178 Seconds to live VFR into IFR

Huh? ATC would have told the airliner pilot and assigned a course/altitude deviation. Would apply to any plane talking to ATC.

Not necessarily. There are plenty of areas where radar doesn't cover down low.
 
Not necessarily. There are plenty of areas where radar doesn't cover down low.

Very true. I was just assuming that the poster wasn’t on the deck or in the rocks. Maybe not a great assumption.
 
The video sort of reminds me of the Reefer Madness...
 
..which, it's a catch-22 because if you are prepared to enter IMC (even if not legally) then you probably can extricate yourself just fine. Whereas, if you aren't prepared, then you also will have a terrible time getting out alive

I feel horrible that people had to die in this accident, but this to me should be the single biggest case study of "stupid pilot tricks" - the guy had a capable plane, with ATC guidance, and yet he still got himself out of sorts.. you have to wonder how this can happen

We had a thread about this recently. This one blows my mind. God bless the controllers..
Wow. Just wow.
 
..which, it's a catch-22 because if you are prepared to enter IMC (even if not legally) then you probably can extricate yourself just fine. Whereas, if you aren't prepared, then you also will have a terrible time getting out alive

I feel horrible that people had to die in this accident, but this to me should be the single biggest case study of "stupid pilot tricks" - the guy had a capable plane, with ATC guidance, and yet he still got himself out of sorts.. you have to wonder how this can happen

We had a thread about this recently. This one blows my mind. God bless the controllers..
That’s tough to listen to. Sounds like he just gave up. Hard to imagine he’d be that uncomfortable with “29 hours of IMC” training. Sounds like the technology on board became a distraction as well.
As a controller you would just want to yell at the guy that “your doing this!,” and just stop asking and just tell him what to do. Competent decision making was clearly out the window.

With regards to the “178 sec” vid. Old and dated but I think it’s intent is not to be based on pure fact but to illicit a reaction or response. For that it serves its purpose.
 
To some extent, it will depend on the individual - Some pilots will think they have skills that they really don't - whether it is the ability to fly in real IMC, navigate around a thunderstorm, teach themselves aerobatics in a 172, or hop straight from the 152 into a twin with no additional training. I suspect those wouldn't be impressed with a scare video even if they bothered to watch it. On the other extreme are those that won't leave the ground with ceilings below 3500. They don't need a scare video. Then there is everyone else in between - we can rationalize our way into thinking that we won't end up in IMC - for example: the forecast for the other side of this overcast is good and it's safer to go over than to go under... Or, the clouds don't look THAT low. For those, some honest statistics or information along with recurring training just might make the difference. And, while a scare video / bad statistic might dissuade someone from deliberately penetrating IMC, I doubt that it will do much for someone who is convinced that they have a plan to not get into the IMC in the first place. We do things because we think we are not going to get caught.

There are a lot of VFR pilots who pack it in in IMC (20 fatal in 2015), but there are also those that make it out the other side - what is it that really makes the difference between the two groups? Luck? Panic? Skill level? Combination of those? And, how do you fix it? As you point out, there are two parts - not getting in the mess to begin with, and finding your way out if you do. Perhaps some real information on the thought process that got them into the soup? That would at least be interesting and something to reflect on compared to your own practices.

There are 10 types of people that understand binary - those that do, and those that don't.
Lol going to use that binary joke!!!

I would venture to say a lot of ppl that make it through live confidently on autopilot.
 
You guys fly differently than me. It isn't uncommon to fly clear of clouds and 1 mile vis. That usually means 500-600' AGL. Make the mistake of flying into the soup and the next time you're better prepared for a blind 180* turn back to where you came from. My wife was a nervous flyer until one day we needed to fly to town for supplies. We were on floats and the weather was low. I found the main power line that runs to town and followed it, fully expecting others to be doing the same. I told my wife that I'd watch for traffic and she needed to keep an eye on the power lines to make sure I didn't get too close. We got to town, went shopping, and she said she wanted to go back out. I reminded her of the weather. She said it was fine and she enjoyed participating. I never expected that!

A very wise old bush pilot told me something I've never forgotten. There's nothing wrong with sticking your nose into the weather as long as you have a way out. Don't let the door close behind you and be ready to make a blind 180* turn without hesitation. Good advice.
 
That’s tough to listen to. Sounds like he just gave up. Hard to imagine he’d be that uncomfortable with “29 hours of IMC” training

Not likely, every single time he did an instrument lesson, the whole entire flight was logged as "actual instrument".
 
A very wise old bush pilot told me something I've never forgotten. There's nothing wrong with sticking your nose into the weather as long as you have a way out. Don't let the door close behind you and be ready to make a blind 180* turn without hesitation. Good advice.[/QUOTE]
Good advice, trying to climb through it or fly on and hope to break out as a VFR pilot in solid IFR not such good advice.
 
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I think most (all) the GA "stats" are BS, or just shallow nonsense. The collection is guessestimates, and the numbers usually lack context. . .

Is it dangerious to continue visual flight into IMC? Sure. How dangeruous, no one knows, and the quantified "how dangerous" numbers aren't relevant to individual pilots anyway - it'd be goofy to base your personal risk assesment on any numbers you hear on continued VFR into IMC - how soon you arrive at your personal smoking hole, or upright on a runway, won't be determined by bogus stats. It only matters how prepared you are.

It's like saying 90% of accidents are pilot error. . .duh, yeah, they should be. Else, would you prefer 90% were engine failures? 90% of ten total crashes in a year? Then we don't really have a problem, do we? 90% of 10,000 crashes? Then yeah, something is wrong. Between those extremes is where we are, and the hand wringing over "most crashes are pilot error" sounds like manufactured drama.
 
I think most (all) the GA "stats" are BS, or just shallow nonsense. The collection is guessestimates, and the numbers usually lack context. . .

Is it dangerious to continue visual flight into IMC? Sure. How dangeruous, no one knows, and the quantified "how dangerous" numbers aren't relevant to individual pilots anyway - it'd be goofy to base your personal risk assesment on any numbers you hear on continued VFR into IMC - how soon you arrive at your personal smoking hole, or upright on a runway, won't be determined by bogus stats. It only matters how prepared you are.

It's like saying 90% of accidents are pilot error. . .duh, yeah, they should be. Else, would you prefer 90% were engine failures? 90% of ten total crashes in a year? Then we don't really have a problem, do we? 90% of 10,000 crashes? Then yeah, something is wrong. Between those extremes is where we are, and the hand wringing over "most crashes are pilot error" sounds like manufactured drama.

I tend to agree with your take away. Aviation bites hard, and it bites fast. I think there is a lot of hidden wisdom in that saying. It seems pretty simple on its surface, but there is a lot lurking underneath. It reminds me of this video:


The thing that is scary to me about this video is that for 99% of this flight, everything is perfectly fine. The pilot has done nothing to endanger himself or his passenger, and they're having a great time. But at some point, without even realizing it, and without doing anything that seems significantly different than what he did 30 seconds ago, the pilot puts himself in a position with no escape. Shortly there after, it's all over.
 
The thing that is scary to me about this video is that for 99% of this flight, everything is perfectly fine. The pilot has done nothing to endanger himself or his passenger, and they're having a great time. But at some point, without even realizing it, and without doing anything that seems significantly different than what he did 30 seconds ago, the pilot puts himself in a position with no escape. Shortly there after, it's all over.
Well, for a lot of the time he was flying a bit lower than I would be comfortable doing in mountainous country. I've never come THAT close to treetops except when landing or taking off. But I agree, the suddenness with which things went wrong there is scary, and it's not clear what the heck was happening at the end there, or why he didn't level off and start a climb before initiating that last right turn.
 
The biggest problem I see in that video is that it appears he was trying to out-climb rising terrain. When I took a CAP mountain-flying course, we were taught to never fly UP a canyon. The inference I drew from that is that a pilot needs to make sure to have sufficient altitude to clear the pass BEFORE overflying a canyon.
 
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He had plenty of space to make that turn to the left. He could have circled for altitude over the basin but he turned toward the ridge. He had enough altitude to complete that turn, too. It sure looks like there's plenty of room to reduce the bank and lower the nose, but he didn't. But that has nothing to do with VFR into IMC.
 
Things started looking really scary to me a little after three minutes into the video (which was about three minutes before the crash).
 
What scary about this crash is, they were fairly close to the tree tops when the stall-spin happened. I wonder if the pilot and the pax survived the crash due to the trees and then died a slow and painful death while waiting to be rescued probably fully knowing that they won’t be.
 
I tend to agree with your take away. Aviation bites hard, and it bites fast. I think there is a lot of hidden wisdom in that saying. It seems pretty simple on its surface, but there is a lot lurking underneath. It reminds me of this video:


The thing that is scary to me about this video is that for 99% of this flight, everything is perfectly fine. The pilot has done nothing to endanger himself or his passenger, and they're having a great time. But at some point, without even realizing it, and without doing anything that seems significantly different than what he did 30 seconds ago, the pilot puts himself in a position with no escape. Shortly there after, it's all over.
The silence at the end of the video is deafening. But as low as he was there was no room for error.
 
Ouch. I didn't realize just how high that country was, and assumed that because they weren't above timberline it was probably under 9000 feet or so. The altitude explains a lot, they just didn't have the power to climb out of it. Still, a steep turn was a doomed maneuver borne out of desperation, he should never have let things get that far. Very sad accident.
I wonder if the altitude lead to some hypoxia that clouded judgement??
 
Last time I flew Dads 182, we took off from his home drome, and he said "climb to 10,000, and we'll stay in the valley for some air work" Well 10,000' in the valley, was about 2000' agl.
 
I wonder if the altitude lead to some hypoxia that clouded judgement??

The crash site was approximately 10,200 MSL, so I am guessing they were probably flying around 13,000 at the highest point. I live at 6500 feet and I am good without supplemental oxygen at 13,000. But I haven't done that very often and not for very long when I do. If the pilot was from the local area he probably was pretty used to the altitude as well.

The last voice recording was pretty quick and loud and did not sound as if he was impaired, but who knows?
 
Back to the VFR into IMC, I've seen one or two wrecks on the ntsb that were initiated by high time ATP types. You know, those guys that fly IFR on a daily basis, (with Otto). They were not prepared, apparently, to hand fly a light GA airplane with no Otto.
Then again, 'round these parts, 3sm, and clear of clouds, is considered CAVU during the summer.
That said, I fully understand what can happen when one is unprepared to enter IMC, then it happens. You get quite nervous due to the 178 second rule, and panic tries to set in. But, with a bit of effort one can get through that and climb, or descend, to get out of it. Paying attention to ATIS, and AWOS as you fly along, can be a big help. As can paying attention to those numbers printed in the grid squares on sectional charts. It will help in the descision to climb, or descend. Once in VMC, above, or below, you can make all the turns you want.
 
First of all, flame on, I know I messed up and made a poor decision. Not afraid to admit it and learn from it. I was alone in the airplane, no passengers.

So I went VMC to IMC this weekend. Made a poor decision of trying to push it to an airport under marginal VFR. Got caught in the overcast as sky conditions deteriorated. I wasn't confident that turning around would put me back in VMC, so I elected to climb through it. Climbed straight ahead, no bank, for just over a minute. Popped out and climbed well above the clouds and headed towards an airport with VFR conditions. I was confident in my ability to fly under instruments, but obviously my decision making needs improvement to keep me out of those conditions to begin with. A humbling experience especially after reading some of the reports posted in this thread.

I came close to doing that recently. I was able to land but if it got any lower I would have had to punch up through a small layer.

It occurred to me that being too afraid to do that could limit your safety ADM depending on the situation.
 
I came close to doing that recently. I was able to land but if it got any lower I would have had to punch up through a small layer.

It occurred to me that being too afraid to do that could limit your safety ADM depending on the situation.

Their is something to that, being too afraid will limit your safety and the three hours of instrument training should give you confidence in your ability to do limited exposure to VFR into IFR and get out. Just remember their are things that you can climb into weather wise that give hard core IFR pilots a hard time and as a VFR pilot your chance of surviving it are slim to none.
 
Late to the discussion, but there are a couple of points I’d like to throw on the table: Okay, so maybe the 178 seconds film is a bit like those venereal disease films they showed us in the service - overstating the obvious. And, as a few posters have suggested, flying IFR isn’t all that hard,...IF one has a practical instrument panel to work with, and a little recent practice behind it,...and the weather issue facing the pilot is clear cut, i,e, an obvious way to good visibility. But one of the problems interpreting statistics of this nature is that it’s difficult to really know how or if the ceiling, visibility, darkness or sometimes just a lack of suitable horizon, such as twilight over a large body of water crept up on the pilot to the point when he/she lost control. I know there are a lot of old airplanes with gyro instruments (some powered by venturi-tube) that I sure wouldn’t ever willingly fly in to a cloud.

I fly IFR with hardware that costs millions, and is meant to plow through the worst weather. It’s easy for me, I do it every day, been doing it for 35 years. In addition to having a superb programmable autopilot, (FMC) that will fly through the eye of a needle, I also count on the considerable talent and experience of my First Officer who, as often than not has in excess of15,000hrs flight time. Point is: Take your average light airplane - equipped with “Sears Best!” avionics out into the abyss, and its damn challenging even for a veteran instrument pilot,...Next point: Most lightplane pilots aren’t seasoned ATP rated pilots,...so, least appropriate airplanes, flown by the least experienced pilots, well, some become statistics.

I don’t instruct much anymore, but I would always try to impress upon my students the idea that (most) light airplanes are more like a rowboat than an oceanliner. On a pleasant morning, during slack tide, one could paddle a canoe from Pier 39 to Sausalito. Would be pretty sporty to do the same at max ebb in a 20kt breeze. More to the point, I would try to deliver my students to some insidious weather phenomena wherein a pilot could end up killing themself, and hopefully teach them to avoid such conditions. I don’t think enough is taught about that. Sure, a few hours under the might help, if you do it often but not as much as a little experience with insidious weather and how to avoid it.
 
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