How much longer to fix the 737 Max

brien23

Cleared for Takeoff
Joined
May 31, 2005
Messages
1,437
Location
Oak Harbor
Display Name

Display name:
Brien
Just how long can Boeing keep making 737 max in Renton and stacking them up around the airport till they run out of space. Airlines are dropping flights, this summer looks bleak if they can't get the Max up and running again. How is this possible that Boeing fell into this mess and how are they going to get out of it if they keep saying only a few more days, and the few more days fix never happens.
 
There was an interesting episode on the Airplane Geeks podcast on the 737Max8 issues which included two pilots who flew them. There were some eye opening points they made. One of the things that stood was a comment that there apparently was still some uncertainty at Boeing about whether the MCAS issue was going to be addressed by a releasing a software "fix" or "update." One implies fault with Boeing and the other with the pilot. This was very surprising to hear.
 
This isn't a simple problem with a straightforward solution. United's chief pilot has publicly stated they have no problem with MCAS. However there are other issues involved. For starters, US carriers have more stringent training requirements than many other carriers due to FAA mandate. If the MCAS training simply consisted of the 2.5 hr of online training, as advertised, wouldn't matter to the US carriers because of the additional training pilots go thru, both for FAA and carrier ops.

I had a lengthy discussion a few weeks ago with two pilots - one United and the other Southwest - and I asked about Boeing's development approach and the MCAS. As a software engineer in the aerospace industry (disclaimer - I worked for Boeing in the past but not the aircraft side so I have zero knowledge of that part of the company) it's now common practice to get the users (not the folks who sign the checks) involved in design and development from Day 1. According to these 2 pilots, they don't know anyone from their companies who were involved, other than at the end when the product was introduced and the training material provided.

To me, this is Fail #1...having experienced pilots involved at the beginning, and able to discuss and weigh in on how a subsystem operates is critical.

On the other hand, these pilots did not have outstanding confidence in some other countries pilot training methods. They pointed out the lack of stick & rudder skills that the ab initio approach takes - put the student in a high-end, complex sim rather than start with the simple basics in a small airplane. One comment was "remember the XXX airplane that didn't make it to the runway at LA a few years ago? Any of the pilots for that company can recite perfectly chapter and verse the operations manuals but can't react instinctively to a problem - they gotta find the manual first!"

Isn't that what was happening with either Lion Air or Ethiopian Air? They were busy searching the manuals rather than flying the airplane.
 
Instead of making a great airplane and require training and a new type rating, Boeing put band-aid on top of band-aid on top of band-aid................until they just made a complete mess. Boeing should buy them all back and give the airlines a modernized 757.
 
One implies fault with Boeing and the other with the pilot. This was very surprising to hear.
They are not mutually exclusive.

It's clear that the MCAS logic, which allowed unscheduled activation based on one faulty data input, was flawed.

It is also becoming clear that neither accident crew did a good job of flying the airplane once the unschedule MCAS activation occurred.
 
Instead of making a great airplane and require training and a new type rating, Boeing put band-aid on top of band-aid on top of band-aid................until they just made a complete mess. Boeing should buy them all back and give the airlines a modernized 757.

They only did what the customers wanted. Airlines have long pushed the type rating issue and have pitted Airbus and Boeing against each other and the FAA to make it happen.
 
Air Canada's schedules seem to be targeting June or July, and they are one of the most affected carriers.
 
Instead of making a great airplane and require training and a new type rating, Boeing put band-aid on top of band-aid on top of band-aid................until they just made a complete mess. Boeing should buy them all back and give the airlines a modernized 757.

Haha! That's like saying Cessna should buy back all the 182s and give them a modernized 206! Any pilot who can fly a 182 can fly a 182. With correct training, a 182A pilot with a hockey puck compass can fly a factory new T182 with full glass after a little training. The 737 is not a mess, just old school jet plane that's been modernized.
 
Modernized with baling wire and duct tape.

Right, and I suppose you and the other hyperbolic naysayers on here could build a better plane.

I don’t know what your background is but I have read a lot of dumb comments on this story coming from folks who I know have neither flown or maintained any jet airliner let alone any 737 derivative.
 
"Boeing's problems are mounting..."
And so are Ethiopia Airlines problems. Putting a 361 hr pilot in the right seat effectively made it a single pilot operation especially when 2 experienced minds and 4 hands were required for certification and handling this problem. But don't take my word, these are the same thoughts as a number of line flying pilots to include one pilot with experience in extreme "Oh s***" moments, named Sullenberger. While the SIC in the Lion Air flight wasn't as junior to the Captain and had over 4000hrs in type, there is still discussion why the captain could maintain control of the aircraft through 21 MCAS activations but after he handed over to the SIC to work checklists the co-pilot didn't make it through 4 activations before losing control.

And don't forget the Germanwings accident. Most social media/internet experts thought the aircraft locked out the captain and deactivated the autopilot altitude function continuously until it hit the mountain. They even thought the SIC succumbed to hypoxia due to a malfunctioning oxygen mask and his "steady breathing recorded on the CVR." And look where that one went.

I have a 8hr flight scheduled on a 9 MAX in June and I hope they get this problem sorted out. I also did not hesitate to fly the 737 when it had the rudder issues or the DC-10 after O'Hara. Where I had the most concern was boarding flights in 3rd world countries. It's not to knock them as they have a number of excellent pilots--they just have very few of them. But that's my opinion. I found in my experience in aviation and accident investigations in particular, it's very rare for the aircraft to actually stop flying and kill you. It will make for interesting reading when both final reports are released.
 
To answer the original question, it’s probably already fixed, if it ever needed “fixing”, but the massive CYA activity will delay implementation until 2119.

Cheers
 
Isn't the fix relatively simple.. don't make the second AoA an option, make it standard, and ensure that pilot training is proper and involves full MCAS failure recovery.. the main part of the delay I think is largely CYA and bureaucracy related

In addition, it will take the plane several years to shake the stigma. If any Max has an accident in the next 1-3 years post fix the first thing they'll be looking at is MCAS.. so there will certainly be some stigma and a massive CYA effort involved here. Luckily people have a short memory. Up until this accident people boarding 737 were not worried about rudder jams, people boarding MD-80s were not worried about jack screw failures, people boarding A330 are not worried about frozen pitot and stalls, people boarding Colgan or Dash 8 are not worried about fatigued pilots and ice.. the public will get over it soon

Boeing should buy them all back and give the airlines a modernized 757.
right. Because Boeing has the capital to buy back 4,661 airplanes (source: https://simpleflying.com/what-airlines-have-the-boeing-737-max-on-order/), build and certify an entirely new plane, and then what, expect Southwest to drop their massive 737 fleet and who's going to pay for SW's cost to introduce a new type to their fleet, train them, etc. I can assure you that Boeing was not actively looking to be in the pickle they're in currently. They didn't cobble together a MAX for the sake of being cheap and half rate, they did so out of fierce competition with Airbus and looking at what the market wants. Just about every modern airliner flying has some sort of envelope protection or electronic control augmentation on there. Boeing's fault with the MAX was tying it to just one AoA and not training crews on how to handle an MCAS failure, and how it may be different from a typical trim runaway
 
As to the silly idea that anyone should be dissuaded from boarding a 737 Max, all I can say is that these two accidents would only dissuade me from flying certain airlines. The plane is safe in my opinion. Those airlines, not so much.
 
Two AoA vanes are standard
okay thanks, I thought from the other thread someone had mentioned that the MCAS gets its input from just the one angle of attack indicator.. and it was an additional option for it to receive inputs from both. I could be wrong, but that's what I remember reading from the other thread
 
okay thanks, I thought from the other thread someone had mentioned that the MCAS gets its input from just the one angle of attack indicator.. and it was an additional option for it to receive inputs from both. I could be wrong, but that's what I remember reading from the other thread

Two games are standard, as mentioned. The MCAS implementation is/was to take data from only one vane, with no cross-checking.

I know not what the logic is for which vane it sources data from.
 
Two games are standard, as mentioned. The MCAS implementation is/was to take data from only one vane, with no cross-checking.

I know not what the logic is for which vane it sources data from.
I thought it alternated flight to flight.
 
okay thanks, I thought from the other thread someone had mentioned that the MCAS gets its input from just the one angle of attack indicator.. and it was an additional option for it to receive inputs from both. I could be wrong, but that's what I remember reading from the other thread
You may have read that. Lots of inaccurate information has been posted.

Each AoA vane feeds its respective flight control computer (FCC) and air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU). Each FCC activates its respective stick shaker when its AoA data indicates a stall or impending stall. Each ADIRU combines information from multiple sources which is output to various systems including the respective airspeed and altitude displays. The master FCC is selected to the side of the pilot-flying for each leg. MCAS is part of the speed trim system (STS). The STS uses the data from the master FCC. The failure of one AoA vane to an excessively high AoA would cause erroneous airspeed and altitude data on the respective side, stick shaker on the respective side, and unscheduled MCAS activation. One of the changes to the STS software will inhibit MCAS when the two AoA inputs disagree by (I think) 5.5 degrees.

The option was to have AoA displays and/or an AOA DISAGREE message. The AoA display option is normally associated with airlines that install the heads up display (HUD) for CAT II/III approaches. Airlines that use the dual-channel autoland option for CAT II/III approaches, instead of the HUD, generally do not have the AoA display. Very few airline transport jets have AoA displays. It isn't something that's normally included. Boeing will be added the AoA display and AOA DISAGREE message to all MAX aircraft.

I know not what the logic is for which vane it sources data from.
Now you do.
 
"Boeing's problems are mounting and things are going to get worse before they get better"

https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-future-remains-unclear-due-to-737-max-scandal-2019-4

An incredibly one-sided article.

What that journal and most others don't understand is that Boeing is 2 companies - Boeing Aircraft (now known as Aviation and Flight Ops) and Boeing Defense (Integrated Defense/Space/Security). Aircraft is having the problems, not the other side of the house.
 
You have to wonder if this software logic "fix" is like chasing your tail or plugging a leaky dyke with your finger. Is the next MAX going to go down because MCAS was disabled on account of AOA Disagree and it stalls? o_O
 
And so are Ethiopia Airlines problems. Putting a 361 hr pilot in the right seat effectively made it a single pilot operation especially when 2 experienced minds and 4 hands were required for certification and handling this problem. But don't take my word, these are the same thoughts as a number of line flying pilots to include one pilot with experience in extreme "Oh s***" moments, named Sullenberger. While the SIC in the Lion Air flight wasn't as junior to the Captain and had over 4000hrs in type, there is still discussion why the captain could maintain control of the aircraft through 21 MCAS activations but after he handed over to the SIC to work checklists the co-pilot didn't make it through 4 activations before losing control.

And don't forget the Germanwings accident. Most social media/internet experts thought the aircraft locked out the captain and deactivated the autopilot altitude function continuously until it hit the mountain. They even thought the SIC succumbed to hypoxia due to a malfunctioning oxygen mask and his "steady breathing recorded on the CVR." And look where that one went.

I have a 8hr flight scheduled on a 9 MAX in June and I hope they get this problem sorted out. I also did not hesitate to fly the 737 when it had the rudder issues or the DC-10 after O'Hara. Where I had the most concern was boarding flights in 3rd world countries. It's not to knock them as they have a number of excellent pilots--they just have very few of them. But that's my opinion. I found in my experience in aviation and accident investigations in particular, it's very rare for the aircraft to actually stop flying and kill you. It will make for interesting reading when both final reports are released.
Every country in the world besides the us uses low time pilots in Boeings and airbus. They can fly the NG just fine. Boeing built a death machine and they know it. Sully is a joke when It comes to commentary. He needs to apologize for slandering that flight crew and never speak again. I hope Boeing gets many suits against them and they think twice about hiding software from crews and then not having an answer on how to actually fly the plane without killing hundreds.
 
You have to wonder if this software logic "fix" is like chasing your tail or plugging a leaky dyke with your finger. Is the next MAX going to go down because MCAS was disabled on account of AOA Disagree and it stalls? o_O

Or because the pilots were incompetent or the right wing fell off or geese were ingested in both engines oh wait, that happened already, or the right windshield blew out and decapitated the Captain or the vertical tail separated, wait, that happened already, or the left engine separated and went over the top of the wing, da** that happened already, or any of any thing goes crazy and people die.

S*** happens and I’d fly as a pax or in the cockpit of any mainline USA or First world airline and NEVER in any third or second world airline no matter who built the airplane.

Cheers
 
You have to wonder if this software logic "fix" is like chasing your tail or plugging a leaky dyke with your finger. Is the next MAX going to go down because MCAS was disabled on account of AOA Disagree and it stalls? o_O
Really?!? A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. No knowledge even more so.
 
How much longer to fix the 737 Max

Why do you ask, are you hoping to buy a lot of them on the cheap and then get the free fix,(whatever needs fixing) and start your own airline.?? :lol::lol:
 
In my opinion, the big sticking point going forward is going to be the “how the pilots will be trained” question.

Obviously, people were astonished that all it took was 30 minutes on a iPad to certify a 737 pilot to be qualified to operate a Max 8.

FAA 8900.1 describes what is required for differences training on a separate variant of an aircraft type based on what “level” of differences the FAA deems the new variant to have. The 737 Max was classified as a differences level “B.”

“FAA 8900.1” said:
B. Level B Differences. Level B differences are those differences in systems, controls, and indicators that have only minor procedural differences. Level B differences are of great enough degree to require formal training in general operational subjects, aircraft systems, or both, but are not of great enough degree to require systems integration training. An example of a Level B difference is a fuel system with additional fuel tanks, pumps, and gauges. Procedural differences are limited to the operation of transfer valves and pumps while an aircraft is in cruise flight. Appropriate instructional methods for Level B differences include, but are not limited to, audiovisual presentations, lectures, and tutorial computer-based instruction (TCBI). A task or systems check for Level B differences must be conducted after training. Appropriate methods include an oral or written exam or TCBI self-test.

C. Level C Differences. Level C differences are part task differences of flightcrew member knowledge, skills, and/or abilities. Level C differences are those differences of great enough degree to require a systems integration training module but that are not of great enough degree to require actual flight training (see Volume 3, Chapter 19, Section 5 for a definition and description of systems integration training). An example of a Level C difference is the installation of a flight management system (FMS) computer. Appropriate training methods in the systems integration module are dedicated part task trainers, interactive computer-based instruction (ICBI), or Level 4 or higher flight simulation training devices (FSTD). Level C differences require a check following training. Appropriate devices are the same as for Level C training. Checking methods appropriate to Level C differences are demonstrations of skill in the procedures affected by the difference. In the case of the installation of an FMS computer, checking might consist of preflight programming of the computer and a demonstration of its use in navigation, climbs, and descents.

D. Level D Differences. Level D differences are full task differences of flightcrew member knowledge, skills, and/or abilities. Level D differences are those differences for which there is a requirement for flight training modules in a Level 6 or higher FSTD. When Level D differences exist between two aircraft, general operational subject modules, aircraft systems modules, and systems integration modules may be required. An example of a Level D difference is the installation of an electronically integrated flight instrumentation display. Aircraft operations using such a display are required to contain flight training in most phases of flight. Level 6 or higher FSTDs are appropriate for conducting Level D differences training and qualification modules. Level D differences require a check following training. The check must be conducted using scenarios representing a real‑time flight environment.

E. Level E Differences. Level E differences are such significant full task differences that a “high‑fidelity” environment is required to attain or maintain knowledge, skills, or abilities. Level E differences are those differences for which there is a requirement for flight training, including landing events. An example of a Level E difference is the installation of a Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) kit on an aircraft, resulting in a very different flare and landing attitude. A Level C or D full flight simulator (FFS) or an aircraft is required for flight training in Level E differences. Checking for Level E differences requires a full part 121 proficiency check or part 135 competency check in a Level C or D FFS or an aircraft.

FAA 8900.1[/QUOTE]

I think if it comes out that, again, after the changes are made to the Max, it still only requires iPad training people are really going to question the sanity of that. I’m guessing the new Max training is going to be Level C or D. Probably D.

The problem is that there are no 737 Max simulators anywhere. I don’t know if there are any Part Task Trainers for the Max. I also don’t know if the FAA will allow airlines to program a non-Max sim to replicate MCAS malfunction behavior.

If the FAA now lets training slide because it will be “inconvenient” to the airlines to train its pilots in a simulator, there will be heads on a spike somewhere in the beltway.
 
I would think you could come pretty close in a non MAX sim by having a runaway trim and stick shaker activation at the same time.
 
I would think you could come pretty close in a non MAX sim by having a runaway trim and stick shaker activation at the same time.
You’d also have to disable the trim brake (unless the brake is part of the new fix, which I’ve heard two different things). Also run it in 10 second pulses. The question is “will the FAA allow that.”
 
Instead of making a great airplane and require training and a new type rating, Boeing put band-aid on top of band-aid on top of band-aid................until they just made a complete mess. Boeing should buy them all back and give the airlines a modernized 757.

This is, without a shadow of doubt, one of the most ridiculous things I have ever read on the Internet.
 
This is, without a shadow of doubt, one of the most ridiculous things I have ever read on the Internet.
I’ve seen worse, Spike. But there is some merit to what kgruber suggests. The -900 series of the 737 is one step too far, IMO. It is in the size range of the 757. I understand commonality but enough is enough.
 
I’ve seen worse, Spike. But there is some merit to what kgruber suggests. The -900 series of the 737 is one step too far, IMO. It is in the size range of the 757. I understand commonality but enough is enough.

I never understood the standing-down the 757, that's a fact, and the 900 with short legs and long body is limited.

But not to the extent suggested above. That was silly.
 
I think he was talking about the MAX, but yeah, fix the problem and it is still a good airplane.
 
Back
Top