5 related adults dead in Cessna 340 crash

I thought the alternative takeoff minimums were applicable to 91 ops but Velocity's post above indicates that they are only advisory in nature. Not once did my CFI during IFR training or the DPE during my check ride mention that and I spent a decent amount of time on ODPs with both.
My CFII was more like "You can do a 0/0 takeoff. Here. Let me show you how dumb they are." *proceeds to scare the crap out of me*

Come to think of it, this is the same guy who demo'd a slip on my first night landing with no warning by grabbing the controls and screaming "SLIP!!!" at the top of his lungs while going immediately full deflection.

Amazing I ever finished!
 
I've always noticed how when tragedies happen people have a tendency to want to blame a person, with the implication that a bad decision that lead to the tragedy makes someone a bad person. That's an attitude that has always bugged me, certainly nobody who knew the outcome of what they were doing was going to be a plane crash would have chosen to proceed. Whatever happened here I think there can be little doubt that this pilot taxied out and pushed his throttles forward with an expectation of making it safely to his destination. We know that didn't work out and we have a good theory of why that might have been but as others have pointed out the NTSB hasn't been out yet- it could still turn out to be mechanical failure or something.

Questioning a decision is something we ought to be doing. Questioning why that decision was made was another thing we ought to be doing. Looking at the pilot's experience, condition, ratings, etc are also completely valid things that we should be doing. This is the useful stuff, this is how we learn what causes problems. This is how we get good statistics and improve safety. We need to do it.

What is not useful is attacking the pilot's character. Attacking the choice is fair game but not the person. I think that, if anything, undermines safety because it puts us into a mindset of "well I'm no dummy, I wouldn't do this". Maybe you wouldn't, maybe I wouldn't. However, I bet every one of us has or will do something that, in hindsight, was probably a really bad idea. It is in our best interest to look at pilots in these sorts of incidents not as irresponsible yahoos but as one of us who made a poor choice and ran out of luck.

tl;dr I am interested in these things to learn something not condemn anyone.

:yeahthat:

Yep. It's amazing the people here are soo quick to call somebody a "idiot" for a legal operation if IFR current and equipped. I agree with others that my personal mins wouldn't allow me to takeoff but other may. And depending on their equipment, experience, and a host of other factors they may do it safely. We don't know what happened here yet so the Sherriff and the people here throwing mud on the pilot are dead wrong.

Lets see what the facts are before judging somebody. And even then, lets judge the pilot's decision making, not the overall mental ability of the dead man/woman. For now, lets mourn the tragic loss of 5 people so close to Christmas.
 
It's his job James. We know you have little respect for law enforcement, so really man, enough of the insults. You only make yourself look foolish.
Well, the Sheriff just placed the blame for the deaths of five people on the pilot's "poor judgement" without having a single fact other than less than optimal weather and the opinion of his (unnamed) "chief pilot", whose qualifications have not been disclosed.
 
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As an aviation accident investigator, the Sheriff of Polkingham is a great Criminal Justice major.
 
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There is an awfully big difference between choosing to or having no choice but to shoot an approach in very poor conditions, but this guy was safe on the ground. He didn't have to go, he wanted to go. Most likely, his ego couldn't let him not launch.

We have a guy at my field like that. On the day I got my instrument rating he said to me "now you don't need to worry about weather anymore". I imagine I'll see him in an NTSB report someday. I don't care if someone wants to go kill themselves, but when they take passengers who have put their trust in them, it just makes me angry.
 
Well, the Sheriff just placed the blame for the deaths of five people, including himself, on the pilot's "poor judgement" without having a single fact other than less than optimal weather and the opinion of his (unnamed) "chief pilot", whose qualifications have not been disclosed.

I see your point. But that may end up being the cause or a factor. We will wait and see.
 
I thought the alternative takeoff minimums were applicable to 91 ops but Velocity's post above indicates that they are only advisory in nature. Not once did my CFI during IFR training or the DPE during my check ride mention that and I spent a decent amount of time on ODPs with both.

91.175 (F). Take off mins whether standard or non standard is a commercial requirement. Doesn’t mention military but the Army has standard mins and must comply with non standard as well.
 
I don't care if someone wants to go kill themselves, but when they take passengers who have put their trust in them, it just makes me angry.
Yep, and it's tough because every aviation accident gets a ton of media attention, which doesn't do any favors for GA.. unfortunately, I feel like the typical cause is usually something along the lines of "pilot's failure to X" and X is usually something very obvious like VFR guy not flying into IMC, or continuing into worsening conditions, or fuel exhaustion, etc.
 
Fact is, as was mentioned, it was a LEGAL pt91 flight and no one yet knows what caused the crash, spoiler alert, it might not have even had anything to do with the weather, we just don't know yet.

Maybe I missed it, but it took nearly two full pages of threads for someone, a pilot, to make that statement.

We don't know what caused the crash, or if weather was a factor. Seems everyone is ready to take the sheriff's summary judgement as fact.

Ridiculous, honestly, for that commentary to be made fresh after the crash. It was unprofessional, at best.
 
We're in the process -- albeit slowly -- of moving past old thinking about automatically assuming pilots who made mistakes were bad pilots, or that bad decisions were obvious in advance just as they were in retrospect. As an industry, we have started to move forward towards finding the systemic errors in our training and our culture and focus on those elements instead of just shaking our heads and blaming a guy for his bad day. The most dangerous assumption is that the accident pilot was weak, and that you are somehow strong because of your advanced ADM/RM skills. The safe assumption is that it absolutely can happen to you, and that the pilot deserves our sympathy.

If you haven't read it yet, this article deserves careful review and consideration. In my role on my company's safety committee we have reviewed and passed this around a few times. It's time to be a little more modern and productive with our post-accident thinking and review... blaming a pilot for being stupid is, well, stupid.

http://www.flightsafetyaustralia.com/2017/05/the-myths-of-pilot-error/

There are times airmanship is egregiously bad and there is simply no other excuse. AF 447 and Colgan 3407 are two relatively recent examples of that, although in both cases the safety culture also played a role in creating a crew scenario which featured such terrible professional work.

But those tend to be the exception, and we can still individually learn from what went wrong, beyond "That was dumb; I won't ever do that."

Sad day. Lots to learn.
 
Well, the Sheriff just placed the blame for the deaths of five people, including himself, on the pilot's "poor judgement" without having a single fact other than less than optimal weather and the opinion of his (unnamed) "chief pilot", whose qualifications have not been disclosed.

The majority of public sector flying in support of law enforcement is done strictly in good VFR conditions. One of my best friends is the former sector commander for a Sheriff's Dept. aviation unit; the rotorwing pilots all flew VFR, all the time. I imagine that from the sheriff's view (probably via his pilot) that the weather was unflyable. But, better chance it's simply a regime of aviation with which he (and his pilot) are unfamiliar.
 
Flown properly by a current and proficient pilot, this flight would have been legal, normal and routine. (I have flown many like that, with only 50% of the engines this guy had at the start). We barely know anything about this particular flight. Was the pilot current and proficient for this type of flight? How many similar flights in hard IFR/IMC, including near zero-zero takeoff, has he had recently? Did he defer or ignore any maintenance? Was he in good health, and feeling OK? Was he on any medications or drugs?
It's been said many times that if you want to be safe in aviation, stay on the ground.
Safety is a trade-off between risk and reward, or as the current Flying article puts it, "safety is affordability". If you are meticulous about your health, maintenance and recent flying skills for the required flight conditions, and make a careful judgment of risk and reward, you should be fine. If you cut corners on any of the above, you are an accident in the making. This is true for all aspects of aviation.
Making snap judgments about others before knowing the details, or without having the background and experience to weigh the facts, is futile.
 
The most dangerous assumption is that the accident pilot was weak, and that you are somehow strong because of your advanced ADM/RM skills. The safe assumption is that it absolutely can happen to you, and that the pilot deserves our sympathy.

You don’t seem very familiar with ADM. “Hazardous attitudes” is specifically addressed, one of which is invulnerability. I think it is equally an erroneous attitude to assume that those who follow and apply the FAA’s recommended methods are necessarily violating them. It certainly can happen to any of us , and that is why I believe in the importance of teaching ADM. The pilot and his family most definitely have my sympathy.
 
You don’t seem very familiar with ADM. “Hazardous attitudes” is specifically addressed, one of which is invulnerability. I think it is equally an erroneous attitude to assume that those who follow and apply the FAA’s recommended methods are necessarily violating them. It certainly can happen to any of us , and that is why I believe in the importance of teaching ADM. The pilot and his family most definitely have my sympathy.

But was invulnerability a factor in this accident? We have nothing to go on but a wrecked aircraft in low visibility.
 
I’ll tell two things that happened to me about 20 years ago. First was a very low visibility takeoff, plenty of fog, we had to taxi slowly out to the runway! I had a microphone problem when we called for a clearance and that was a distraction, using the hand mic for the first time in a long time! But, it shouldn’t have been a tough takeoff, it was a 500 foot layer, in a 441, I’d be on top in less than a minute after rotation. The FBO fueled the airplane incorrectly, putting 80 gallons in the left side and 8 in the right side! Holy mother of fuel imbalance on lift off!! Quickly retrimmed and started cross feed, but I let the distraction of the hand mic cause me to skip checking the fuel quantity indicator! Hasn’t happened since!
The other one was a couple years early in a 414A, took off and got in the soup at about 500 feet and I got the leans, I kept thinking we were turning, when the gauges said we weren’t. I turned it over to the autopilot for a few minutes and I was fine. Either one of these things could have ended badly, as pilots we live and learn from our mistakes as well as others. RIP to those involved.
 
Part I really don’t get is the why. Latest news said they were just going to Key West to have lunch and then back to Bartow. I’ve done a few zero-zero departures. When I did, my decision was very calculated. Very thought through. Not a casual thing. I can’t imagine taking that risk to grab lunch.
 
You don’t seem very familiar with ADM.

No? IATA OSA certified, IEP inspector, FOQA analysis team, in charge of Safety Promotion for a large pt. 91 large cabin int'l and domestic business aviation operation... assigned to conduct Remedial Training events by my FSDO's FPM for pilots who have been deemed to have had serious lapses of judgement... and have given safety seminars for the TEB FSDO on ADM... but gee, what do I know... maybe you are right.

“Hazardous attitudes” is specifically addressed, one of which is invulnerability.

At this time we have no information about this pilot's attitude or decision-making abilities. To blame him for a hazardous attitude in light of this dearth of information is highly suspect.
 
Maybe I missed it, but it took nearly two full pages of threads for someone, a pilot, to make that statement.

Yeah you missed it. I explained a few posts ago Pt 91 vs 135/121 difference.
 
But was invulnerability a factor in this accident? We have nothing to go on but a wrecked aircraft in low visibility.
I don’t know, but that’s not what I was referring to. He insinuated that people who are questioning this pilot’s decision to launch are telling themselves that this could never happen to them because they are too smart for that. My point is that ADM addresses this attitude.
 
No? IATA OSA certified, IEP inspector, FOQA analysis team, in charge of Safety Promotion for a large pt. 91 large cabin int'l and domestic business aviation operation... assigned to conduct Remedial Training events by my FSDO's FPM for pilots who have been deemed to have had serious lapses of judgement... and have given safety seminars for the TEB FSDO on ADM... but gee, what do I know... maybe you are right.
So you are familiar with it, you just assumed that anyone who questions this pilot’s decision to launch isn’t.
 
At this time we have no information about this pilot's attitude or decision-making abilities. To blame him for a hazardous attitude in light of this dearth of information is highly suspect.
That was directed at your comment, not the pilot that died. I don’t know what played into his decision making or what his attitude was. I only know that he attempted to launch into very challenging conditions that were temporary, and he is no longer alive.
 
Our medevac crews with two experienced pilots don't do below minimum takeoffs on their part 91 positioning flights. What was so urgent in Key West that it required a procedure deemed too risky for commercial and airline operations ?
 
I don't take my pax's trust for granted. Very sad and my condolences for those who had misplaced faith in their pilot to make good decisions and keep them safe.

Legal doesn't make it safe.

No 0/0 departures for me. My departure airport has to be at or above landing minimums. I do fly at night, but change my routes a little to allow for options and, I can usually see better at night than in 0/0 fog.
 
With all due respect to the dearly departed, I'm in the camp of "the pilot was stupid". Legal vs safe" is the same thing as "current vs "proficient". IMHO, any takeoff into conditions that are so poor that you could not turn around and land is a foolish and unnecessary risk. (Unless of course NOT taking off would be equally risky, which is hard to imagine.) Doing so with passengers aboard is not only stupid, but it's also irresponsible. There is an awfully big difference between choosing to or having no choice but to shoot an approach in very poor conditions, but this guy was safe on the ground. He didn't have to go, he wanted to go. Most likely, his ego couldn't let him not launch.

Personally, I've never understood why 0/0 takeoffs are legal for Part 91 ops. Can someone explain the FAAs logic about this to me?

Here we go again name calling !! Let the facts get out before you call someone stupid. As someone said it may not even be related to weather. There are acceptable and unacceptable risks and he took one based on his assessment of overall situation. The GA is inherently risky and risk starts as soon as you turn motor on. There are many 0/0 TO done everyday but you do not hear about it because they are doing it safely. The only thing I can think of is one should raise their bar for what is acceptable risk if trusting passengers are aboard.
 
When I did a 0-0 simulated takeoff in training, I used instruments only right from the start, I remember telling my instructor “this seems like a stupid thing to do”.
Exactly same here, when I tried this using the DG for takeoff - found it difficult to stay within runway bounds - told my CFII I would never attempt such takeoff for real, but if this guy had some visibility - say 1000 ft (< 1/4 m)- I (probably) would have no problem taking off if IFR current and having full confidence in the airplane.

I've never understood why 0/0 takeoffs are legal for Part 91 ops. Can someone explain the FAAs logic about this to me?
Perhaps it is there to let pilots make their own decisions about safety. Like for example flying over mountains at night in a single engine airplane, for some it is unthinkable , others do it routinely.
 
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Assuming the pilot had enough visibility to stay on the runway until rotation; and assuming the pilot was trained, experienced and current in low IFR conditions; this departure does not sound unreasonable in a 340. If he had a flight director with GA (go around) pitch indication and set it up properly before rolling, one could actually say the departure was easy. Pilots should all have personal minimums based on many factors. I totally encourage that, and hope I always carefully evaluate all aspects of my intended departure and make an informed, safe decision before I push the throttles forward. We do not know enough about this tragic loss at this time to make a judgement about the pilot.
 
I don’t know, but that’s not what I was referring to. He insinuated that people who are questioning this pilot’s decision to launch are telling themselves that this could never happen to them because they are too smart for that. My point is that ADM addresses this attitude.

No, that was not said or insinuated by me. My ire was very clearly aimed at judgement of the pilot for his decision to depart in these conditions. (Some folks here have already decided they blame this pilot and only feel for his passengers, for crying out loud!) But these conditions are not necessarily beyond the capability of the pilot or equipment. After the accident investigation has concluded, it may well be proven that the pilot was in over his head, but on the face of it, at this moment, we do not know.

The decision to "go" may have been well within the pilot's acceptable risk profile. That sort of departure happens all the time in very similar aircraft out of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard. That's the aspect of risk management you apparently seem to be rather weak in, yourself. Risk is variable for every pilot, and the equipment plays a role as well. One's criteria are not necessarily the accident pilot's, and that difference does not define a superior form of ADM on the one who is armchair quarterbacking, vs. the one who is dead. Hopefully this makes my position a little clearer to you.
 
Assuming the pilot had enough visibility to stay on the runway until rotation; and assuming the pilot was trained, experienced and current in low IFR conditions; this departure does not sound unreasonable in a 340. If he had a flight director with GA (go around) pitch indication and set it up properly before rolling, one could actually say the departure was easy. Pilots should all have personal minimums based on many factors. I totally encourage that, and hope I always carefully evaluate all aspects of my intended departure and make an informed, safe decision before I push the throttles forward. We do not know enough about this tragic loss at this time to make a judgement about the pilot.

Well-stated; thank you.
 
I only know that he attempted to launch into very challenging conditions that were temporary, and he is no longer alive.

How do you know they were challenging?

Are you saying, in other words, that they would be challenging for you? Or challenging for you in the equipment you normally fly?

Those are not challenging conditions for me, or the equipment I fly. Would my decision to launch with a safe outcome pre-dispose you to judge me?
 
How do you know they were challenging?

Are you saying, in other words, that they would be challenging for you? Or challenging for you in the equipment you normally fly?

Those are not challenging conditions for me, or the equipment I fly. Would my decision to launch with a safe outcome pre-dispose you to judge me?
Yea I wouldn’t launch in those conditions in a piston twin or single. If I’m in my work jet, it’d be no issue.
 
No, that was not said or insinuated by me. My ire was very clearly aimed at judgement of the pilot for his decision to depart in these conditions. (Some folks here have already decided they blame this pilot and only feel for his passengers, for crying out loud!) But these conditions are not necessarily beyond the capability of the pilot or equipment. After the accident investigation has concluded, it may well be proven that the pilot was in over his head, but on the face of it, at this moment, we do not know.



The decision to "go" may have been well within the pilot's acceptable risk profile. That sort of departure happens all the time in very similar aircraft out of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard. That's the aspect of risk management you apparently seem to be rather weak in, yourself. Risk is variable for every pilot, and the equipment plays a role as well. One's criteria are not necessarily the accident pilot's, and that difference does not define a superior form of ADM on the one who is armchair quarterbacking, vs. the one who is dead. Hopefully this makes my position a little clearer to you.
I probably read too much into your initial comment. I wasn't considering the other comments posted when I responded, only those I posted. Since you didn't quote me, it was probably unfair to assume you were responding to my post. I apologize for the confusion. Reading back through it, we agree on the larger issue. But there are other things at play in the conversation that have been assumed or unaddressed where I disagree with you. I will specify those in the future so as not to muddy up the discussion.

Also, I don't consider myself weak in ADM although I'm sure I have some blindspots like everyone else. But there are things we do know about this flight and I think its fair to comment on them based on our own experiences.
 
Yea I wouldn’t launch in those conditions in a piston twin or single. If I’m in my work jet, it’d be no issue.
I know (or have heard of) many airline pilots who refuse to fly IMC in any single engine piston. Since this is the main environment I fly in, we are clearly on opposite ends of the spectrum. Are they right? If being 100% safe = "right", then sure, but that's not practical.
Still, there are many accidents in jets and/or turbine engines, so clearly the type of engine is only one factor of many. The bottom line is that, flown with proper experience, currency, proficiency, maintenance, pilot health and judgment, all legal modes of modern aviation can be fairly safe. I'd argue that the engine type would take a back seat to the "usual suspects" that cause most accidents in either jets or pistons.
 
How do you know they were challenging?

Are you saying, in other words, that they would be challenging for you? Or challenging for you in the equipment you normally fly?

Those are not challenging conditions for me, or the equipment I fly. Would my decision to launch with a safe outcome pre-dispose you to judge me?
Watch out boys, we got us a real Internet badazz!
 
I know (or have heard of) many airline pilots who refuse to fly IMC in any single engine piston. Since this is the main environment I fly in, we are clearly on opposite ends of the spectrum. Are they right? If being 100% safe = "right", then sure, but that's not practical.
Still, there are many accidents in jets and/or turbine engines, so clearly the type of engine is only one factor of many. The bottom line is that, flown with proper experience, currency, proficiency, maintenance, pilot health and judgment, all legal modes of modern aviation can be fairly safe. I'd argue that the engine type would take a back seat to the "usual suspects" that cause most accidents in either jets or pistons.
Probably because a majority of them haven’t set foot in anything but a jet in years. I still fly GA pretty regularly and fly single engine hard IMC when I need to. All of my GA is flying is done in the northeast, mid Atlantic, and some central U.S, so terrain is mostly not a concern. If I flew out west, I’m sure I’d change my flying habits.
 
Yea I wouldn’t launch in those conditions in a piston twin or single. If I’m in my work jet, it’d be no issue.

Same here. Personally, I depart in a light twin at or above Cat I minimums. That's where I feel comfortable. I also load the airplane appropriately for the terrain and elevation to ensure I can climb into the enroute structure and return to the departure airport for the approach.

In a jet, 0-0 is fine.

The Cessna 340? I don't know - I've never flown that aircraft. It's a higher performance piston twin than the one I fly, but has far less than the nearly 28,000 lbs. of thrust I have available to me in the Gulfstream 450. I might feel comfortable, with time and experience, departing in the Cessna 340 from a sea level airport in low IFR conditions, knowing that the fog would burn off in the next hour or so and that I had many nearby airports to consider for emergency return.

So, I can't say the pilot made a good decision, or a bad one, not at this juncture, anyway.
 
How do you know they were challenging?

Are you saying, in other words, that they would be challenging for you? Or challenging for you in the equipment you normally fly?

Those are not challenging conditions for me, or the equipment I fly. Would my decision to launch with a safe outcome pre-dispose you to judge me?
They are challenging based on my experience and knowledge. Any irregularities or deviations from the absolute norm become more difficult to manage in those conditions. On any risk assessment I've ever used, weather of this nature drives the risk up and it complicates the decision making. Any risk assessment that ignores this type of weather isn't worth using. If you are concerned about a culture of safety as your initial post suggested, publicly trivializing the effects that weather has on flights like this isn't helping your cause.

We can argue about who has more experience, but the fact is your comfort level doesn't change the nature of some of the difficulties presented by fog and very low visibility. In some situations, a takeoff in these conditions would simply be mitigated by a more thorough takeoff brief. In others, it would be addressed by delaying the flight until better conditions are present. The question is what drives the necessity for takeoff and what is it that determines that the risk is worth taking. My problem with your post is that you are refusing to acknowledge the high risk factor. We know that this is a flight with family heading to a vacation type atmosphere. This guy may be a very capable pilot. That reduces the risk but it doesn't eliminate it. Based on the link you posted, everyone is prone to error and the article states that error itself is inevitable. With that in mind, when the margin for error is reduced the risk is increased. This is worth pointing out and discussing.

And to answer your question, yes. I probably would judge you to some extent if you were taking off in temporarily poor conditions in a private airplane with your family to go grab lunch somewhere. I think that judgement contributes to safety, it doesn't diminish it.
 
Watch out boys, we got us a real Internet badazz!

LOL. Nope! I don't fly single-engine airplanes at night or in low IMC, and there are lots of pilots who do. That type of profile exceeds my comfort level by a wide margin. Give me two engines and it's a different discussion, but not a given that I'm go-oriented.

The point here is that ADM is not a one-size-fits-all jacket we can slap on to any pilot, living or dead.
 
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