came when they were already 20 degrees pitch down and decreasing, flirting with negative Gs.
Here's what it looks like when you put some of the above puzzle pieces together:
* They started getting knocked around in turbulence at 12:38:26.
* Five seconds later at 12:38:31, the TOGA button was pushed, whether on purpose or inadvertently. (Based on the CVR sound spectrum study.)
* At 12:38:37, pitch hit its max of +5 degrees, but the airplane was barely climbing even at 240 knots.
* The engines were fully spooled up to 110% N1 by 12:38:43, but nobody had said anything about the TOGA or the increase in thrust.
* At 12:48:44, they briefly (and pretty suddenly) hit negative G for the first time, a "sound of mechanical click" was on the CVR, and the control column was briefly yanked back before going forward again. Airspeed exceeds 250 knots.
One second increments now:
* 12:48:45 is the first time anyone vocalizes anything about the situation ("Whoa!" in an elevated voice), and somebody pulled the throttles back.
* 12:48:46 FO: "Where's my speed, my speed" in elevated voice. Pitch is already at -9 degrees and begins decreasing rapidly here.
* 12:48:47 Another, louder, "mechanical click" on the CVR. Captain keys up and says "OK" on the radio in response to ATC advising them of the plan to get them through the weather and turn north for the approach.
* 12:48:48, they went into the negative G range again and the throttles increased back to full power. "Sound similar to multiple random thumping noises." (Cargo shifting, or other items hitting the floor again after going negative G?) FO says "We're stalling!"
* For the next 5 seconds, pitch continues to decrease, from 23 degrees nose down to 40 degrees nose down, engines spool back up, altitude finally starts to drop precipitously (5900 to 4300 in these 5 seconds, with the vertical speed reaching its maximum right at the end), and they're negative G.
* 12:48:53, there's another big bump, going from negative G to a full 1G before dropping negative again and pitch suddenly increases before starting to decrease again. Multiple random thumping noises and "Lord have mercy" on the FO's mic.
* For a couple more seconds, the same sorts of things happen as in the previous five-second interval. Overspeed warning goes off at 12:48:55 at a speed of about 360 knots.
* 12:48:56: Captain says "What's goin' on?" A second later, jumpseater says "What's goin' on?" in an elevated voice. At this point, there's another big bump. The fact that both pilots who aren't flying don't seem to have a clue also gives some idea of the level of confusion happening here, and again makes me think this wasn't a simple case of the first officer screwing the pooch. Nobody seems to have a clue what's happening.
* 12:48:57: Pitch reaches its lowest value of 49 degrees nose down. Control column is pulled back hard and suddenly. Nose starts to come up, thrust levers start to move back at a very smooth rate (I'm guessing it was the autothrottle doing this, it's a rate that's very steady and consistent all the way to the crash), engines start to spool down, g loading goes positive and begins increasing quickly.
* 12:48:59: Jumpseater yells "Pull up!" They already have, they hit 4 Gs at this point. Airspeed is 420 knots and increasing.
* The last four seconds is chaotic on the audio, understandably, but the G load stays up around 4 and the pitch increases quickly. It's at 16 degrees nose down when they hit the water, but descent rate barely changes from its value when they were 49 degrees nose down. Speed at impact is 433 knots.
Looking at what's there, it seems like maybe this was as simple as hitting the weather and getting knocked around, having someone inadvertently knock the TOGA, and getting disoriented by the turbulence and things seemingly starting to change themselves, and just losing awareness and control. Nobody ever actually said "pitch up" or vocalized anything else that was wrong. There's still some things that confuse me, though. Looking forward to the final report.
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hindsight2020
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Are you sure you read through the same docket? Its all there man. I was gonna post it, but go read up on APC for the cliffnotes. @Fearless Tower is correct. It is another colgan 3407, and the FO screwed the pooch. That's why this has been fairly quiet since the prelim. The cat has been out for a while now. Occams razor. If people want to wait for the appeal to authority formalities of the ntsb spoon feeding it to ya, that's fine.
But lets dispense with the platitudes here among fellow SGOTIs: He was both fired or resigned from 3 separate regionals, the last one for failure during CA upgrade. At which point according to Mesa he was placed back in the FO list and resigned for "career growth". He failed training on all 3 regionals and at Atlas, including 2 type rides, one oral, and 2 line checks! Also failed training on his 76 type rating.
They hit the GA button, he panicked and lost control. When he was screaming about stalling he was at 275 kcas. The CA broke through the column pin (25 lbs) trying to pull back against a panicking lock-elbow FO who thought he was stalled. By the time the split elevator input starts matching it apparently requires in excess of 40 lbs, which is where the CA column achieves mechanical advantage. Best the CA could do is impact at 16NL and in excess of 400+ knots calibrated. They were probably aeroelastic at that point; well into hydraulic blanketing or control reversal. He killed them all in a perfectly working airplane.
Atlas is gonna get sued, and they're already on record stating the FO lied on his application by withholding his employment history prior to Mesa (tsa, commutair, and air wisky). two of those didn't make it to a pria as a result, and of course atlas argues they would have not made the job offer upon discovery of that additional training failure history. The whole thing is rotten man, it's time to call a spade a spade. The dead don't care for nor need our meekness.
denverpilot
Tied Down
The FO’s training record is a disaster. Including the fraud committed in the application. He didn’t belong there.
This is what meeting minimum standards gets us. Four different places and more than four instructors write down that they’re concerned, but still passed him. There’s blood on those signatures.
Guy lies and says he only worked two places. Ugh.
But the Captain wasn’t really being a Captain either... nothing recorded of even a hint of “MY CONTROLS!”
We all nearly do this instinctually in every bit of training anybody does ... and nothing here.
The only person communicating at all was the jumpseater who at least said “pull up” before they killed him.
So weird. I haven’t met any long time Captains of transport category sized stuff who weren’t always in a command mentality.
Yeah let the PF fly, but if a trend like that had developed none would have any qualms telling the FO to get the **** off the controls WHILE pulling both the throttles and the yoke back.
Weird. Just weird.
Air France, same thing. Two pilots making completely opposite control inputs and nobody taking about it.
Me pull to the point of breaking a shear pin while you’re pushing and not say anything? Not a chance in hell. I might hurt your damn feelings. Oh well.
I’ve flown with old wise Captains who let me get the airplane right to the edge of safe for a learning experience — but never had one moment of thinking they wouldn’t smack me and the airplane back into submission in a heartbeat if we crossed that line.
Pitch, power, airspeed.
If it’s trimmed it’ll fly. Let it.
Positive exchange of controls always.
Announce dangerous trends out loud.
Etc. All these things we beat into people’s heads. Why do they disappear in these accident cockpits?
This is what meeting minimum standards gets us. Four different places and more than four instructors write down that they’re concerned, but still passed him. There’s blood on those signatures.
Guy lies and says he only worked two places. Ugh.
But the Captain wasn’t really being a Captain either... nothing recorded of even a hint of “MY CONTROLS!”
We all nearly do this instinctually in every bit of training anybody does ... and nothing here.
The only person communicating at all was the jumpseater who at least said “pull up” before they killed him.
So weird. I haven’t met any long time Captains of transport category sized stuff who weren’t always in a command mentality.
Yeah let the PF fly, but if a trend like that had developed none would have any qualms telling the FO to get the **** off the controls WHILE pulling both the throttles and the yoke back.
Weird. Just weird.
Air France, same thing. Two pilots making completely opposite control inputs and nobody taking about it.
Me pull to the point of breaking a shear pin while you’re pushing and not say anything? Not a chance in hell. I might hurt your damn feelings. Oh well.
I’ve flown with old wise Captains who let me get the airplane right to the edge of safe for a learning experience — but never had one moment of thinking they wouldn’t smack me and the airplane back into submission in a heartbeat if we crossed that line.
Pitch, power, airspeed.
If it’s trimmed it’ll fly. Let it.
Positive exchange of controls always.
Announce dangerous trends out loud.
Etc. All these things we beat into people’s heads. Why do they disappear in these accident cockpits?
Rushie
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Could it have been both? They hit a microburst and the FO couldn’t handle it and the captain failed to correct him/it?
I mean he tried but never verbally said “my airplane”. Earlier he says he’s bleeding. Did he get knocked on the head from turbulence? Was he a bit disoriented?
I mean he tried but never verbally said “my airplane”. Earlier he says he’s bleeding. Did he get knocked on the head from turbulence? Was he a bit disoriented?
flyingcheesehead
Touchdown! Greaser!
Not all 2,000-ish pages, no...
What am I missing?
Oh. THAT is what I was missing.
What's still not really clear to me is why/how the GA button was hit. Where is it on the 76? Is it somewhere that the FO would hit it by accident? Is there a second one on the FO's side of the thrust levers?
They certainly weren't stalling when he said that, but there was the exclamation of "Where's my speed?" that leads me to believe that there might be more to it. Was there a failure of the airspeed indication on the FO's side? What is that system like on the 767?
But what I don't get is that the captain never says anything, never announces he's taking control - And the captain's control column didn't move back until they were 49 degrees nose down, so I think his failure to monitor as the PM and PIC is going to be listed as a contributing factor at least.
This. And I hadn't seen any mention of the captain's own training failures in the past as well. It was the captain, not the FO, who had previously been on Atlas' Proficiency Watch Program for "repetitive need for additional training."
So yes, the FO may have indeed screwed the pooch, but that's definitely not the sole reason for the accident.
Tarheelpilot
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Doesn’t fit. It takes two conscious pilots going in opposite directions to shear the interconnect. In my opinion. As much as I hate to say it i think this is pretty clear.
Copilot was PF. He called for flaps, captain reached around the throttle quadrant to extend the flaps and accidentally hot the TOGA button. They were in IMC. Copilot took the sudden acceleration as a pitch up and rammed the yoke forward to the stops. Captain hauled back on his side (no positive exchange of controls) and broke the shear pin. Now they have a split elevator. Never retarded the throttle. By the time they exit IMC at 2,000 feet its too late.
Co-pilot had "separated" from 3 previous carriers, one being Mesa. Failed a half-dozen rides. Lied to Atlas on his application. Read the record of conversations. He was fine as long as everything was as expected, but multiple times in the sim, if something unexpected happened he'd just start pressing buttons and doing random sheet.
Last word on the CVR, before the copilot's unsuccessful prayer anyway, was the jumpseater screaming "pull up".
https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news...1-ntsb-public-docket-opened.html#post10643902
Co-pilot had "separated" from 3 previous carriers, one being Mesa. Failed a half-dozen rides. Lied to Atlas on his application. Read the record of conversations. He was fine as long as everything was as expected, but multiple times in the sim, if something unexpected happened he'd just start pressing buttons and doing random sheet.
Last word on the CVR, before the copilot's unsuccessful prayer anyway, was the jumpseater screaming "pull up".
https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news...1-ntsb-public-docket-opened.html#post10643902
Tantalum
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San_Diego_Pilot
Perhaps the FO mistook the negative Gs for a stall?.. assumed it was the plane falling and was attempting to break the stall?
*Would the outcome have been different in an Airbus? Airbus has envelope and "inappropriate" attitude protection, as well as I believe the ability to just select which stick is priority.. and in the case of opposing commands (without priority pressed) I believe it averages the two? Or would it have been the same as this / Air France
*The deck certainly seems to point to a failure of the FO.. but how was the captain, and the the jumpseater, so far behind the airplane?
..and yes, like someone else said, at least this was just 3 people in a bay, and not 200 in a city
*Would the outcome have been different in an Airbus? Airbus has envelope and "inappropriate" attitude protection, as well as I believe the ability to just select which stick is priority.. and in the case of opposing commands (without priority pressed) I believe it averages the two? Or would it have been the same as this / Air France
*The deck certainly seems to point to a failure of the FO.. but how was the captain, and the the jumpseater, so far behind the airplane?
..and yes, like someone else said, at least this was just 3 people in a bay, and not 200 in a city
falconkidding
Line Up and Wait
Flying for my regional carrier I’ve seen some ****. Not mistakes like missing a radio call or hitting vs instead of flc but full on breakdowns of airmanship from multi year captains. I fully believe these 2 guys wrecked a perfectly airworthy plane luckily they only killed 3 sadly Sean died due to their incompetence.
At only 500 hours in the plane many times I’m sitting there there wondering what the fck this guy is doing. I want to upgrade at 1K, hrs just to escape some of these guys and I at least can tell an FO to sit on his hands.
At only 500 hours in the plane many times I’m sitting there there wondering what the fck this guy is doing. I want to upgrade at 1K, hrs just to escape some of these guys and I at least can tell an FO to sit on his hands.
Rushie
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Wow. If that’s true, that’s a horrible design of the TOGA button.
Is this they? Sorry, no, this is the 777 I think.
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Greg Bockelman
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Yes, that is they. And personally, having many thousands of hours in two different Boeing products, I can’t really figure out how one can accidentally hit the TOGA buttons.
Rushie
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Here’s another pic, kind of different location, supposedly a 767?
(Me having zero hours in the cockpit of a Boeing have no idea.)
