Fatality Crash KHOU looks like a Cirrus

I’ve had many controllers give me wind-wise, the wrong runway for me. If I comply, my C-182 landings can take a lot of runway and just aren’t pretty.

The heavier planes and air carriers aren’t that picky about the favored runway and just prioritize getting on the ground quickly. A 15 knot crosswind component is all my POH allows. Heavier planes do better, I’m sure.

I prefer and almost always ask for the runway the winds favor. Vector me around to what I want is minimizing my risk, as long as it is logical for the traffic.

You are the pilot and are to fly your plane first. Ask for what you think you need from the controller.

If the controller puts his needs first, as is his first priority, make sure he will work with you or you should divert. This mishap pilot deferred to the controller too much for all that low level manuevering & did not ask for vectors to her best runway & did not fly her plane & got killed for it. Many accidents are combinations of wrong events.
 
teejayevans said:
I wonder if the 737s were asked to slow down, they mention a 80k closing speed, so maybe a 160K approach speed, sounds like they weren’t?
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Airliners are at final approach speed by FAF and/or 5 mile final, probably around 145+ for a 737.
 
oilburner said:
The heavier planes and air carriers aren’t that picky about the favored runway and just prioritize getting on the ground quickly. A 15 knot crosswind component is all my POH allows. Heavier planes do better, I’m sure.
.
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Wrong, air carriers are just as “ picky” and most, if not all, have a 10 knot tailwind limitation.

Your POH lists the maximum demonstrated crosswind, and is not a limitation. Whether you use more (greater than 15) is your call but there is no limitation.
 
Thanks for sharing this video. This review really made a big impact on me (no pun intended in any way).

As a relatively new pilot you study and have an initial, but probably partial vs true understanding of the fact WE ARE IN COMMAND.

It was so sad hearing how calm she was on the radio. Being around a Delta and now more frequently thru the Bravo...that damn radio seems to take so much precedence. We want to sound good on the radio (and she did). But at what cost.

I know I would have been so confused and frustrated. As you listen to the audio you are quietly thinking "Just abort, ask for vectors out of the craziness." IIRC, she arrived on a not so short flight eithet so could have been tired to.

I also agree that ladder at the end is sticking in my brain now.

Gosh I hope if I'm in anything like this, my true inner bad ass PIC in me busts out and takes charge. I'll buy the controller drinks afterwards while we fill out our NASA reports.

This woman was so calm, quite impressive. My condolences to her family. Very sad.

And I bet the controllers feel absolutely terrible. Trying to get this little plane down without getting reamed by a higher up for messing up the major airline machine. I notice they didn't find any fault above the controllers? Do the controllers have explicit or implicit directives to give the big planes down first? If it's implicit then there should be even more blame. But it seams that no accident investigation ever faults anyone in a management or regulatory role. It's always down at the bottom: pilot, controller, mechanic.
 
Bizarre how the AOPA video finds fault with the controller for the poorly worded request to turn 30 degrees, saying "the pilot interpreted the incident as her fault." Well, it was her fault. She turned downwind for the wrong runway. A problem the video pretended did not exist.
 
Yup... lots of confusion and contributing factors. I get that.

But you still can’t retract the flaps well below speed.
 
The entire video I was thinking "Just abort and go to KEFD or KLVJ." These airport are close and not as busy as KHOU.
 
Kritchlow said:
Yup... lots of confusion and contributing factors. I get that.

But you still can’t retract the flaps well below speed.
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Well technically.....

But yeah, that’s the bottom line. I found the video really interesting in how her flap retraction speed was given for each go around, and was lower each time.
 
dmspilot said:
Bizarre how the AOPA video finds fault with the controller for the poorly worded request to turn 30 degrees, saying "the pilot interpreted the incident as her fault." Well, it was her fault. She turned downwind for the wrong runway. A problem the video pretended did not exist.
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ACT in Bravo tells you fly heading 30* .... what are you going to do? And she was not corrected for quite a while. ATC hopefully got a lot of lessons learned out of this because they sure as heck played a part.

In any case that kinda knocked her down a notch. She thought she was doing the right thing. And apologized for the confusion which really was on the other end. And as per my initial post, once a pilot is cleared to land ATC should be hands off. Outside of an emergency of course. That controller should not have called a go around in the first place because he screwed up the sequencing.
 
eman1200 said:
In my opinion she never should have gone to KHOU in the first place.
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I get that impulse, but I have flown into Hobby dozens of times, all without issue (except once, but it was Approach, not the tower, that messed me around; it was a bad day for them, a most unusual event with a typically fine facility).

Hobby is hardly a "jets-only" kind of place.
 
SCCutler said:
I get that impulse, but I have flown into Hobby dozens of times, all without issue (except once, but it was Approach, not the tower, that messed me around; it was a bad day for them, a most unusual event with a typically fine facility).

Hobby is hardly a "jets-only" kind of place.
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Yep plenty of people do it successfully, no issues.
 
Don't know if anybody posted this but here is another analysis of the crash. Predates the AOPA release. I'm following it up with the comment I left on the video.


Bad Gyro

Fly8MA, you seem to think that hours in the logbook make one a competent pilot. She was, by no means, a competent pilot. She could not comply with ATC instruction to "keep the speed up" on her first approach, she could not get her speed and altitude right for landing on subsequent attempts, and she repeatedly retracted her flaps too early on each go-around. There is an old saying about having 300 hours of experience or 1 hour of experience 300 times. She flew like she had 75 hours of experience four times. I feel for the friends and family of those lost but this should not have happened and it is not ATC's fault.
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Sinistar said:
As a relatively new pilot you study and have an initial, but probably partial vs true understanding of the fact WE ARE IN COMMAND.
...
As you listen to the audio you are quietly thinking "Just abort, ask for vectors out of the craziness."
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Asking for vectors isn't my idea of being "in command". Telling the tower you want to orbit southeast of the runway until they make space would be more like it.
 
No doubt ATC messed up the sequence but it’s far more efficient to resequence a VFR in the tower pattern than to take an IFR 737 around and find a gap with other IFRs. Unless a controller’s sequence mistake results in a midair or wake turb accident, it’s still all on the pilot. A PIC should be able to do go arounds all day long without spinning their aircraft in. It’s PIC 101 stuff.

The applicant demonstrates the ability to identify, assess and mitigate risks, encompassing:

Delayed recognition of the need for a go-around/rejected landing.

Delayed performance of a go-around at low altitude.

Improper application of power.

Improper airplane configuration.

Collision hazards, to include aircraft, vehicles, vessels, persons, wildlife, terrain, obstacles, and wires.

Low altitude maneuvering including stall, spin, or CFIT.

Distractions, loss of situational awareness, and/or improper task management.

The applicant demonstrates the ability to:

Complete the appropriate checklist.

Make radio calls as appropriate.

Make a timely decision to discontinue the approach to landing.

Apply takeoff power immediately and transition to climb pitch attitude for VX or VY as appropriate +10/-5 knots.
 
For the controller crowd: Is turn 30* and turn hdg 030 very different? I thought headings were supposed to three digits.
 
Ravioli said:
For the controller crowd: Is turn 30* and turn hdg 030 very different? I thought headings were supposed to three digits.
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Yep. One is just a 30* turn while the other is a heading to fly. Yes three digits IF a heading, but not if it’s jusy a turn, like turn left 10*.
 
interesting, now we're comparing AOPA's factual analysis to 'some guy on the internetz opinion who's trying to sell (repeatedly) subscriptions to his videos'. pretty solid connection there.
 
benyflyguy said:
Overall I thought that video was a good review. Listening to the dialogue from atc to pilot she seemed to take everything in stride. Very unfortunate. Perhaps a good take home message is that practicing go arounds seems boring but can be lifesaving. Something I’ve never done is tell ATC “I can’t do that”. Fortunate perhaps but something to think about.
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i consider unable or negative to be my birth right (even when i am not flying ...lol). controllers sometimes like it, sometimes dont, but if i know i cant do something, unable is what i am saying, then if they want to vector me around for 15 mins.. so be it
 
WannFly said:
i consider unable or negative to be my birth right (even when i am not flying ...lol). controllers sometimes like it, sometimes dont, but if i know i cant do something, unable is what i am saying, then if they want to vector me around for 15 mins.. so be it
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I agree, but saying "unable" to a go around instruction can be deadly, I wouldn't recommend it short of engine failure, but in that case the controller should already know, or if they don't, "unable, engine failure, why do you want me to go around?".
 
PaulS said:
I agree, but saying "unable" to a go around instruction can be deadly, I wouldn't recommend it short of engine failure, but in that case the controller should already know, or if they don't, "unable, engine failure, why do you want me to go around?".
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yah i guess i cant say unable go around unless there is an emergency and i have been asked to go around after cleared to land in short final, 200 AGL due to a C-130 trying to eat my tail, it was clearly a spacing thing on the controller part, but i also understand it happens. i was commenting on OP's comment "Something I’ve never done is tell ATC “I can’t do that”". dont accept something you cant do, or never tried.

a few flights back, it was dark, i was coming to land on ILS 36 practice approach VFR, i heard a fedex big iron wants to take off in a hurry on 27 (with tail wind, they seem to like it that way), i was cleared to land, on short final i was asked if i could do a circle to land on 27. i knew it was because they wanted to clear that fedex, i said unable, but gave the option of "i can go around or land short and hold". Tower asked me to land and hold 27.

i have never done a circle to land and i wast going to try that at night.
 
mscard88 said:
Yep. One is just a 30* turn while the other is a heading to fly. Yes three digits IF a heading, but not if it’s jusy a turn, like turn left 10*.
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The recording catches, "turn left heading thirty degrees". It seems like the controller meant (fom his reaction) "turn left thirty degrees" and the pilot thought he meant (from her reaction) "turn left heading zero three zero degrees".
 
woodchucker said:
And apologized for the confusion which really was on the other end.
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Nope. She was told to fly right downwind for 35 and that the controller would call her base. She turned downwind for runway 4 and would have crossed the extended centerline of 35 at an angle while flying away from the runway. The confusion started with her.
 
WannFly said:
.... controllers sometimes like it, sometimes don't...
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I think this is a problem for many pilots, in that they worry that they are making controllers mad. This is something I consider my right, to **** them off! lol

When I was training for my instrument rating earlier this year, I was up with my instructor one day, and we flew to a Class C with a VERY fast talking controller...he was giving instructions ridiculously fast, and (at least from what I could see/hear) he was doing it for no reason. It wasn't busy at all, very little traffic, and long pauses between transmissions (I understand that sometimes these guys are on multiple frequencies with ground, clearance delivery, etc, but I was monitoring two of them, and THOSE were at least dead). When he started talking to me, I couldn't get any of it. I told him "say again, slower please". You could tell it totally ****ed him off, as...n o w... h e...s p o k e...r i d i c u l o u s l y...s l o w. I didn't give a damn at all. In fact, I'm the kind of guy that considered finding out his work schedule, just to do this repeatedly...lol. I remember my instructor giving me kudos, saying how its more important to understand what he was saying, than keeping quiet out of fear to **** him off.

I think the controllers at KHOU could tell she was having a problem, and in trying to help her, they might of made things worse...but I still say fault rests clearly on her...FLY THE DAMN PLANE!
 
tawood said:
I think this is a problem for many pilots, in that they worry that they are making controllers mad. This is something I consider my right, to **** them off! lol

When I was training for my instrument rating earlier this year, I was up with my instructor one day, and we flew to a Class C with a VERY fast talking controller...he was giving instructions ridiculously fast, and (at least from what I could see/hear) he was doing it for no reason. It wasn't busy at all, very little traffic, and long pauses between transmissions (I understand that sometimes these guys are on multiple frequencies with ground, clearance delivery, etc, but I was monitoring two of them, and THOSE were at least dead). When he started talking to me, I couldn't get any of it. I told him "say again, slower please". You could tell it totally ****ed him off, as...n o w... h e...s p o k e...r i d i c u l o u s l y...s l o w. I didn't give a damn at all. In fact, I'm the kind of guy that considered finding out his work schedule, just to do this repeatedly...lol. I remember my instructor giving me kudos, saying how its more important to understand what he was saying, than keeping quiet out of fear to **** him off.

I think the controllers at KHOU could tell she was having a problem, and in trying to help her, they might of made things worse...but I still say fault rests clearly on her...FLY THE DAMN PLANE!
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reminds me of controllers at grand forks, cant blame em.. there are like 25 students in the air at any given point of time , doing whatever the heck they want
 
Matthew said:
The recording catches, "turn left heading thirty degrees". It seems like the controller meant (fom his reaction) "turn left thirty degrees" and the pilot thought he meant (from her reaction) "turn left heading zero three zero degrees".
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The use of the word "heading" is, for me, an unambiguous instruction to fly a heading.

This crash is a tragedy and it's right in that "few hundred hours in the logbook, let's take on some challenges" phase where a lot of pilots get into trouble. There is a lot that we can learn from this pilot's mistakes. I am certain that ATC has learned a lot from the controllers' mistakes, as well. Ultimately, though, it's on us. We need to (1) promptly recognize task saturation, (2) always be willing to answer awkward questions on the ground rather than be the subject of an NTSB report asking questions that we aren't around to answer, and (3) always remember the mantra "aviate, navigate, communicate."

The pilot's mistakes, such as the lower flap retraction speed on each go-around, are also a lesson, but they are the smaller lesson here. If you are falling into the pit of being task saturated and try to put anything ahead of 'aviate' in your list of priorities, you are going to make mistakes and some of them can be fatal, especially as you fall deeper into the pit.
 
Ravioli said:
For the controller crowd: Is turn 30* and turn hdg 030 very different? I thought headings were supposed to three digits.
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We can get a bit pedantic at times, but this is yet another case where imprecise language may have contributed to 3 deaths.

“Turn 30° left” is clear. Throw the word “heading” into it, and it can be misinterpreted.

That did not cause the accident, but it was certainly a factor.
 
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iamtheari said:
The use of the word "heading" is, for me, an unambiguous instruction to fly a heading.

This crash is a tragedy and it's right in that "few hundred hours in the logbook, let's take on some challenges" phase where a lot of pilots get into trouble. There is a lot that we can learn from this pilot's mistakes. I am certain that ATC has learned a lot from the controllers' mistakes, as well. Ultimately, though, it's on us. We need to (1) promptly recognize task saturation, (2) always be willing to answer awkward questions on the ground rather than be the subject of an NTSB report asking questions that we aren't around to answer, and (3) always remember the mantra "aviate, navigate, communicate."

The pilot's mistakes, such as the lower flap retraction speed on each go-around, are also a lesson, but they are the smaller lesson here. If you are falling into the pit of being task saturated and try to put anything ahead of 'aviate' in your list of priorities, you are going to make mistakes and some of them can be fatal, especially as you fall deeper into the pit.
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FastEddieB said:
We can get a bit pedantic at times, but this is yet another case where imprecise language may have contributed to 3, deaths.

“Turn 30° left” is clear. Throw the word “heading” into it, and it can be misinterpreted.

That did not cause the accident, but it was certainly a factor.
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The task saturation element is a good point. That's why "fly the plane" has to be rule #1. Once our brains start racing to try to figure out what's going on, we can lose track of what's really happening. Trying to stay ahead, or catch up, can lead to inadvertently skipping a step and that step might be flying the airplane.
 
Matthew said:
The task saturation element is a good point. That's why "fly the plane" has to be rule #1. Once our brains start racing to try to figure out what's going on, we can lose track of what's really happening. Trying to stay ahead, or catch up, can lead to inadvertently skipping a step and that step might be flying the airplane.
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The other thing to note is that our brain's ability to juggle tasks is both limited and variable, affected by many factors. Fatigue and hypoxia are two good examples of factors that reduce our capacity to manage multiple tasks. It's why climbing through a cloud layer for 10 minutes and flying a 4-hour cross-country entirely in the clouds have different risk levels. And it's why this pilot's flying degraded the longer she was dealing with Hobby tower. Task saturation is also insidious, sneaking up on us. The longer we try to juggle multiple tasks, the harder it is to recognize that we are no longer able to manage all of them.

I wish I could sit here and say that I'm an expert at recognizing task saturation, but the truth is that I don't have that kind of confidence in that ability and I don't think anyone else can rightly claim that he can do much better. Unlike a fuel gauge or AOA indicator, there isn't a read-out of how close we are to running out of capacity for task management. My only answer is to burn "aviate, navigate, communicate" so hard into my brain that, if I get hit in the head and go into a coma for 30 years, my first thought when I wake up is "AVIATE!" It should be as much of an unconscious reaction as breathing, if not more so.
 
The video states that she was retracting flaps at 62 knots while in a turn...so it would seem that she was ignoring the stall warning too...from the SR20 manual:

The warning sounds at approximately 5 knots above stall with full flaps and power off in wings level flight and at slightly greater margins in turning and accelerated flight.
 
Indeed, the stall speed was 60 to 62 KIAS with full flaps. No time for a power reduction either.
 
WannFly said:
yah i guess i cant say unable go around unless there is an emergency and i have been asked to go around after cleared to land in short final, 200 AGL due to a C-130 trying to eat my tail, it was clearly a spacing thing on the controller part, but i also understand it happens. i was commenting on OP's comment "Something I’ve never done is tell ATC “I can’t do that”". dont accept something you cant do, or never tried.

a few flights back, it was dark, i was coming to land on ILS 36 practice approach VFR, i heard a fedex big iron wants to take off in a hurry on 27 (with tail wind, they seem to like it that way), i was cleared to land, on short final i was asked if i could do a circle to land on 27. i knew it was because they wanted to clear that fedex, i said unable, but gave the option of "i can go around or land short and hold". Tower asked me to land and hold 27.

i have never done a circle to land and i wast going to try that at night.
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We just have no way of knowing why the controller is telling us to go around, we can't confuse hindsight with what we experience in flight. Even if you know the big plane is chewing up separation behind you that may not be the reason for being told to go. If it's really bugging you, you can ask on the go, once you are sure it's under control, why you were asked to go. If it was for the guy behind you, then call them up and ***** if you feel it necessary.

In your example with the fed ex jet what you did was perfectly reasonable. The Fed Ex jet probably had a void time they had to be off by for their IFR plan, but you made a great accommodation.

The field I'm flying out of now, the norm is for VFR piston planes to stay off to the side of the taxi way during runup and when ready to go to allow larger IFR traffic to get by and leave if they need to, again, to accommodate void times.
 
SCCutler said:
I get that impulse, but I have flown into Hobby dozens of times, all without issue (except once, but it was Approach, not the tower, that messed me around; it was a bad day for them, a most unusual event with a typically fine facility).

Hobby is hardly a "jets-only" kind of place.
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You probably have a lot more experience that the pilot in this accident.

I've been flying 8 years now and still have no problem leaving the airport area if things are getting too busy for me. Leave the area, fly around for a few minutes and get your head together then come back and try again.
 
I may have posted this upthread, but one contributing factor was this pilot’s inability to get down when high on the approach. It was a link that may have gotten her safely on the ground and broken the chain of events before things turned tragic.

Makes me wonder...

1) Was the power pulled all the way back to idle?

2) Did she deploy full flaps?

3) Was she trained to use aggressive slipping to get down as a routine technique?

Questions 1 and 2 are because I’ve seen students struggle to get down, while still having some power in or less than full flaps. SOP for Cirrus training is full flaps on base. Though with all the maneuvering she often did not have a well-defined base, the idea is to get full flaps down early.

Question 3 is because I’ve seen lots of pilots who do not slip routinely, and seem spooked by the concept. It’s a skill every instructor should instill in his or her students, and a skill every pilot should practice and maintain. And a Cirrus slips very well.
 
Ravioli said:
For the controller crowd: Is turn 30* and turn hdg 030 very different? I thought headings were supposed to three digits.
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Yup. Heading to fly is individual digits. Amount of turn is group form. Zero three zero vs thirty. In heading to fly, the number comes last. In amount of turn the number comes before the direction of turn.

a. Vector aircraft by specifying:
1. Direction of turn, if appropriate, and
magnetic heading to be flown, or
PHRASEOLOGY−
TURN LEFT/RIGHT HEADING (degrees).
FLY HEADING (degrees).
FLY PRESENT HEADING.
DEPART (fix) HEADING (degrees).
2. The number of degrees, in group form, to turn and the direction of turn
PHRASEOLOGY−
TURN (number of degrees) DEGREES LEFT/RIGHT.
 
oilburner said:
my C-182

A 15 knot crosswind component is all my POH allows.
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That is not a limitation, it's a "demonstrated" number that has to be done for certification. It's a certain percentage of the stall speed, and they have to demonstrate capability to land in a crosswind of that magnitude. They don't publish anything higher than they have to so they don't get sued when someone tries something worse and screws it up.

I've landed a 182 in a 25G35 direct crosswind. Still had plenty of rudder left, I bet a 182 could be landed in a 45-50 knot crosswind if the gust factor wasn't too ridiculous and there weren't too many up and downdrafts associated with it (unlikely).

eman1200 said:
In my opinion she never should have gone to KHOU in the first place.
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Why not?
 
flyingcheesehead said:
...Why not?
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I don't want the thread to go off in this direction again but I've always stated I don't like the idea of flying GA into a busy class B. that's just my opinion, don't need to debate it, I know plenty of people do it successfully. I just prefer to stay out of big iron's way, that's all.
 
eman1200 said:
I don't want the thread to go off in this direction again but I've always stated I don't like the idea of flying GA into a busy class B. that's just my opinion, don't need to debate it, I know plenty of people do it successfully. I just prefer to stay out of big iron's way, that's all.
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I would agree...at the very least, you should find a flight into a busy C to be run-of-the-mill before heading into a B.
 
tawood said:
I would agree...at the very least, you should find a flight into a very busy C to be run-of-the-mill before heading into a B.
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So I'm training for my Instrument Rating. One thing my instructor has been drilling into my head from the beginning is that you need to be ahead of the airplane at all times. If your situation or ATC instructions cause you to fall behind the aircraft, ask for a delaying vector, get yourself some time to get back ahead of the aircraft. It's a good lesson to learn, and you are a blip on the radar screen to ATC, they don't care.
 
FastEddieB said:
I may have posted this upthread, but one contributing factor was this pilot’s inability to get down when high on the approach. It was a link that may have gotten her safely on the ground and broken the chain of events before things turned tragic.

Makes me wonder...

1) Was the power pulled all the way back to idle?

2) Did she deploy full flaps?

3) Was she trained to use aggressive slipping to get down as a routine technique?

Questions 1 and 2 are because I’ve seen students struggle to get down, while still having some power in or less than full flaps. SOP for Cirrus training is full flaps on base. Though with all the maneuvering she often did not have a well-defined base, the idea is to get full flaps down early.

Question 3 is because I’ve seen lots of pilots who do not slip routinely, and seem spooked by the concept. It’s a skill every instructor should instill in his or her students, and a skill every pilot should practice and maintain. And a Cirrus slips very well.
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She actually had a bit of a tailwind so slips wouldn’t helped that much. She couldn’t side step to the runway from 2 miles away. She reduced power on the climb out and was slower with each approach. She was lacking in stick and rudder skills required to do a non standard approach. I don’t think she needed to slip the plane, just control it.
Remember she had 2 passengers, was seeing a sick or dying relative so her concentration may have been lacking.
 
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