Cirrus Fatal yesterday and I learned something about Class B floors

A fairly high percentage of IMC CFIT is from IFR pilots, yes, but I think that's more due to hubris.. "I'm IFR, I know how to fly in the clouds and keep the plane upright" .. but how many vmc into IMC loss-of-control accidents are from IFR pilots?

I don't know for sure, but you'd think it should be nearly zero. Nonetheless here's a quote from one ERAU study at least suggesting that overall VMC into IMC the figure is "somewhere around" 20% that are instrument rated, (but admittedly it doesn't specify LOC vs. other causes, and I don't know if the data collection might have excluded CFIT):

In 1985, even though 46% of U.S. pilot certificate holders possessed an instrument rating, only 23% of the VFR-into-MC accidents between 1975 and 1986, and 27% between 1982 and 1993, involved pilots with instrument ratings (AOPA, 1996; NTSB, 1989; TSBC, 1990a). Also, between 1976 and 1985, U.S. commercial pilots, 83% of whom were instrument-rated in 1985, were proportionally involved in significantly fewer VFR-into-IMC accidents than their counterparts in Canada, where only 15% were instrument-rated (

Interestingly, there is also the suggestion that IR pilots are simply less likely to scud run, which should lower their VFR into IMC rate in those figures.
 
No pilot, no controller is infallible. Years ago Ricky Nelson's older brother David was a guard fighter pilot, I think In a F4 coming east at night out of San Diego. He followed atc instructions right into the mountains.
I just looked this up and its not correct, not even close, so I don't know who, but I recall something like this. I learned to fly there, but it has been 50 years.


It was Dean Martins son, in March of 87.
 
What exactly was the Clearance you got? Was that heading assigned on the ground to fly after departure? Or did they vector you to it after departure? What was your assigned altitude? Was it below mountain?

Hi, uh, Luv?

Cleared to Oakland Airport via PALLY departure, Coaldale transition... maintain your own terrain clearance.

PALLY calls for an initial heading off the runway of 168 degrees, which I set in the HSI, then intercept a 199 degree course to CAVER.

When I called tower for takeoff clearance, they amended, "Maintain 168 degree heading, climb and maintain 4,000." OK, can do...

Tower handed me off to Las Vegas departure, who kept me at 4,000 until I was clear of the Bravo 6,000' ring, then "maintain 168 degree heading, climb and maintain 6,000."

I was motoring along a long, long ways on that heading and altitude, but about 20 nm south of the airport, I could see the terrain was going to intersect my flight path. So that's when I told Approach I was modifying course 10 degrees to the west to miss the terrain, and he scolded me for accepting "maintain own terrain clearance" if I couldn't. Well... I could, certainly, but the controller assigned me an altitude and heading that was taking me into the rocks... so something had to give.

http://www.secure4host.net/upload/files/HND_Departure.jpg

The NTSB investigator and I agree that approach either can assign heading and altitude, OR have me maintain my own terrain clearance. But they can't have it both ways. The NTSB guy tells me they do that often at LAS, despite the NTSB complaining about it to the FAA. Local stupid procedures...

After the scolding, they vectored me clear of the Bravo, and turned me over to center for a climb. Very poor service.
 
Tower handed me off to Las Vegas departure, who kept me at 4,000 until I was clear of the Bravo 6,000' ring, then "maintain 168 degree heading, climb and maintain 6,000."

I was motoring along a long, long ways on that heading and altitude, but about 20 nm south of the airport, I could see the terrain was going to intersect my flight path. So that's when I told Approach I was modifying course 10 degrees to the west to miss the terrain, and he scolded me for accepting "maintain own terrain clearance" if I couldn't.
Once you're in radar contact and given a vector ATC assumes terrain responsibility. It's in the AIM and Controller Handbook. Lucky you were able to see the terrain and say something. When they give you a heading after they tell you to maintain your own terrain clearance, remind them it's their responsibility now. Shouldn't have to, but... "When in Rome, etc., etc."
 
Four words that I’ve used to good effect are “Just to confirm that...”

Only on rare occasion has ATC gotten snippy with me for asking for clarification of a clearance. I write it off as them maybe having a bad day, and remind myself they exist to serve us, not the other way around.
 
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Four words that I’ve used to good effect are “Just to confirm that...”

Only on rare occasion has ATC gotten snippy with me for asking for clarification of a clearance. I write it off as them maybe having a bad day, and remind myself they exist to serve us, not the other way around.

Most of the ATC around here BOS are pretty relaxed. The NYC guys get pretty wound up though. Had one guy ask me to change to his frequency then 2 seconds later give me a "Hello??", I guess he wanted a changing over call then a I'm here call.
 
I just got back from a long cross country. Family vacation in the Bahamas over Christmas. MN to FL then out into the Bahamas (Cat and Long Island). This is the second time we've taken this trip, the first time I wasn't instrument rated. We ended up having pretty good weather on that trip, left a day early to get ahead of some weather, and stayed an extra day in Fort Pierce because of some weather off the coast. Overall a great trip.

Now I am instrument rated (and current....proficient is a term used a lot, I'm always striving to improve). This trip absolutely wouldn't have happened without my IFR. Outside of while in the Bahamas every approach I made was an instrument approach, except for two. The first approach I did was the poorest, last second change by ATC to intercept and fly straight in, I had the full approach with procedure turn loaded, should have just asked for that....I felt rushed and un-prepared, I learned a lesson. After that each approach I felt better about, ended up with 6 instrument approaches on the trip, with much of my time in FL in IMC.

Being on an IFR flight plan just makes it so much less stressful when flying in busy airspace.
 
Hi, uh, Luv?

Cleared to Oakland Airport via PALLY departure, Coaldale transition... maintain your own terrain clearance.

PALLY calls for an initial heading off the runway of 168 degrees, which I set in the HSI, then intercept a 199 degree course to CAVER.

When I called tower for takeoff clearance, they amended, "Maintain 168 degree heading, climb and maintain 4,000." OK, can do...

Tower handed me off to Las Vegas departure, who kept me at 4,000 until I was clear of the Bravo 6,000' ring, then "maintain 168 degree heading, climb and maintain 6,000."

I was motoring along a long, long ways on that heading and altitude, but about 20 nm south of the airport, I could see the terrain was going to intersect my flight path. So that's when I told Approach I was modifying course 10 degrees to the west to miss the terrain, and he scolded me for accepting "maintain own terrain clearance" if I couldn't. Well... I could, certainly, but the controller assigned me an altitude and heading that was taking me into the rocks... so something had to give.

http://www.secure4host.net/upload/files/HND_Departure.jpg

The NTSB investigator and I agree that approach either can assign heading and altitude, OR have me maintain my own terrain clearance. But they can't have it both ways. The NTSB guy tells me they do that often at LAS, despite the NTSB complaining about it to the FAA. Local stupid procedures...

After the scolding, they vectored me clear of the Bravo, and turned me over to center for a climb. Very poor service.

Yeah, they boo booed. They can give you specific departure instructions that include headings along with the maintain your own terrain clearance speech. But they can't change things after you've accepted it without reaffirming the 'maintain your own.' When they took the SID away, the thing you had agreed to 'maintain your own' on, and replaced it with something else, the heading to fly, they were wrong. Did you make contact directly with the NTSB to talk about it? Or did you file an ASRS and they called you? Just curious, I havn't heard of NTSB getting directly involved with something like this before.
 
That is a horribly drawn airspace. Ultimately, the poor guy was PIC, but the airspace designers are accessories in this - as is anyone who created a culture where he thought he couldn't get a clearance in that area.

By the way, why don't more people earn and fly with an IFR flight plan.. it seems like so much extra work to avoid the bravo's, be on your own, for what ultimately is (in my opinion) a less safe and higher workload flight.. not that IFR guarantees safety.. but you wouldn't be monkeying around avoiding airspace.. you just go where they tell you (basically)

We're a bit spoiled where we live, because it is rare that we see icing, let alone icing that we can't escape in non-FIKI aircraft, and even when we do get rain, that is usually not convective rain and we can fly in hard IMC without risking tearing our aircraft apart.

Instrument flight plan and ATC assistance does not preclude flying into mountains, in sight of the airport.

Yes, that incident - and the United that nearly proceeded it - were problematic and resulted in major changes. In fact, SIDs and STARs exist not just to simplify clearances, but also to help prevent this sort of thing. Same thing with computer aided vectoring.

It certainly does not.. however, in this case and in the Twin Commander case above they likely wouldn't be dead as they wouldn't have been making an effort to avoid the Bravo

That is very true.

Just going where "they" tell you is so dangerous of an attitude I can't stifle myself. An attitude of only going where "you" feel it's safe to go liberates you from fear and uncertainty and ensures your safe passage.

I think you're missing the point. By flying IFR, you're making a deal to exchange your ability to choose your route and altitude in exchange for guaranteed terrain clearance and services to vector you away from other aircraft. It is your choice to make, but one that makes sense in many situations.

Not a fair example to use today since the FAA has since implemented changes to the AIM and the controller’s manual.

Yeah, it is a pretty poor example to use, and was part of the learning curve to get us where we are today.

Certainly odd, seems a little lazy on the part of the people who designed the chart.. does this imply that tunneling, or even hiking around that mountain, requires a Bravo clearance?


Yup! That giant blue "8,5" is a good indicator that staying below a 6,500 foot shelf will likely be unsafe


Context and being able to comprehend statements relative to their subject is important.. quite the straw man you built here.. PoA's pedantry strikes again!
1) I indicated "basically" .. no where in my post did I indicate that you should "just" go where ATC tells you and this guaranteed safety
2) "they" are not telling you anything.. as the PIC you agree to the route they cleared you on, and should be vigilant of the instructions given, notice that my post did not say "blindly do what they tell you".. it said "you *basically* go where they tell you" .. you agree to a clearance on the ground and fly that.. it saves you the hassle of monkeying around trying to avoid Bravo's because you're too lazy to talk to ATC or intimidated by it.. if they vector you or deviate you from the course then it is your responsibility to ensure safety of that (the "basically" part of my statement).. in this example I highly doubt his IFR clearance (among the thousands given) would have put him into that mountain, but, if it had, that would still be on him to only accept a clearance or instruction he can safely handle
3) not sure why people seem to be piling onto controllers here, and going back to the 1970s for an example and "I once had someone vector me towards a mountain" .. just somewhat recently a 777 was saved by ATC near LA after their crew (english as second language) made a wrong turn and almost blasted into the mountains.. from my experience ATC is very careful with terrain, you're just about guaranteed to get a terrain alert from ATC when on the published RNAV for 17 at SEE

I totally agree... we've always visualized airspace as going up in the air, and unless it say "SFC" that there is room under it

The fact that they chart a Bravo shelf below not just the highest point in the sector, but a high point that basically dominates it, is pretty egregious.

Also, you know my cure for the RNAV 17 at SEE. Don't fly to that terrible airport :p

So I have watched this air Safety accident report before. What strikes me odd was the statement about FAA policy dictated denying flight following foe the surrounding airports of the Phoenix TRACON. Why is that?? Is that true?? The class Bravos near me must be more accommodating.

It wasn't FAA policy. It was apparently a local practice at P90. FAA policy encourages flight following.

A number of contributing causes in that accident:

Yeah, there was some registration issue with the aircraft and it had been flown on a ferry permit. That is probably part of the reason they didn't fly IFR.

Following the ODP would have taken him into the Bravo, so I can easily see why they didn't follow it - especially back then, when FF requests were regularly denied and Bravo clearances were non existent outside the two transition routes.

They raised the Bravo floor in the sector he was in to help allow a safer transition altitude, but it is still low.

The primary cause was improper preflight planning.

Not really. The tower told him to extend his upwind. He then turned into the path of a mountain that he wouldn't be able to climb above because of the Bravo shelf. Now, there were other mistakes made - particularly involving situational awareness - but the preflight was probably ok.

That's bonkers, and quite infuriating.. so do they make the Southwest guys jump through the same hoops and play musical mountains, or they actually treat them with a modicum of respect?

No, they bend over backward for the air carriers. I was VFR out of HND on a brutally hot day after an Angel Flight. Performance was fine, but the JPI was telling me that a slow climb was probably the best thing for my cylinders, so I had no interest in meeting the IFR climb requirements and just followed the 15 till I was clear and climbed super slowly. The guy on approach was telling all the air carriers that he knew it was hot, so what could he do to help them and not worry about hitting the altitudes - though most of them seemed to not be struggling.

The only rude controllers I've ever talked to were PHX. I used to fly to California quite a bit, and they had a habit of turning eastbound traffic SE towards Gila Bend, then spewing " you're out of my cover area, squawk VFR frequency change approved" after they PUT you there. In short, you're with ABQ center, hand off PHX then back to ABQ center or Tuscon APP if heading back to Texas. Could never get a Class B transition landing any of the outlying fields - the corridors weren't handy or I would have used them.

To be fair to them, the culture does seem better now. I just did 2 recent trips to SDL, IFR both ways on both, and I heard plenty of FF requests and Bravo clearances after VFR pilots followed certain, sensible instructions. The controllers were polite, patient with the various visiting students and seemed to care.

As someone who has had the IR for 35 years I can assure you that the rating itself is no assurance that you can file IFR. There's currency and proficiency that needs to be maintained, including current charts (which admittedly is easy now with Foreflight but was often a problem with paper subscriptions for a limited area and no time to get them by mail). Also, with the IR you are exposed to some hazards like ice and embedded thunderstorms that you likely wouldn't be if VFR.

Yes, it is easier to keep your charts current and lots of currency options.

I don't know for sure, but you'd think it should be nearly zero. Nonetheless here's a quote from one ERAU study at least suggesting that overall VMC into IMC the figure is "somewhere around" 20% that are instrument rated, (but admittedly it doesn't specify LOC vs. other causes, and I don't know if the data collection might have excluded CFIT):



Interestingly, there is also the suggestion that IR pilots are simply less likely to scud run, which should lower their VFR into IMC rate in those figures.

VFR into IMC incidents with instrument pilots usually has happened with either lapsed currency/proficiency pilots or unplanned circumstances. Part of the problem there is that people often treat VFR flying with less of an attention to detail. Just fly by landmarks and such, instead of loading up a flight plan with safe altitudes - even if that just means direct - and staying sharply on heading. I recently read an ASRS report about a pilot at MRY who ended up VFR into IMC after relying on a rosy AWOS report when tower was closed and turning into a cloud bank on departure. He maintained situational awareness and did what people should do when faced with a situation where they know there are terrain issues (MRY is at the base of a mountain). Instead of freaking out and trying to turn, he just maintained heading, which was over beaches, ocean and flat land, put on his AP and climbed at 500 fpm until he broke out. That kind of situational awareness is needed in any sort of flying, but of paramount importance when flying VFR.
 
That is a horribly drawn airspace. Ultimately, the poor guy was PIC, but the airspace designers are accessories in this - as is anyone who created a culture where he thought he couldn't get a clearance in that area.

I believe that shelf was put so low there in order to allow parallel runways on the 2 south runways at KPHX, which they did not end up often doing.

Not really. The tower told him to extend his upwind. He then turned into the path of a mountain that he wouldn't be able to climb above because of the Bravo shelf. Now, there were other mistakes made - particularly involving situational awareness - but the preflight was probably ok.

I read the whole book by the wife. “Angels Three” by Karen Perry, since I am a newer pilot and we live in Phoenix. Some of the admissions in the book surprised me.

It struck me that there was a certain sloppy attitude about this flight. They had done the same flight a week or two before and just quickly turned it around. IIRC they turned this around quickly. Probably no time to really consider the specific pre-planning of this flight segment. They may never have even considered what would happen if the turn to the south was made later.

So complacency may have been a factor here.

I think there also was a tower controlled change just as they were taking off which may have reduced the awareness of the situation by the controller as well.
 
I believe that shelf was put so low there in order to allow parallel runways on the 2 south runways at KPHX, which they did not end up often doing.



I read the whole book by the wife. “Angels Three” by Karen Perry, since I am a newer pilot and we live in Phoenix. Some of the admissions in the book surprised me.

It struck me that there was a certain sloppy attitude about this flight. They had done the same flight a week or two before and just quickly turned it around. IIRC they turned this around quickly. Probably no time to really consider the specific pre-planning of this flight segment. They may never have even considered what would happen if the turn to the south was made later.

So complacency may have been a factor here.

I think there also was a tower controlled change just as they were taking off which may have reduced the awareness of the situation by the controller as well.

With regards to the Bravo shelf, I was referencing the one in Vegas that just probably killed this Cirrus pilot.

The FFZ crash was definitely partly due to the late turn. Still, I'm not sure why the guy, who apparently used an iPad, wasn't looking at that and wondering.
 
Not really. The tower told him to extend his upwind. He then turned into the path of a mountain that he wouldn't be able to climb above because of the Bravo shelf. Now, there were other mistakes made - particularly involving situational awareness - but the preflight was probably ok.

:confused2:

"OK" preflight planning on a night-VFR flight would have been to devise a way to know where those mountains were at all times, so that an unexpected instruction from ATC would not lead to killing everyone on board. Even without a moving-map GPS, he could have plotted a couple of PXR VOR radials that would have given him options for safe climb paths out from under the 5000-foot shelf which ends at 25 DME.
 
:confused2:

"OK" preflight planning on a night-VFR flight would have been to devise a way to know where those mountains were at all times, so that an unexpected instruction from ATC would not lead to killing everyone on board. Even without a moving-map GPS, he could have plotted a couple of PXR VOR radials that would have given him options for safe climb paths out from under the 5000-foot shelf which ends at 25 DME.

Remember, the shelf was different then. I believe the current shelf would have resulted in him climbing safely
 
Remember, the shelf was different then. I believe the current shelf would have resulted in him climbing safely

I was looking at the current chart when I wrote my post. Without a Bravo clearance, it would have him climbing out from under the 5000 MSL shelf with a 5057 MSL peak only four NM ahead. That's too close for comfort for me for night VFR.
 
By the way, when did that shelf change? I have a 2012 sectional that shows it being at the same location and altitude as it is now.
 
I was flying out of KFFZ just a few weeks ago VFR during the day with an instructor. He normally works out of KCHD. He was really impressed by how close this shelf is and commented also on the bad design.
 
By the way, when did that shelf change? I have a 2012 sectional that shows it being at the same location and altitude as it is now.

I think 2007. I was not a pilot then but remembered the complaints about noise changes shortly after we moved here in 2005. The accident was in late 2011.
 
I was looking at the current chart when I wrote my post. Without a Bravo clearance, it would have him climbing out from under the 5000 MSL shelf with a 5057 MSL peak only four NM ahead. That's too close for comfort for me for night VFR.

My whole thing about that accident is that, I just don't think PHX needs a 5k floor all the way to Apache Junction. They can raise that slice to 6k and the airliners would be fine.

Of course this entire question would be moot if PHX wasn't hostile with VFR traffic and Bravo in the first place. That's really what this is about.
 
That is a horribly drawn airspace. Ultimately, the poor guy was PIC, but the airspace designers are accessories in this - as is anyone who created a culture where he thought he couldn't get a clearance in that area.



We're a bit spoiled where we live, because it is rare that we see icing, let alone icing that we can't escape in non-FIKI aircraft, and even when we do get rain, that is usually not convective rain and we can fly in hard IMC without risking tearing our aircraft apart.



Yes, that incident - and the United that nearly proceeded it - were problematic and resulted in major changes. In fact, SIDs and STARs exist not just to simplify clearances, but also to help prevent this sort of thing. Same thing with computer aided vectoring.



That is very true.



I think you're missing the point. By flying IFR, you're making a deal to exchange your ability to choose your route and altitude in exchange for guaranteed terrain clearance and services to vector you away from other aircraft. It is your choice to make, but one that makes sense in many situations.



Yeah, it is a pretty poor example to use, and was part of the learning curve to get us where we are today.



The fact that they chart a Bravo shelf below not just the highest point in the sector, but a high point that basically dominates it, is pretty egregious.

Also, you know my cure for the RNAV 17 at SEE. Don't fly to that terrible airport :p



It wasn't FAA policy. It was apparently a local practice at P90. FAA policy encourages flight following.



Yeah, there was some registration issue with the aircraft and it had been flown on a ferry permit. That is probably part of the reason they didn't fly IFR.

Following the ODP would have taken him into the Bravo, so I can easily see why they didn't follow it - especially back then, when FF requests were regularly denied and Bravo clearances were non existent outside the two transition routes.

They raised the Bravo floor in the sector he was in to help allow a safer transition altitude, but it is still low.



Not really. The tower told him to extend his upwind. He then turned into the path of a mountain that he wouldn't be able to climb above because of the Bravo shelf. Now, there were other mistakes made - particularly involving situational awareness - but the preflight was probably ok.



No, they bend over backward for the air carriers. I was VFR out of HND on a brutally hot day after an Angel Flight. Performance was fine, but the JPI was telling me that a slow climb was probably the best thing for my cylinders, so I had no interest in meeting the IFR climb requirements and just followed the 15 till I was clear and climbed super slowly. The guy on approach was telling all the air carriers that he knew it was hot, so what could he do to help them and not worry about hitting the altitudes - though most of them seemed to not be struggling.



To be fair to them, the culture does seem better now. I just did 2 recent trips to SDL, IFR both ways on both, and I heard plenty of FF requests and Bravo clearances after VFR pilots followed certain, sensible instructions. The controllers were polite, patient with the various visiting students and seemed to care.



Yes, it is easier to keep your charts current and lots of currency options.



VFR into IMC incidents with instrument pilots usually has happened with either lapsed currency/proficiency pilots or unplanned circumstances. Part of the problem there is that people often treat VFR flying with less of an attention to detail. Just fly by landmarks and such, instead of loading up a flight plan with safe altitudes - even if that just means direct - and staying sharply on heading. I recently read an ASRS report about a pilot at MRY who ended up VFR into IMC after relying on a rosy AWOS report when tower was closed and turning into a cloud bank on departure. He maintained situational awareness and did what people should do when faced with a situation where they know there are terrain issues (MRY is at the base of a mountain). Instead of freaking out and trying to turn, he just maintained heading, which was over beaches, ocean and flat land, put on his AP and climbed at 500 fpm until he broke out. That kind of situational awareness is needed in any sort of flying, but of paramount importance when flying VFR.

Sorry, but his preflight was totally lacking because he did not know where the terrain was for his departure at night. We see the same thing with pilots departing without an IFR clearance attempting to get the clearance inflight.
 
Remember, the shelf was different then. I believe the current shelf would have resulted in him climbing safely

There have been no changes to the airspace since the 2011 Superstitions crash. That part of the Class B (known as "Area I") had a floor of 8000' until 2007, at which point it was lowered to 5000'-- where it remains today. Efforts to change that are ongoing.
 
There have been no changes to the airspace since the 2011 Superstitions crash. That part of the Class B (known as "Area I") had a floor of 8000' until 2007, at which point it was lowered to 5000'-- where it remains today. Efforts to change that are ongoing.

Yup, clear as day. That's all people need to understand about this. As to change, 9 years of debate? file that ask with the likes of primary non commercial, or any item under the "wish in one hand, defecate on the other see which one fills up first" paradigm of regulatory capture.
 
Losing the ASI in or near IMC near mountains warrants declaring an emergency negating Bravo requirements, so he still could have climbed through the bravo if he wanted to.
From the limited info we have it seems this guy was not situationally aware until he realized he was heading for a mountain so none of this really matters.
 
Did you make contact directly with the NTSB to talk about it? Or did you file an ASRS and they called you? Just curious, I havn't heard of NTSB getting directly involved with something like this before.

I filed an ASRS, and got a call...
 
So ATC turned him into mountains via a canyon and has no blame for the accident?

2.46 hours in the last 6 months flying is hardly enough to be proficient for a day VFR flight, never mind a dark night near mountains. Although in his defense the pilot probably never thought he would be any where near the mountains.

This is a sad accident. The pilot lost SA. He was probably rusty. Probably out of IFR currency. Once he was turned away from the airport, there was no reason for him to be flying at 170 knots. Just a lot of mistakes all around. RIP
 
So ATC turned him into mountains via a canyon and has no blame for the accident?

2.46 hours in the last 6 months flying is hardly enough to be proficient for a day VFR flight, never mind a dark night near mountains. Although in his defense the pilot probably never thought he would be any where near the mountains.

This is a sad accident. The pilot lost SA. He was probably rusty. Probably out of IFR currency. Once he was turned away from the airport, there was no reason for him to be flying at 170 knots. Just a lot of mistakes all around. RIP

Yeah that is a little odd. When VFR, you are required to provide your own terrain and obstacle avoidance, even with a controller issuing vectors you must be ready to say "Unable." However you'd think the controller should have noticed the aircraft going off into the terrain on radar and been a little more proactive with the vectors. I'm guessing they were focused on the fast movers leaving Nellis and didn't spend much time worrying about the little ole VFR Cirrus.
 
So ATC turned him into mountains via a canyon and has no blame for the accident?

2.46 hours in the last 6 months flying is hardly enough to be proficient for a day VFR flight, never mind a dark night near mountains. Although in his defense the pilot probably never thought he would be any where near the mountains.

This is a sad accident. The pilot lost SA. He was probably rusty. Probably out of IFR currency. Once he was turned away from the airport, there was no reason for him to be flying at 170 knots. Just a lot of mistakes all around. RIP

Yeah, unfortunately the aircraft was VFR. ATC isn’t responsible for terrain avoidance even when vectoring. Kinda wonder why a safety alert wasn’t issued though.
 
Yeah that is a little odd. When VFR, you are required to provide your own terrain and obstacle avoidance, even with a controller issuing vectors you must be ready to say "Unable." However you'd think the controller should have noticed the aircraft going off into the terrain on radar and been a little more proactive with the vectors. I'm guessing they were focused on the fast movers leaving Nellis and didn't spend much time worrying about the little ole VFR Cirrus.

Yeah, unfortunately the aircraft was VFR. ATC isn’t responsible for terrain avoidance even when vectoring. Kinda wonder why a safety alert wasn’t issued though.

Whenever I'm going to be near mountains, I'm extra vigilant with my preflight, I want to know the MVAs. I also get wigged if I'm vectored away from my plan, FF is good with their profile view. I'm thinking the warning the pilot was talking about was from foreflight. Unfortunately he was already boxed in and 170 knots too fast to make tight enough turns. When I'm turned away from my destination, I pull back to 30% power and slow down, no sense in speeding away from your destination.
 
No pilot, no controller is infallible. Years ago Ricky Nelson's older brother David was a guard fighter pilot, I think In a F4 coming east at night out of San Diego. He followed atc instructions right into the mountains.
I just looked this up and its not correct, not even close, so I don't know who, but I recall something like this. I learned to fly there, but it has been 50 years.
You're not thinking of Dean Martin's son are you? He was killed in an F4. My brother who was regular Air Force flying F4's out of George AFB in Victorville, CA used to fly with him on joint training exercises with the guard. Said he was a really nice guy, very unpretentious but, sadly, not the greatest fighter pilot.
 
FF is good
I second this, you can also turn on terrain on the map that will do similar color shading to represent threats.. great to have and always important to stay vigilant

When I'm turned away from my destination, I pull back to 30% power and slow down, no sense in speeding away from your destination.
This. People in fast planes love to go fast, understandable, but if air traffic control is giving you delay vectors there's no sense in going fast..
 
Yeah, they boo booed. They can give you specific departure instructions that include headings along with the maintain your own terrain clearance speech. But they can't change things after you've accepted it without reaffirming the 'maintain your own.' When they took the SID away, the thing you had agreed to 'maintain your own' on, and replaced it with something else, the heading to fly, they were wrong. Did you make contact directly with the NTSB to talk about it? Or did you file an ASRS and they called you? Just curious, I havn't heard of NTSB getting directly involved with something like this before.

I did a flight out of HND a few years ago to LAX, this was the exchange:
ATC: "cleared to KLAX via fly heading 170, complete the turn within 2nm of the airport, expect radar vectors CRESO, V538 GFS HEC, then as filed. Maintain 7000 expect 10,000 2 minutes after departure, departure frequency 119.4 squawk 4742."

Me: "copy all, squawk 4742, let me know if you need the rest."

ATC: "that's up to you, sir, and verify this clearance allows for compliance with terrain and obstruction avoidance."

This isn't from memory, it's transcribed this from a video of the flight.
 
I did a flight out of HND a few years ago to LAX, this was the exchange:
ATC: "cleared to KLAX via fly heading 170, complete the turn within 2nm of the airport, expect radar vectors CRESO, V538 GFS HEC, then as filed. Maintain 7000 expect 10,000 2 minutes after departure, departure frequency 119.4 squawk 4742."

Me: "copy all, squawk 4742, let me know if you need the rest."

ATC: "that's up to you, sir, and verify this clearance allows for compliance with terrain and obstruction avoidance."

This isn't from memory, it's transcribed this from a video of the flight.

No read back. That’s rare these days. ;)
 
It's one of the few times I've not read back the whole clearance. It was unusually long, I was confident that I'd copied it correctly, and lastly, the freq was busy (clearance and ground were combined). It's been a while so I can't quite remember, but since it was being filmed as part of a broader set of flights (flying from NJ to CA and back), I _think_ I wanted to show that it's not technically mandatory to readback the whole clearance. I don't recall if I addressed in the debrief or not.
 
I did a flight out of HND a few years ago to LAX, this was the exchange:
ATC: "cleared to KLAX via fly heading 170, complete the turn within 2nm of the airport, expect radar vectors CRESO, V538 GFS HEC, then as filed. Maintain 7000 expect 10,000 2 minutes after departure, departure frequency 119.4 squawk 4742."

Me: "copy all, squawk 4742, let me know if you need the rest."

ATC: "that's up to you, sir, and verify this clearance allows for compliance with terrain and obstruction avoidance."

This isn't from memory, it's transcribed this from a video of the flight.
Yeah. All the I's were dotted and T's crossed on that. As I recall, what happened to @PaulMillner is they gave him a Clearance including the maintain your own terrain clearance speech. Then just before take off, the Tower changed his departure instructions. But did not reaffirm the maintain own terrain clearance. They are required to do that. As far as a complete, verbatim read back of the Clearance goes, that's a different subject.
 
No pilot, no controller is infallible. Years ago Ricky Nelson's older brother David was a guard fighter pilot, I think In a F4 coming east at night out of San Diego. He followed atc instructions right into the mountains.
I just looked this up and its not correct, not even close, so I don't know who, but I recall something like this. I learned to fly there, but it has been 50 years.

It was Dean Martins son.He was a pretend drunk prior to that day. He became a real one after that day.
 
No pilot, no controller is infallible. Years ago Ricky Nelson's older brother David was a guard fighter pilot, I think In a F4 coming east at night out of San Diego. He followed atc instructions right into the mountains.
I just looked this up and its not correct, not even close, so I don't know who, but I recall something like this. I learned to fly there, but it has been 50 years.

Ricky Nelson was killed in the crash of his DC-3 on New Year's Eve, 1985. The crash was due to an onboard fire and was not ATC related. The two seriously burned pilots were the only survivors.
 
Instrument flight plan and ATC assistance does not preclude flying into mountains, in sight of the airport. The controller in question swore under oath that he had never seen the mountain, although it was clearly visible as he drove to work each day, for years. Every body died except the controller vectoring the flight to the ILS. The flight was diverted to Dulles due to high cross winds at National. The Captain and First Officer had never flown to Dulles previously.

A little personal to me, as a controller tried to fly me into the same mountain, on an IFR flight plan, but I refused to remain at my assigned altitude, and announced I would declare an emergency if I did not get a climb immediately. The climb was approved, and I crossed Mt. Storm at 1,000 feet AGL.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TWA_Flight_514

Did you read the wiki article?

"Air traffic controllers cleared the flight down to 7,000 feet (2,130 m) before clearing them for the approach while not on a published segment.

The jetliner began a descent to 1,800 feet (550 m), shown on the first checkpoint for the published approach. The cockpit voice recorder later indicated there was some confusion in the cockpit over whether they were still under a radar-controlled approach segment which would allow them to descend safely. After reaching 1,800 feet (550 m) there were some 100-to-200-foot (30 to 60 m) altitude deviations which the flight crew discussed as encountering heavy downdrafts and reduced visibility in snow.

The plane impacted the west slope of Mount Weather at 1,670 feet (510 m) above sea level "

Controller did not vector to them into the mountain. He did clear them from the approach when it was not on a published segment. So they descended too early.
 
When the PIC requests higher 3 times and is refused, and the present altitude is going to be fatal in a matter of minutes, you, as PIC have a right to

Declare an emergency and do what you need to do.
 
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