It was scary today

To put a "face" on Lance's comment WRT your alternates fading away...If you were SVFR in the CCR surface area without reliable comm radios, how would you remain legal while enroute to alternate airports?

WRT to Dr Bruce's comment about the "...edge of the envelope...", whether SVFR is or is not a common practice, you got suckered. Perhaps you got suckered because SVFR is a common practice. SFVR goes right to the line when, once crossed, you are now in solid IMC. The line can be awfully thin.

Because we all take an active part in this stuff, we tend to "arm chair QB". My suggestion would be to continually ask the question, Is proceeding as intended still a good idea? Think of it as an aerial Go/No go decision. So the wx dropped real fast. Your reference to SVFR as a commom practice suggests familiarity. Why then would that familiarity not preclude you being surprised by the rapidly falling wx? Perhaps another factor was significant...maybe you placed pressure on yourself to not let down your passengers. The problem with that is you are locked and loaded to continue to your destination. But one thing goes wrong and you're hosed. The good side of this, yes there is a good side, is you learned a valuable lesson. You just stepped up one rung on the experience ladder. GET YOUR IR.

I have the numbers of several airport towers. I mean the numbers that get me through to a real person in the twr cab on the first ring. Go to the aprt mgr and explain what you want. In every case he has patched me through to the cab. Or call that automated number and actually leave a message.
 
you need to read the thread about the family dead in the sr20 b/c of vfr into imc
you just don't seem to grasp it
 
*sigh* I SAID it wasn't VFR - it was SVFR. It was not IFR, though, at any point, for me. It WAS IFR for those coming in down through the clouds. They could have SVFR too, but if I were IFR rated I'd have used that instead, making the whole thing a non-event.

Just losing radios isn't a big deal. Agreed.

SVFR is only available inside B, C, D, and E airspace. I assume you were inside that airspace?
 
Suggesting that the OP should get his IFR, considering the area he operates from, is probably suggesting the obvious. That however does not help other VFR pilots, such as myself, learn from this particular incident.

This board is not composed of all IFR ratings, there are more than a few VFR only as well participating. The issue here is the OPs incident, and what you guys, IFRs included, would have done had you been in his shoes? What are the options available to him in that situation, with his present ratings?

How can we learn from this? What was done, what could have been done? Suggesting he run out right a way and get his IFR rating is of little value to this situation, even though it is sound advise, I somehow think the OP is clever enough to have deduced that himself.

This is an excellent learning thread, it should be milked for all its worth.

John


Here should be the key learning point: do not fly in marginal VFR conditions unless you can request and accept an Instrument Flight clearance should the conditions deteriorate.

If you can't, don't.
 
I don't know the protocol where you guys are but...... Out here in Jackson the tower guys are VERY worried about giving out the cab phone number... Maybe one of the moderators can delete the number thats posted if you guys think it needs to be " less then circulated"... IMHO..

Ben. :idea::idea::dunno:
 
My reply was not intended to be snarky. As for the "nut behind the yoke" - that's an old aviation chestnut, no slam on your sanity... the problem here was caused (and/or exacerbated) by the pilot making the decision to continue flight in deteriorating conditions (in this case, wx and comm). How would the NTSB report have read?

I'm glad you were finally scared by something and seem ready to learn.

Interested to hear about some of the outs you thought you had. Grant asked much earlier, but you sloughed off his question. I'm not familiar with the area - airports, airspace, terrain, weather.
At least some of those outs should probably have been spring-loaded. You know, along the lines of, "When the engine quits on take-off, I will..." (Note it's "When" not "If")

BTW - one other thing I'm curious about, perhaps it was your headset/mic, not the plane's radios or PTT connection. I've had ATC remark that they were having trouble reading me... turned out my (directional) mic had rotated so that it was pointing the opposite direction of my mouth. (I've also had a situation where the fault was not with my equipment but the plane's... tried using the pax jack and PTT, tried using a backup headset in both pilot and pax jack, (no hand-held mic), before calling tower on the phone (from the ground) to coordinate my arrival.)
 
My reply was not intended to be snarky. As for the "nut behind the yoke" - that's an old aviation chestnut, no slam on your sanity... the problem here was caused (and/or exacerbated) by the pilot making the decision to continue flight in deteriorating conditions (in this case, wx and comm). How would the NTSB report have read?

Right, well... like I tried to explain, I didn't make this decision consciously. I was fixating on the radios and circling and all that without paying attention much to the weather. It was easy enough to do until it was too late.

Interested to hear about some of the outs you thought you had. Grant asked much earlier, but you sloughed off his question. I'm not familiar with the area - airports, airspace, terrain, weather.
At least some of those outs should probably have been spring-loaded. You know, along the lines of, "When the engine quits on take-off, I will..." (Note it's "When" not "If")

There are three other airports in close vicinity, for one. But I let those options close down, which was dumb (although it is certainly feasible that I could have made it to at least two of them if I turned northeast, but that would have entailed me entering the area that CCR told me to avoid as part of the SVFR clearance, which if was going to do then I would simply go to CCR). Another option - not a happy one, but if I somehow found myself caught in actual IMC - was the point the nose to the flatlands and climb until I got out, then go back to the area I came from, where the weather was sunny and completely clear. But it would not have come to that; I was fully prepared to enter 7600 and simply fly to CCR, which I could see the whole time, and land, if it got to the point where it became intolerable.

BTW - one other thing I'm curious about, perhaps it was your headset/mic, not the plane's radios or PTT connection. I've had ATC remark that they were having trouble reading me... turned out my (directional) mic had rotated so that it was pointing the opposite direction of my mouth. (I've also had a situation where the fault was not with my equipment but the plane's... tried using the pax jack and PTT, tried using a backup headset in both pilot and pax jack, (no hand-held mic), before calling tower on the phone (from the ground) to coordinate my arrival.)

Directional mike is an interesting idea. I think the Zulu2 does have one, so what you describe could have been the case. It's a completely new headset for me - first time in use - and all my previous ones are not as high-tech. But we all could hear myself all the time on the intercom, so I don't think it was that. The dirty mic jack was brought up already by the maintenance officer.
 
Directional mike is an interesting idea. I think the Zulu2 does have one, so what you describe could have been the case. It's a completely new headset for me - first time in use - and all my previous ones are not as high-tech. But we all could hear myself all the time on the intercom, so I don't think it was that. The dirty mic jack was brought up already by the maintenance officer.
If you were able to hear yourself, it probably wasn't a directional mike issue. You could have had whomever was sitting in the copilot seat try to make a call, or swap headsets with them. Also, pulling out your headset and plugging it in a few times may help correct a dirty connection. All of which take time, of course. And, as we've already established, you were fixated. That right there is the biggest red flag. It's a lot easier to say than to do, but as I think you now realize you needed to pause a moment and look at the whole picture, letting the fixation wash away. You weren't out of options, but you were close to being out of options that were being actively considered.
 
Glad things turned out ok.

I am going to disagree with the majority opinion in this thread and say that this was primarily a maintenance issue.

Pilot decisionmaking played a role but it was secondary.

I hope the problem is fixed and fixed soon. Intermittent radio problems can be a bear to troubleshoot. Its concerning that both are flaking at the same time - common antenna? In the end, its conjecture and something for the owner and maintainer to fix.

As for decision-making.. SVFR is a good tool in the toolbox. There's no problem with using it as a VFR guy as long as you recognize its (and your) limitations.

My guidance would be be a little quicker on the trigger - squawk radio failure and see if they give you directions to arrive.. you can declare an emergency at any time even if you cant communicate it.. and in that case you have the ability to deviate as needed (and are accountable for those deviations).. Make a beeline for the field and work with wing rocking or light signals...

OR.. invoke you alternate options. Another field. Invest in a handheld..

I'm not going to beat you up over this. You did a pretty good job of that yourself.

The key here is not to make the same mistakes twice. And the only real "mis-take" in my armchair view of things was not declaring and proceeding to land before weather deteriorated further. Even if the aftermath costs you your ticket, its worth the cost.
 
Glad you and your family made it down safely, Onwards. If you are planning to buy anyway, I would consider buying then getting your rating in the airplane you own. It will be easier since you will be learning in the airplane you will be flying. Personally, I don't like to trust my behind (or those of my loved ones) to marginally maintained airplanes.
 
Glad you and your family made it down safely, Onwards. If you are planning to buy anyway, I would consider buying then getting your rating in the airplane you own. It will be easier since you will be learning in the airplane you will be flying. Personally, I don't like to trust my behind (or those of my loved ones) to marginally maintained airplanes.
My thoughts exactly: much better to train in what you're going to fly on a regular basis. However, make sure you have a good reliable mechanic on the field where you're based if you're trying to get that rating in your own airplane, or you may find your training drawn out painfully by endless maintenance downtime.
 
I've been writing a paper all day on aero decision making and so I'm probably in a bad mood from wading through NTSB reports. So keep that in mind.

For me, if the weather is marginal, either I'm instrument proficient, or we're not going. SVFR should not, in my opinion, be used as a "normal" procedure by pilots who are not instrument proficient. It's a good procedure for instrument-proficient pilots and it's an emergency procedure for the VFR-only pilot who paints himself into a corner.

The decision that you made that I have the most problem with is that you took other people with you into marginal weather. I don't think you truly realized the risks you are taking, and I'm damn sure your kids didn't.

Think for a moment on this worst-case scenario. As a result of flying in those weather conditions, you either ended up in the clouds and had an accident, or you ran into something trying to stay out of the clouds and had an accident. You were the only survivor. Now, do you really think that there's any way you can apologize to the other occupants of that airplane - your family - and honestly feel that you did the best that you could do? I'm really concerned that you were not sufficiently scared by this incident.

It's one thing to take the risks of flying, and work to manage those risks, and have an in-flight emergency come up and to fail in spite of your best efforts. It's another thing entirely to fail to manage those risks in the first place.

Now, besides the "don't put yourself into this situation", what other lessons were there?

First, when you had unreliable comms, squawk 7600 and keep listening on the radio. Then, head for good VFR, even if it means going somewhere far away from your intended landing. ATC will try to contact you even if your only way to reply is with the IDENT button. Your job is to maintain aircraft control (preferably in VMC), and get the airplane down safely at that point. Let ATC worry about any IFR traffic and keep them away from you. If there's no better airport elsewhere, then yes, you bust the bravo/charlie/delta airspace and land, and explain later. You had an emergency, you handle your emergency and let the rest of the "system" work around you. It's designed to do that. You probably wouldn't have to do anything other than explain what happened to the ATC facility after landing, and maybe answer some questions from a FSDO inspector. Both of these beat the heck out of standing by a gravesite explaining how sorry you are.

I think you did something stupid, and it rises to the level of incredibly stupid when you have your family on board. To your credit, you kept functioning and trying to work the problem, and got down ok. That says good things about you as a pilot, and horrible things about you as an aviator (who is supposed to use good judgement so he doesn't NEED his good skills).

I hope this doesn't seem "snarky". It should seem like I'm condemning you, because I am. I hope you take a good long look at your kids, realize that you could have killed them, and work on your attitude and judgement. I don't think you are sufficiently afraid of the weather you operate in.
 
I won't make any judgements here, I think enuff has been said, and I also think the OP is taking it all in appropriately and hopefully learned a valuable lesson from the situation.

After all, we are ALL always learning aren't we?

I'm a boat captain, and have spent plenty of time in rough, cold seas, and have narrowly avoided disaster more than I care to admit and I will say this:

"A superior captain uses his superior knowledge, so that he never has to use his superior skills"

Glad everyone made it down ok.

-Rob
 
I've been writing a paper all day on aero decision making and so I'm probably in a bad mood from wading through NTSB reports. So keep that in mind.

For me, if the weather is marginal, either I'm instrument proficient, or we're not going. SVFR should not, in my opinion, be used as a "normal" procedure by pilots who are not instrument proficient. It's a good procedure for instrument-proficient pilots and it's an emergency procedure for the VFR-only pilot who paints himself into a corner.

The decision that you made that I have the most problem with is that you took other people with you into marginal weather. I don't think you truly realized the risks you are taking, and I'm damn sure your kids didn't.

Think for a moment on this worst-case scenario. As a result of flying in those weather conditions, you either ended up in the clouds and had an accident, or you ran into something trying to stay out of the clouds and had an accident. You were the only survivor. Now, do you really think that there's any way you can apologize to the other occupants of that airplane - your family - and honestly feel that you did the best that you could do? I'm really concerned that you were not sufficiently scared by this incident.

It's one thing to take the risks of flying, and work to manage those risks, and have an in-flight emergency come up and to fail in spite of your best efforts. It's another thing entirely to fail to manage those risks in the first place.

Now, besides the "don't put yourself into this situation", what other lessons were there?

First, when you had unreliable comms, squawk 7600 and keep listening on the radio. Then, head for good VFR, even if it means going somewhere far away from your intended landing. ATC will try to contact you even if your only way to reply is with the IDENT button. Your job is to maintain aircraft control (preferably in VMC), and get the airplane down safely at that point. Let ATC worry about any IFR traffic and keep them away from you. If there's no better airport elsewhere, then yes, you bust the bravo/charlie/delta airspace and land, and explain later. You had an emergency, you handle your emergency and let the rest of the "system" work around you. It's designed to do that. You probably wouldn't have to do anything other than explain what happened to the ATC facility after landing, and maybe answer some questions from a FSDO inspector. Both of these beat the heck out of standing by a gravesite explaining how sorry you are.

I think you did something stupid, and it rises to the level of incredibly stupid when you have your family on board. To your credit, you kept functioning and trying to work the problem, and got down ok. That says good things about you as a pilot, and horrible things about you as an aviator (who is supposed to use good judgement so he doesn't NEED his good skills).

I hope this doesn't seem "snarky". It should seem like I'm condemning you, because I am. I hope you take a good long look at your kids, realize that you could have killed them, and work on your attitude and judgement. I don't think you are sufficiently afraid of the weather you operate in.

Yikes, Tim.

I think he's already beating himself up about things and he's taking all of the feedback he gets very seriously.
 
Weather at destination was VFR when I left for a 35 minute flight. Turned marginal on the way but into something I felt quite familiar with which is a way of life here. With the radios working normally, this would have been a typical flight, file and forget.
I think what is being said is if such inclement weather is a "...way of life..." that a pilot should be prepared, ie, be IFR current and proficient. The concern seems to be that anywhere along that 35 nm return trip you could have devised an alternate and then use that Plan B before it faded. The decision to continue (to CCR) was a sucker bet arising from complacency because this weather cycle was familiar. The lesson here is expect the unexpected. Be prepared, load your bucket with tools, etc. Instrument rating is a great tool...it also teaches a lot more about decision making.

Where exactly is the major error? yes, I got caught by surprise, no doubt. It never quite became imc, either. Sounds like a lot of snap judgment. I didn't feel lucky at all, felt quite UNlucky to be honest. Learned a couple things. Certainly don't intend to stop using SVFR at CCR, but will be more aware of what it could turn into and will become more discerning in the future (see it once...)
The major error is you got caught because of complacency and unpreparedness. This weather appeared like every time prior so you blithely continued. To reiterate, the bottom end of the SVFR envelope allows you to legally enter conditions up until the point it becomes become IMC. Be judicious.

BTW: I know where Tim is coming from. We all wince and suffer when we hear of a fatal flight. Try to be objective and learn from what is being said.
 
Tim,

I do appreciate your comments but, honestly, they apply far more to the NTSB reports you've been reading :)

I never was in danger of losing visual, at any point during the flight. If it got THAT bad, I'd be landing at the airport and dealing with the FAA later, precisely like you suggest. I may have taken a longer time to reach the point of being willing to do so than you or someone else, but in the end, I never lost visual contact with the airport itself (so visibility stayed 3+ miles, because that's how far I was from it).

The challenge I have with applying your words is that it appears like you are reading a lot more into my self-made report than was intended. So let's try and clarify. When I make a post like that, its entire purpose is to share an experience, and hope BOTH to gain from the community interaction, AS WELL as give back (by sharing). I don't see many people writing candidly about bad moments. I learn a lot more from those threads than I do from books, ground school, or AOPA videos (as much as I like those).

What would have turned this into a disaster, and what really prompted me to write the letter in the first place (then share it here), is engine failure. Under less stressful conditions, such a failure is not too big of a deal, especially out here where there are strips literally everywhere to glide into (whether public or private). Had that happened too, we would have crashed into the water and you'd have another NTSB report to go through with fatalities. THAT was the actual thing that scared me, realizing that it got to the point where "one more thing" would have turned a fairly routine flight into "real bad".

In the end, nothing happened. I circled for 30 minutes at 500ft over water, saw the same bridges about 15 times, got really frustrated, had adrenaline pumping through my blood for hours later, and my kids hit several new levels on their respective DS games. My ex, who was also on board, got a pretty good scare too (she stayed on the radio the whole time so listened to it unfold). I did not break any rules nor airspace, to which in retrospect I paid too much respect (and that's another lesson learned; I really should have 7600ed it, but I guess in the moment I felt comfortable enough to continue circling). This was not an "incident", but it sure was a big learning moment, which I chose to share with you all.

And it makes it hard to do that when you get jumped on with comments like yours and others. So I want to turn the tables and ask you this: would you rather I DON'T share these stories, and just stick to the good stuff? because getting "condemned", as you put it, doesn't do anything to further any goal other than shut me down. Is there a reason you would want that result?
 
Ok, so you had at least 3+ vis at all times. So why did you not divert to DVO or another non-towered field? From there you could coordinate your arrival to CCR over the land line.
 
Ok, so you had at least 3+ vis at all times. So why did you not divert to DVO or another non-towered field? From there you could coordinate your arrival to CCR over the land line.

3m southeast to CCR. I had NO visual to the west (which would have taken me to Napa or the rest of the bay), because that's where the fog was building.

I initially circled between the two bridges, and was forced east of the Benicia because of that fog. When it started looking like it was going to cross THAT bridge, too, and "come after me", was when I decided enough was enough. Almost magically, I got that quick exchange on the radio happening right then (about time something went right :D).
 
Head east to Byron or Rio Vista. :dunno:

I am not fully comprehending why you loitered near CCR with spotty raidios and fog rolling in.
 
Head east to Byron or Rio Vista. :dunno:

Right. That was one of the outs, for sure, I think I mentioned those. Rio Vista more so than Byron, because it was over land and it seemed like the fog was building on the water. But I was afraid of "giving up" my visual contact with CCR and THEN running into IMC en route to any of the others. I felt more comfortable sticking around so I can head in to something I could see.
 
I wonder if circling east of the Benicia bridge at 500 msl is on the app/dep path RWY 19R.

It's awful close, although not quite. I stayed away, but we're talking hundreds of feet here (maybe a couple thousand). It was not a comfortable place to be.
 
Thanks for posting your story; I haven't read all of the comments yet (just scanned them) but will read it in full tomorrow. I am curious about what checks you did on the weather... you said "CCR was reporting VFR". Did you look at just reported weather, or did you also check forecast weather? I'm curious what the TAFs for nearby airports like KSUU and KOAK were indicating, or the area forecast (FA), or Flight Service weather briefing --was the low weather expected? If so, that's another lesson to take away, even for "quick local flights"...

What time of day was the flight? Sounds like you're used to the fact that the weather conditions can change rapidly there. That can be good or bad, depending on how you use that knowledge.
 
Tim,

I do appreciate your comments but, honestly, they apply far more to the NTSB reports you've been reading :)
[...]

And it makes it hard to do that when you get jumped on with comments like yours and others. So I want to turn the tables and ask you this: would you rather I DON'T share these stories, and just stick to the good stuff? because getting "condemned", as you put it, doesn't do anything to further any goal other than shut me down. Is there a reason you would want that result?
I think that word "condemn" has some unfortunate connotations. One of the meanings is to express public disapproval of something. In that sense, I think it's perfectly acceptable here, and others have already done so in this thread. I have found the thread to be very helpful, and I don't think Tim would want you or anyone else to refrain from posting like this in the future. Knowing Tim, I can say fairly confidently that his concern is that you learn from this incident and take steps to see that you don't kill yourself or others if it can be prevented with some forethought. He was slapping you (metaphorically) to get your (and everybody else's) attention. At least that's what I think!
 
Thanks for posting your story; I haven't read all of the comments yet (just scanned them) but will read it in full tomorrow. I am curious about what checks you did on the weather... you said "CCR was reporting VFR". Did you look at just reported weather, or did you also check forecast weather? I'm curious what the TAFs for nearby airports like KSUU and KOAK were indicating, or the area forecast (FA), or Flight Service weather briefing --was the low weather expected? If so, that's another lesson to take away, even for "quick local flights"...

What time of day was the flight? Sounds like you're used to the fact that the weather conditions can change rapidly there. That can be good or bad, depending on how you use that knowledge.

Yeah, I got a standard briefing via duats online for the entire region before we went out (the whole trip there and back, plus lunch, was to be two hours, tops). Most everywhere was reporting "clear" - and even better, with no marine layer on the pacific shore (where HAF is), it was highly unlikely that one would be present mid-afternoon in CCR.

Now that ask this question, I am realizing something I hadn't until just now. We had an unexpected delay in our original departure FROM CCR because when I got to plane, the battery was dead. Someone left something on, I guess. Took about 30 minutes to get it recharged and go. Had this not happened, we would have flown BACK in under normal VFR conditions. I am also wondering if the dead battery somehow had something to do with the radios acting funky.
 
It's awful close, although not quite. I stayed away, but we're talking hundreds of feet here (maybe a couple thousand). It was not a comfortable place to be.
There may be a lesson there. I mean, maybe CCR twr was already treating you as an emergency because of proximity to arriving/departing traffic. Perhaps all that was left was for you to declare...they already had it worked out, waiting to see what you would do.

I suggest you call CCR tomorrow to get the scoop from their end.

BTW: intermittent faults are the hardest to troubleshoot. So difficult that I get on the ground as soon as practical, depending upon what system is affected.
 
There may be a lesson there. I mean, maybe CCR twr was already treating you as an emergency because of proximity to arriving/departing traffic. Perhaps all that was left was for you to declare...they already had it worked out, waiting to see what you would do.

I suggest you call CCR tomorrow to get the scoop from their end.

Yeah. I actually DID call them after I was safely in the car, and spoke to the guy. Because they heard so little of my transmissions, they were more annoyed than concerned. When I told him how many times I had tried to talk to them and what was going on, he changed his tone immediately to "oh, you should have just come in then, really sorry you went through that".

The one good thing is that I had at least one radio that I could listen on at all times, so I could figure out where the IFR planes were (benefit of having studied the low IFR charts and approaches for this airport recently). So when I was ready to go, it was also trying to slot myself in between a couple of them in a way that would have hopefully not endangered either.
 
No one has said it yet so I will; file an ASRS. Be sure to include what you would had done differently and/or what other way you could have resolved this scenario.

Oh, one other thing. You wrote the FBO a letter but did you properly squawk the plane?
 
Last edited:
No one has said it yet so I will; file an ASRS. Be sure to include what you would had done differently and/or what other way you could have resolved this scenario.

I thought ASRS was for actual incidents? as much as this was scary to me, nothing actually happened that qualifies it as an incident. I think.
 
Your understanding is incorrect or at least incomplete.

My understanding of ASRS, or of the event itself? can you please elaborate a bit more? it would be much appreciated.
 
My understanding of ASRS, or of the event itself? can you please elaborate a bit more? it would be much appreciated.

"Pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, mechanics, ground personnel, and others involved in aviation operations submit reports to the ASRS when they are involved in, or observe, an incident or situation in which aviation safety may have been compromised. All submissions are voluntary."

The ASRS program is all about learning from other peoples' mistakes and unfortunate situations... whether there's a violation or not doesn't really matter. Glad you got back on the ground safely. :)
 
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/summary.html

While the occurence of an incident is a trigger, it is one aspect. Think of the ASRS as concerned with human factors. Think of human factors as a means to prevent incidents or to identify 'hotspots' in decision making (aircrew or ATC). Also it helps to identify deficiencies in airport operations, communications, or airspace construction.
 
ASRS is good for anything safety-related. Do it. Many of us learn by reading their summaries of common mistakes.

As another comment to add to the pile from a VFR only pilot who has about 65 approaches in real aircraft and lots of others in the sim, but no rating...

I treat SFVR like I do 4-wheel-drive. As my now passed away truck-driver grandfather with at least a million miles in the driver's seat used to say, "4-wheel-drive is to get you home when things don't go as planned. Not to use regularly and not to get you out in it.".

I treat SVFR the same way. It's there as a last-ditch effort, never routine. Ever.

I know I don't have the marine layer to deal with like you do on the coast, but I would NOT be a VFR only pilot if I lived there. Get the IR.

Enough said about that.

As far as the radios go, I absolutely *hate* avionics problems. Avionics give me options. Radios especially are key in busy airspace. If the mechanic replies with anything but "The aircraft is going into the avionics shop to attempt to find the problem", find another airplane to fly. Seriously.

Crap maintenance and people beating up rentals is one of the major reasons I joined a co-ownership. Worst-case scenario, even IF the other two co-owners don't agree (never happened yet but just for the sake of conversation), I can whip out my wallet and fix whatever the heck I want to fix anytime I want. No having to send an e-mail to the maintenance guy and hope. I won't put up with broken avionics beyond our known weak Auto-Pilot which is just a known liability of the Cessna ARC stuff. It'll wander back and forth with big S-turns but keep me upright if I absolutely lost the sight-picture.

I've had one VFR into IMC incident many many years ago. It was both the most focused few minutes and the most sobering and frightening thing in my entire logbook. I do NOT take it lightly and didn't back then. I recommend keeping your very healthy fear of it alive and working hard to never have to utilize SVFR at all.

Hammer out that IR. Especially with family on board counting on your skills 100% to keep them not only alive but also not injured to the point where they need lifetime medical care. You fly where those superior skills are regularly needed.

I think you've already hit on the other item: Escape routes. Better to be safely on the ground at an alternate looking at the weather maps and reports wishing you could finish the flight, than circling airborne with options disappearing.

Get those radios fixed. Get the IR. Don't utilize SVFR on a regular basis. Just my two cents.

Another survival tactic: I land (or even stop the pre-flight and consider canceling the flight) whenever two major things go wrong. Utilizing SVFR is number one of those two in this scenario. Radios die? Two strikes, put it on the ground somewhere safely and re-assess everything, treating the go/no-go as a completely new decision. That's my way to keep myself from having that kind of "decision lock-up" you described when fixating on a problem. If that's problem number one, okay... Work the problem. If its number two, time to land. Now. No further decisions to make. The "rule" makes the divert decision for you to avoid lock-up under stress.

(Yeah if you work out the problem enroute to your pre-planned divert airfield, maybe re-assess in flight. But the practiced, initial response is "We're diverting to X now."

There ya go. Greet thread. Fly safe!
 
......I am realizing something I hadn't until just now. We had an unexpected delay in our original departure FROM CCR because when I got to plane, the battery was dead. Someone left something on, I guess. Took about 30 minutes to get it recharged and go. Had this not happened, we would have flown BACK in under normal VFR conditions. I am also wondering if the dead battery somehow had something to do with the radios acting funky.
Yeah it was the bad voltage regulator that did that.
Three items.

Yikes notwithstanding, radios still don't make an airplane fly, nor prevent landing.... ;)
 
Just one little comment, since it doesn't look like anyone brought it up yet. You mentioned you got a DUAT briefing, which is fine. But as a word of advice for a relatively new VFR-only pilot... If there's *any* question or chance that the weather will deteriorate to IMC conditions, or even MVFR conditions, I *highly* recommend calling flight service and getting a phone briefing. Some of those flight service specialists really know their stuff, and can tell you things about the weather that you probably wouldn't catch with a text briefing. I'd venture to guess that the VFR-only pilot community is missing more than just a few pilots as a result of passing over the opprtunity to get a briefing with flight service...
 
Back
Top