Fatality Crash KHOU looks like a Cirrus

The video clearly shows the shadow of the plane coming in from the top of the frame, across the propane tanks. At 1 pm CDT, at Hobby, the sun was at "altitude" 87.7 degrees, azimuth 157.0
If you watch the silhouette the shadow is almost aligned with the sun(the tail is aligned with the fuselage in the video). This typically corresponds to a post stall gyration when the pilot is pulling full aft stick. Most of us have never seen the visual ground rush that causes this pilot reaction, except in a simulator. At the stall, the (longitudinal) dynamic stability causes a rapid pitch down as the plane is trying to fly, despite the elevator input. Usually a sequence of post stall gyrations occurs as the spin develops, first in pitch, and then in roll. I suspect the initial shadow in the video the plane has reached the maximum pitch down(past the vertical based on landing gear shadow) and then, as the shadow is crossing the white concrete parking lot, the nose has started to oscillate(pitch) back upwards and this is confirmed when the plane comes into view with the pitch rate continuing upwards, a classic post stall gyration pattern, with the roll.
It appears that the wings are not rotating initially, but then the rotation starts as the shadow crosses the parking lot towards the car. That turn is about 130 degrees. You can see the landing gear shadow in the early frames indicating the plane was still not rolling at that point. The left roll is consistent with what we call P-factor with an engine at high power settings, but this is less certain, but may be determined by further video analysis which could reveal the RPM of the prop(notice the apparent curvature of the prop shadow caused by the video scan pattern). The engine power setting and state will be revealed by the engine tear down and analysis next week, as well.
This is all consistent with post stall gyrations developing to incipient spin from an altitude of 300-500 feet when it started, presumably after the 4th missed approach to 35 or 4. We did thousands of spins in the USN during the F-14 top-gun area when we needed to train F-4 pilots to recognize spins, and later at the Test Pilot School. I have since been an advocate for spin and upset training for all pilots. I recommend this course. Its fun and will enhance your safety. If you need a good argument, say that safety is the requirement, that you must rent that aerobatic trainer!
 
Just to add what others have said about Hobby I've also flown in there dozens of times. It is quite friendly to GA even though it is a Class B airport. IAH is much more intimidating. The controllers are very friendly, as you can hear on the ATC recording in this case. Remember probably a majority of GA Angel Flights in Texas are terminating in Houston and almost every one of those pilots flies into Hobby. It is the most convenient airport to get to MD Anderson.
 
Hobby has the GA history that still remains...in the 70 and early 80's it had well over 250K GA movements a year...and we kept a aircraft there...but in reality its a very busy class B with a third International terminal going in currently...it is not a sleepy class B airport...and yes so many options within 10 miles that I would never consider telling anyone to go there unless they needed Jet Center type service.
 
Warlock said:
Hobby has the GA history that still remains...in the 70 and early 80's it had well over 250K GA movements a year...and we kept a aircraft there...but in reality its a very busy class B with a third International terminal going in currently...it is not a sleepy class B airport...and yes so many options within 10 miles that I would never consider telling anyone to go there unless they needed Jet Center type service.
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Well paradoxically this was probably one of the safer airports to land at in the region with the winds out of the east. The majority of the other runways airports in the region are aligned north-south. On that day Rwy 12 would have been easy with the winds out of 100 gusting to 20 knots. Only 20 degrees off the the runway which is long and wide. One of the lessons for us all is a reminder to say "unable" if we don't like the runway assignment and to request what we want. Rwy 4 would have been a good choice too, quite manageable even for a beginner (not saying she was one).
 
Bill Miller said:
The video clearly shows the shadow of the plane coming in from the top of the frame, across the propane tanks. At 1 pm CDT, at Hobby, the sun was at "altitude" 87.7 degrees, azimuth 157.0
If you watch the silhouette the shadow is almost aligned with the sun(the tail is aligned with the fuselage in the video). This typically corresponds to a post stall gyration when the pilot is pulling full aft stick. Most of us have never seen the visual ground rush that causes this pilot reaction, except in a simulator. At the stall, the (longitudinal) dynamic stability causes a rapid pitch down as the plane is trying to fly, despite the elevator input. Usually a sequence of post stall gyrations occurs as the spin develops, first in pitch, and then in roll. I suspect the initial shadow in the video the plane has reached the maximum pitch down(past the vertical based on landing gear shadow) and then, as the shadow is crossing the white concrete parking lot, the nose has started to oscillate(pitch) back upwards and this is confirmed when the plane comes into view with the pitch rate continuing upwards, a classic post stall gyration pattern, with the roll.
It appears that the wings are not rotating initially, but then the rotation starts as the shadow crosses the parking lot towards the car. That turn is about 130 degrees. You can see the landing gear shadow in the early frames indicating the plane was still not rolling at that point. The left roll is consistent with what we call P-factor with an engine at high power settings, but this is less certain, but may be determined by further video analysis which could reveal the RPM of the prop(notice the apparent curvature of the prop shadow caused by the video scan pattern). The engine power setting and state will be revealed by the engine tear down and analysis next week, as well.
This is all consistent with post stall gyrations developing to incipient spin from an altitude of 300-500 feet when it started, presumably after the 4th missed approach to 35 or 4. We did thousands of spins in the USN during the F-14 top-gun area when we needed to train F-4 pilots to recognize spins, and later at the Test Pilot School. I have since been an advocate for spin and upset training for all pilots. I recommend this course. Its fun and will enhance your safety. If you need a good argument, say that safety is the requirement, that you must rent that aerobatic trainer!
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mind_blown.gif
 
mscard88 said:
I recall when I started flying, way before the internet, in 1974 I would devour publications such as Flying magazine and thoroughly read the accident reports. Why? Because I didn't want something to bite me so I learned what not to do. Sticking your head in the sand is senseless unless you have no interest in flying safely. The majority of accidents are pilot error and the "chain" leading to the incident could have been broken many times usually, especially in this accident. For instance, maybe she should have had a CFI on board, or flown to a "slower" airport, and on and on. This isn't being disrespectful to the deceased at all.
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I feel sorry for every pilot (and passenger) in every report I read, but I do like to read them. Sometimes I feel like nothing could have been done, but many times I see situations where I know I could have fallen down the same slippery slope. As long as people are tasteful about it, I like to hear some speculation because it does enlighten me to other things that can happen.
 
I don't see too much wrong with speculation, as long as you remember that's all it is and as long as it's constructive. It gets you to think about what *might* have happened, maybe, and then you can put yourself into that situation and consider how you *might* have reacted, maybe. I tend to think we owe it to the pilots that haven't made it home to learn from their accidents.
 
Velocity173 said:
So it's the controller's fault?
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Here is my thinking on this.
The pilot had multiple missed approaches. It's obvious to a lot of people on this board that the pilot was in trouble.
Why wasn't it obvious to the guy in the tower?
Instead of changing runways on her, multiple times. Why didn't he clear the airspace and talk her down?
Instead, he vectored her to a crosswind runway with a 727 a half mile out, telling her to keep it tight (and I think) he told her to speed it up.
Sorry, that was not helpful, and in this case I think it contributed to the fatal results.
My personal opinion, and I would like anyone with actual ATC experience to correct me, but I think the orders to the tower personnel are to accommodate the big iron at (almost) all costs. Big iron pays big fees and get first dibs. It's expensive to clear big iron out of the airspace, so it's the last resort of the guy in the tower.
This opinion is based on purely recent personal experience. I was trying to get a crippled bird into a class D, and the guy in the tower castigated me for messing up his traffic. Some movie stars in a couple of Gulfstreams were being inconvenienced because I was unable to go faster and I refused to extend out to let them in first or tighten it up to get down quicker, and they had to pull out and go around.
 
Pilots who have planes with parachutes: I have little expertise in this so I would like to ask a question.
Could the attitude of the plane be caused by slowing the plane down in anticipation of pulling the red handle and either misjudging the speed or worse, the chute failed to deploy?
 
I think it is probably a good idea to figure out some sort of personal minimum for knowing when you are getting in over your head before it is too late.
Tough to quantify but maybe go up with a CFI who is an versed in task saturation so you can detect when you are getting flustered and know when it is time to think about winding the watch.
 
Shepherd said:
Pilots who have planes with parachutes: I have little expertise in this so I would like to ask a question.
Could the attitude of the plane be caused by slowing the plane down in anticipation of pulling the red handle and either misjudging the speed or worse, the chute failed to deploy?
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I doubt it. Chute speed is 133kts. I haven't checked her track but I would expect she would be below that in the pattern.
 
Warlock said:
Newspaper quotes NTSB Investigator Tom Latson today saying they found no fuel at the crash site but with a slight caveat that both tanks were ruptured in the crash...
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And this is the perfect example why speculation is not useful.

The NTSB investigator will presumably look in the fuel manifold and establish authoritatively if there was or was not fuel available to the engine. You could get either answer based on the quote.
 
MAKG1 said:
And this is the perfect example why speculation is not useful.

The NTSB investigator will presumably look in the fuel manifold and establish authoritatively if there was or was not fuel available to the engine. You could get either answer based on the quote.
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They have already looked at the site, and decided how much fuel was onboard. Probably very little. Regardless, she stalled the airplane at low altitude, the rest was inevitable.
 
It does appear that there were multiple runway changes but I believe this was because the controller recognized that task saturation was the problem. They tried repeatedly to accommodate what they thought the pilot was doing, but delays in understanding and loss of orientation were confusing. Many readers may not understand the limitations the tower controllers are bound by. They cannot tell the pilot what to do unless the pilot in command requests help. Any guess like "are you out of gas?" Or why not go to hou southwest airport where winds are favorable"
 
could make the situation worse, so that's why these rules evolved, based on previous experience.
 
Shepherd said:
Here is my thinking on this.
The pilot had multiple missed approaches. It's obvious to a lot of people on this board that the pilot was in trouble.
Why wasn't it obvious to the guy in the tower?
Instead of changing runways on her, multiple times. Why didn't he clear the airspace and talk her down?
Instead, he vectored her to a crosswind runway with a 727 a half mile out, telling her to keep it tight (and I think) he told her to speed it up.
Sorry, that was not helpful, and in this case I think it contributed to the fatal results.
My personal opinion, and I would like anyone with actual ATC experience to correct me, but I think the orders to the tower personnel are to accommodate the big iron at (almost) all costs. Big iron pays big fees and get first dibs. It's expensive to clear big iron out of the airspace, so it's the last resort of the guy in the tower.
This opinion is based on purely recent personal experience. I was trying to get a crippled bird into a class D, and the guy in the tower castigated me for messing up his traffic. Some movie stars in a couple of Gulfstreams were being inconvenienced because I was unable to go faster and I refused to extend out to let them in first or tighten it up to get down quicker, and they had to pull out and go around.
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ATC provides service on a first come first served basis. There is no big iron over GA policy.

I think both controllers in question handled it well. They didn't sound impatient with the pilot. When she did a go around, they sequenced her back in around their arriving traffic. The last controller even realized that a tight pattern wasn't going to work with her and had her extend downwind. By that time it was too late though. She should have 1) known that flying into a busy airport that sequencing is going to be tight and 2) if that sequencing doesn't meet your approval, you say "unable."

As far as talking her down. Unless the controller is also a pilot, not just a pilot but one familiar with Cirrus speeds / power settings, I can't see any talking down being of use.
 
mscard88 said:
I recall when I started flying, way before the internet, in 1974 I would devour publications such as Flying magazine and thoroughly read the accident reports. Why? Because I didn't want something to bite me so I learned what not to do. Sticking your head in the sand is senseless unless you have no interest in flying safely. The majority of accidents are pilot error and the "chain" leading to the incident could have been broken many times usually, especially in this accident. For instance, maybe she should have had a CFI on board, or flown to a "slower" airport, and on and on. This isn't being disrespectful to the deceased at all.
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The difference being that you were reading the accident reports. Filled with "facts." Here you're reading wild speculation within an hour of the smoke settling. We all want to learn from others' mistakes. I just don't see the benefit of wild speculation. Which happens here after almost every crash.
 
As a new pilot I was getting checked out in a 172 at Bolton Field, probably back in 2002. A guy entered the pattern the wrong direction (e.g. head to head) with traffic on downwind, of which I was one. The controller barked some orders, and the guy - somewhat meekly - said, I'm just going to go out here a little bit and get sorted out. At the time I thought 'this guy is out of his mind!' I am so sorry she didn't (or wasn't able to) do that and it's a sad reminder that it can be the best possible option.
 
SixPapaCharlie said:
I doubt it. Chute speed is 133kts. I haven't checked her track but I would expect she would be below that in the pattern.
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Thanks.
As I said, I don't have any experience, other than regularly deploying the chute on an F-4D\E, a long time ago. Different circumstances, new knowledge base.
 
SixPapaCharlie said:
I think it is probably a good idea to figure out some sort of personal minimum for knowing when you are getting in over your head before it is too late.
Tough to quantify but maybe go up with a CFI who is an versed in task saturation so you can detect when you are getting flustered and know when it is time to think about winding the watch.
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This makes sense. . .very personal, such limitations. Being a middle of the pack pilot, in experience, I'm not seeing a workload here that rises to the level of task saturation. Stress maybe, but a slow, simple, airplane, severe VFR, etc. Patient tower controller, too. But it doesn't matter what I think about SA, but what she felt. . .
 
Question - What was her altitude when initiating the final approach leg to 35? If it was 1600 feet, consistent with the Tower's designated altitude on the downwind leg, she was probably too high on both attempts given her estimated distance from the threshold (upon turning final) was only about 2.5 miles.

If true, it would explain her comments of repeated difficultly in getting down.
 
Paul Boling said:
Question - What was her altitude when initiating the final approach leg to 35? If it was 1600 feet, consistent with the Tower's designated altitude on the downwind leg, she was probably too high on both attempts given her estimated distance from the threshold (upon turning final) was only about 2.5 miles.

If true, it would explain her comments of repeated difficultly in getting down.
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She was 1100, decent to 100 before climbing on go around, last shown around 400
 
Velocity173 said:
ATC provides service on a first come first served basis. There is no big iron over GA policy.

I think both controllers in question handled it well....
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I would have to disagree on the Cessna 172 = Boeing 777 in a controller's eyes. And I agree it should be that way, most of the time. IMO, it isn't right to inconvenience 250 people in a Boeing so that I can do touch and goes in my 152.

I do agree that the controller was trying to be helpful in the midst of his heavy workload. I think the pilot was just worse off operationally that the controller knew. He was late realizing how serious the situation was for Cirrus. I'm very sure he is wishing he had done it differently.
 
I'm still a pretty new pilot and on one of my first long cross countries I was headed to McKinney Texas (class Delta) but super busy. I learned at a non controlled airport and did not have a lot of radio experience but did my homework and had the confidence to make the trip.

I had used flight following all the way there (home is northeast Arkansas). As I was approaching the class Delta airspace I became a little flustered as I hadn't been handed off to McKinney tower and I wasn't too far away. I didn't know if I had to make the request or if the handoff was on them. I was watching fore flight closely and my heart rate began to race as the jagged blue line got closer but still nothing... Just before I entered the Delta I made the decision to do a 180 and get things sorted out. At the end of my turn away I made another radio call and friendly airline pilot let me know I was on the wrong frequency for what I was asking. The details were muddied by my stress at the moment but I thanked him and got back over to the correct frequency and got back on track talking to McKinney. It was a beautiful sunny fall day and that place was buzzing like a bee hive.

At first I was embarrassed at my mistakes but eventually decided that given the circumstances I made the right call to get out. It only takes one occurrence of making the wrong decision for it to be your last.
 
Shepherd said:
My personal opinion, and I would like anyone with actual ATC experience to correct me, but I think the orders to the tower personnel are to accommodate the big iron at (almost) all costs..
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I was an USAF controller, worked military as well civilian traffic. FAA 7110.65 (ATC Handbook) states "first come first served". Now that's not to say an ATCer can't modify his traffic to get a faster bird in, but it has nothing to do with how many passengers are on board. I believe the vast majority of airline pilots would take a delay to get someone in trouble in. Here's an example. I was flying a CRJ 700 or 900 to South Bend. Approach slowed us 30 miles south as they had a Bonanza inbound I assume from the north. Finally turned final for 27 and the Bonanza was a mile or so on final to 18. Guess who was sent around? We were w/ 76 passengers. As a former controller I questioned the controller's judgement but what can you do, had to go around. I had to write it up as any go-arounds the FAA wants to know the reason, and I unloaded in my write up.

The other thing perhaps you may not realize is there are few controllers who are pilots. Even though I was a pilot I sure couldn't tell an F15 driver how to fly their jet. Give them priority or assistance if they were having trouble, yes, but they know their jet. In this instance I feel she was way behind her airplane and possibly not experienced enough, nor proficient enough in her own airplane, to take on a busy airport. Getting down and landing is so basic. I feel the controller did all he could do and was calm and helpful trying to accommodate her. That's why CFIs teach slow flight, slips, etc. I don't mean this as any disrespect for those that died as a result in this tragedy, but it's so obvious this pilot was in way over her head.
 
edo2000 said:
I think the pilot was just worse off operationally that the controller knew. He was late realizing how serious the situation was for Cirrus. I'm very sure he is wishing he had done it differently.
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Her calm sounding read-backs may have hidden it. She was in a high stress situation but her voice didn't give any of that away.
 
mscard88 said:
. I don't mean this as any disrespect for those that died as a result in this tragedy, but it's so obvious this pilot was in way over her head.
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They were seeing a sick relative, first time at a busy class B, her initial landing was waved off...she had a lot on her mind, some days you're not on your game...there by grace of God go I. Cut down in the prime of your life...tragic.
 
Some controllers are better than others at sensing when chit is about to go sideways and will work accordingly. I think if he would have given her vectors, sent her out a ways and brought her back in, or even recommended a diffrent uncontrolled airport 15+ min away she would still be around.

In this case she appeared to be so far behind the plane, I doubt she even honestly debated the red handle until she was half a second from impact.

BSBD
 
jstro said:
Her calm sounding read-backs may have hidden it. She was in a high stress situation but her voice didn't give any of that away.
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But her missed approaches sure as heck did.
 
And the controller was very accommodating and really tried to help. This wasn't a multiple missed approaches in IMC situation, nor was an emergency declared, it was windy, and she didn't get lined up a few times. That's not a reason to turn the airport around or vector and hold a bunch of airliners. There's only so much a controller can do before the pilot has to realize that they're in over their head, and take steps needed to save their own butt.

I do realize that a lot of facts will come out, but given the current info, I don't think ATC gets any of the blame here.
 
VMC makes it even worse, no doubt ATC won't get any blame, they didn't do anything WRONG, but they could have done a little more, not placing blame with them at all, just saying from what the facts appear to be, it seems obvious she was way behind the plane and just getting worse.

I think a hint/suggestion from tower could have saved this.

End of the day fault is 100% PIC.
 
I do understand what you are saying and agree with you there... It sort of reminds me of that AOPA case study video where the guy lost his vacuum system in a Cherokee, made it to VFR or there were VFR conditions nearby(I can't remember which), but he tried to shoot an approach 2 more times in IMC and ended up losing control and crashing.

If ATC had suggested he get to VFR, I bet he would have followed that suggestion. But they didn't, and he didn't assert that he needed to get to VFR conditions.

ATC always says they are here to help, and I do believe that they are. But sometimes, we need to ask for it to get it. I'm sure if that controller had known what was about to happen, he would have offered a lot more than he did.
 
timwinters said:
The difference being that you were reading the accident reports. Filled with "facts." Here you're reading wild speculation within an hour of the smoke settling. We all want to learn from others' mistakes. I just don't see the benefit of wild speculation. Which happens here after almost every crash.
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Point taken. But I don't actually think human nature has changed all that much over the decades. When a similar accident would happen 30 years ago in any region most local pilots would be doing exactly the same thing going on here. Only it would be done over coffee in the airport cafe on Saturday morning or in someone's hangar with beer after the days flying was over. Technology just enables a wider circle to engage in the what has always gone on. It's human nature.

One difference is that a spoken comment that might get a pass within a small circle of pilot friends at the airport, is instead in written form on this forum and can more easily be interpreted or judged by someone within a potentially nationwide or even worldwide audience as inappropriate, disrespectful, or worse.
 
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timwinters said:
Wow, who took a dump in your cheerios yesterday?
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I'm not trying to be rude but you have one guy who wants to be acting commissioner of the Speculation Police and the other saying we should delete the thread because reality is too hard to handle. I mean come on. This is an internet discussion forum about aviation. Naturally crashes will be discussed.
 
Bill Miller said:
The video clearly shows the shadow of the plane coming in from the top of the frame, across the propane tanks. At 1 pm CDT, at Hobby, the sun was at "altitude" 87.7 degrees, azimuth 157.0
If you watch the silhouette the shadow is almost aligned with the sun(the tail is aligned with the fuselage in the video). This typically corresponds to a post stall gyration when the pilot is pulling full aft stick. Most of us have never seen the visual ground rush that causes this pilot reaction, except in a simulator. At the stall, the (longitudinal) dynamic stability causes a rapid pitch down as the plane is trying to fly, despite the elevator input. Usually a sequence of post stall gyrations occurs as the spin develops, first in pitch, and then in roll. I suspect the initial shadow in the video the plane has reached the maximum pitch down(past the vertical based on landing gear shadow) and then, as the shadow is crossing the white concrete parking lot, the nose has started to oscillate(pitch) back upwards and this is confirmed when the plane comes into view with the pitch rate continuing upwards, a classic post stall gyration pattern, with the roll.
It appears that the wings are not rotating initially, but then the rotation starts as the shadow crosses the parking lot towards the car. That turn is about 130 degrees. You can see the landing gear shadow in the early frames indicating the plane was still not rolling at that point. The left roll is consistent with what we call P-factor with an engine at high power settings, but this is less certain, but may be determined by further video analysis which could reveal the RPM of the prop(notice the apparent curvature of the prop shadow caused by the video scan pattern). The engine power setting and state will be revealed by the engine tear down and analysis next week, as well.
This is all consistent with post stall gyrations developing to incipient spin from an altitude of 300-500 feet when it started, presumably after the 4th missed approach to 35 or 4. We did thousands of spins in the USN during the F-14 top-gun area when we needed to train F-4 pilots to recognize spins, and later at the Test Pilot School. I have since been an advocate for spin and upset training for all pilots. I recommend this course. Its fun and will enhance your safety. If you need a good argument, say that safety is the requirement, that you must rent that aerobatic trainer!
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http://philip.greenspun.com/flying/cirrus-sr20

Cirrus SR20

an owner's review by Philip Greenspun, ATP, CFII, in July 2005, updated February 2015

...In terms of avoiding an accident, one problem with the Cirrus is its unforgiving handling compared to other basic four-seaters. For pilots accustomed to learning about an impending stall by feeling reduced airloads on the flight controls, the Cirrus provides much less stall warning. This is due to spring cartridges that continue to resist flight control movement even when the airplane is not moving. In other words, the flight controls feel similar whether you're flying or stalled.

Once a pilot has gotten sloppy with airspeed, the plane is harder to keep level with rudders in a stall than a Cessna or Diamond; if in a deep uncoordinated stall, the Cirrus wants to drop a wing and go into a spin...​
 
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The spring-centered nature of the cirri half-yoke-stick-whatever has been acknowledged for a while. In theory it has nothing to do with anything, but yes those of us who consider flight control feedback not a distinction without difference, do highlight it as a transition training worthy item. It was something I didn't like when I flew the SR20, and the lack of manual trim does make setting a level-flight trim setting a pain (very pilot unfriendly setup if you ask me)
But my preference in control setup doesn't have anything to do with the accident.

I would say that dampened aerodynamic cuing on the flight control as a result of spring-centering can be contributory to an unrecognized approach-to-stall energy state. The SR20 is a heavy underpowered tub. Once that sucker departs controlled flight it's gonna take a lot of altitude to get yourself back to line on line. In contrast, a much lighter airplane with the similar useful load like my Arrow II, can literally hold the stick all the way aft with power in the cruise range and the thing just keeps bucking back and forth like it has a canard. Ridiculously benign stall characteristics by comparison. Tons of buffet feedback on the stabilator.

None of this is a non-starter btw. It simply takes 1) acknowledgement and 2) sufficient operating recency to get accustomed to that behavior in the low energy regime. I can't speak to where in that curve the mishap pilot was. I still think she would have met the same fate had she been in a Comanche or Bonanza, two airplanes with much more refined control feedback and harmony. Which is my way of saying, yes I agree with the lack of feedback on the cirri, but no I don't think it was causal. Certainly contributory, but not enough to write the airplane off as a cross country cruiser.
 
More of the human aspect of this tragedy:

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...nd-brother-filmed-crashing-killing-three.html


A chain of events usually set up these accidents. What link of this chain seems common to a pilot with a two year old ticket?
I've heard it many times from others, and been guilty of it too, of having my worst landings be the ones made after a long x-country.

If this mishap pilot had made the correct transition from cruise/approach to landing such as altitude, airspeed and descent rate, there would be no discussion of complex ATC instructions, low altitude manuevering, etc.

Sticking good landings while practicing T&Gs happens often, but hitting the numbers and greasing one in after a long cruise just seems problematical sometimes. Does there exist a cruise mindset and a landing mindset that some pilots or low time pilots have to work around and try to keep straight? Obviously from this sad example, there is an additional safety component in trying extra hard in making that first landing attempt be your best.
 
I've started hand flying the last 20 minutes or so x-ctry, just kinda for that reason; a feeling that I handle the airplane better with some warm-up stick time. . .
 
hey tex go back to school an learn how to read. it might take a guy like you 4 passes of what i said to GET IT . reading is fundamental!! go get a check out in a sr 20 and get back to me, otherwise stfu
 
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