Boeing 737s Grounded

Anything with stabilizer trim is likely to have a jackscrew. That would cover most, if not all, transport jets.
In this case, the jackscrews in both of the accident planes were adjusted to a nose-down attitude position.
 
I thought two of the ASRS reports were from the same flight. One from the pilot, one from the copilot. Also, I don't think you can make a conclusion about the 737 Max unless you do a comparison of the number and nature of ASRS reports involving the 737 Max versus similar types. I wouldn't be surprised if similar ASRS reports are filed every day by pilots flying a wide variety of airline hardware.

Possibly. How many other airplanes have pilots filing reports because the flight automation software is trying to crash the airplane or because there's no documentation for what controls do?
 
Saw this article today.

The Boeing 737 Max crisis goes way beyond software
~Tim Fernholz

"By now, you may well have heard of MCAS, software that automatically pitches 737 Maxes downward to avoid stalling in mid-air. It exists only because Boeing wanted to upgrade its 737 without changing it fundamentally—so it added new engines that made the aircraft more likely to stall, rather than starting from scratch. In the emerging picture of the two accidents, the software only failed because the mechanical sensor it depended on also malfunctioned.

Software is easy to blame, because for many people computer science is a mystery. But these crashes emerged from an experience we’re all familiar with: the pressure to deliver on a tight timetable, the temptation to cut corners, and the hope that in a big, complex world, one little kludge won’t mess up the whole program."
 
Possibly. How many other airplanes have pilots filing reports because the flight automation software is trying to crash the airplane or because there's no documentation for what controls do?
Most. “What’s it doing now?” Is a fairly common cause for ASRS reports.
 
Possibly. How many other airplanes have pilots filing reports because the flight automation software is trying to crash the airplane or because there's no documentation for what controls do?
It's been a while since I reviewed ASRS reports for transports. When did they start attributing causes? If you're going soleley off what the reporter chose to document you also have to include the crew not understanding the documentation and/or training that was provided, in which case the answer is close to "all of them"

Nauga,
glossed over
 
Saw this article today.

The Boeing 737 Max crisis goes way beyond software
~Tim Fernholz

"By now, you may well have heard of MCAS, software that automatically pitches 737 Maxes downward to avoid stalling in mid-air. It exists only because Boeing wanted to upgrade its 737 without changing it fundamentally—so it added new engines that made the aircraft more likely to stall, rather than starting from scratch. In the emerging picture of the two accidents, the software only failed because the mechanical sensor it depended on also malfunctioned.

Software is easy to blame, because for many people computer science is a mystery. But these crashes emerged from an experience we’re all familiar with: the pressure to deliver on a tight timetable, the temptation to cut corners, and the hope that in a big, complex world, one little kludge won’t mess up the whole program."

Can only pray that Microsoft isn’t writing the software. Hahahahahaha


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Saw this article today.

The Boeing 737 Max crisis goes way beyond software
~Tim Fernholz

"By now, you may well have heard of MCAS, software that automatically pitches 737 Maxes downward to avoid stalling in mid-air. It exists only because Boeing wanted to upgrade its 737 without changing it fundamentally—so it added new engines that made the aircraft more likely to stall, rather than starting from scratch. In the emerging picture of the two accidents, the software only failed because the mechanical sensor it depended on also malfunctioned.

Software is easy to blame, because for many people computer science is a mystery. But these crashes emerged from an experience we’re all familiar with: the pressure to deliver on a tight timetable, the temptation to cut corners, and the hope that in a big, complex world, one little kludge won’t mess up the whole program."

Exactly. If only Cessna had started over from scratch when upgrading the C-172 from the straight tail to the swept tail, or when they added the rear window, or when they upgraded it from the Continental to the Lycoming, or...
 
Exactly. If only Cessna had started over from scratch when upgrading the C-172 from the straight tail to the swept tail, or when they added the rear window, or when they upgraded it from the Continental to the Lycoming, or...
It's actually more like Cessna decides to add two more seats to the 152 and calls it a 152. No extra training required. Then makes a 6-seat 152. Next thing you know you have a high-wing, 9-seat turboprop powered C-152.
 
Meh...that's a bit more of a stretch.

Not really, compared to the -100, the MAX has twice the thrust, carries 72% more pax, and has a 77% higher MTOW. Interestingly, wing area has only gone up 40% to carry the extra weight. But hey, at least the fuse diameter hasn't changed...
 
Has any MAX pilot actually even seen a -100 in person, let alone flown one? Are there any still in service?
 
Has any MAX pilot actually even seen a -100 in person, let alone flown one? Are there any still in service?
I've ridden on the 737-200 many times and flew the DC9 with similar technology cockpits and the same Pratt engines (PW JT8D). Does that count?
 
Has any MAX pilot actually even seen a -100 in person, let alone flown one? Are there any still in service?

No, but it goes to show how far the original type has been stretched.
 
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