Lear down TEB

That chain started when CA and FO were paired.

The chain started with whoever wrote the policies for that operator.

The chain really goes back a lot further than that. When you look at the history of both those pilots, my opinion is the chain started with their instructors who signed them off for their private checkrides, and arguably the DPEs who eventually passed them. Now, that may be a bit harsh - they could have potentially been fine in piston singles, but when you read the full NTSB report with the histories of both pilots, they failed multiple checkrides at multiple levels.

The system is supposed to stop people who are genuinely bad pilots from getting into the seat of a Lear or similar high performing aircraft. Unfortunately, the realities of the system are that those people are given too many chances. Most wash out, but some make it through the cracks. I can think of another person who doesn't participate here anymore (at least who I haven't seen participate in a while) who I expect to have a very similar NTSB report one day.
 
The chain really goes back a lot further than that. ...
Most wash out, but some make it through the cracks...
I’d agree with that. Reading the interview summaries, there were definitely indicators for the FO, the CA indicators seemed to be much more subtle at times, yet stark contrasts stood out.

I got the feeling a large percentage of those interviewed didn’t want to be recorded as speaking ill of the dead, but that one part of the docket was quite damning on both of their performance issues.
 
I’d agree with that. Reading the interview summaries, there were definitely indicators for the FO, the CA indicators seemed to be much more subtle at times, yet stark contrasts stood out.

I got the feeling a large percentage of those interviewed didn’t want to be recorded as speaking ill of the dead, but that one part of the docket was quite damning on both of their performance issues.

It's been a while since I read the report, but my recollection was that the PIC's history was pretty damning when you looked at it as well.

I think most pilots try not to speak ill of the dead, and we also need to be cognizant of the fact that any of us can become NTSB reports. But the reality is there are indicators that were noted.

The bigger issue arguably is that people don't stop things when they have a chance. Some of that is what goes around comes around. None of us are perfect, and we wouldn't want someone trying to hinder our careers or otherwise aviation pursuits. Certainly, having such a reputation is not something anyone wants. I don't have all the answers and I don't know where the balance needs to be. I would say on the whole we are doing well with it in this country, but I also wish that the people who make it through the cracks didn't - for their sake as well as the sake of others who they may take out with them.

Interestingly, one of the pilots my wife flies with at her new job landed 2 planes before that Lear crashed at TEB that day. He remembered hearing that plane on the radio and thinking the pilots (or at least the guy talking) had no idea what they were doing. Turns out he was right - he got pictures of the smoke from the Atlantic ramp at TEB after they shut down their engines.
 
It's been a while since I read the report, but my recollection was that the PIC's history was pretty damning when you looked at it as well.

It was; The feeling I got from reading it was a Jekyll/Hyde depending on who was being interviewed, as well as no one really seemed to know the PIC, not even his wife.

The CAE instructors didn’t leave me feeling too confident about their teaching practices too, but that may be bias with my USAF schoolhouse experience.

The bigger issue arguably is that people don't stop things when they have a chance.

This. I can recall two students who has problems in the schoolhouse. One we eliminated, the other made it through, after getting the ‘there’s no crying in aviation’ speech.

About 18 months later, I was asked give give that student a last chance checkride. Failed recurring, did the retraining, failed the re-check, then did more retraining. She failed the last chance with me before we even got to the jet simply because she literally did not do the required mission planning paperwork, which for us was a critical area (she had failed on that in both previous checkrides, too).

She wasn’t complacent about it either, she just developed a habit pattern and her squadron accepted it as ‘that’s just the way she is’.

Her leadership nearly got fired for accepting that type of mediocrity.
 
The chain really goes back a lot further than that. When you look at the history of both those pilots, my opinion is the chain started with their instructors who signed them off for their private checkrides, and arguably the DPEs who eventually passed them. Now, that may be a bit harsh - they could have potentially been fine in piston singles, but when you read the full NTSB report with the histories of both pilots, they failed multiple checkrides at multiple levels.

All that wouldnt have mattered had the operator maintained reasonable training policies. A positioning flight is the time to train your FOs. But if you hire crews that you don't trust enough for the FO to take the controls, then there is little you can do to get them up to speed.

Was this the first time in his life that this captain went into TEB ? Heck I have flown ils6 circle 1 !

Mindbogging. But it goes way beyond : bad pilot
 
All that wouldnt have mattered had the operator maintained reasonable training policies. A positioning flight is the time to train your FOs. But if you hire crews that you don't trust enough for the FO to take the controls, then there is little you can do to get them up to speed.

Was this the first time in his life that this captain went into TEB ? Heck I have flown ils6 circle 1 !

Mindbogging. But it goes way beyond : bad pilot

Yes, a positioning flight is the time to get FOs up to speed with their initial time flying the plane. However I would argue first off that the FO flying on that particular leg (when he was clearly not up to speed) was not an opportune time, especially since it seemed like this may have been the first time the captain went into TEB - he certainly seemed unfamiliar with the airspace norms. PHL to TEB is a fast, high workload flight. The SIC-0 I also agree is a bad idea, but note the LOC happened with the PIC controlling the aircraft, attempting to perform a maneuver that was a really bad idea to salvage an approach instead of just going around and getting resequenced after the SIC attempted to hand off the controls to the PIC multiple times and he refused to take them back.

The way I look at this is the PIC was a poor pilot, and if he'd had a good SIC with him then that could've saved the situation, to your point. However ultimately, while both pilots have faults, I think the PIC in this crash has significantly more fault in this and was destined to crash anyway. Reality is, neither should've been hired.
 
Was this the first time in his life that this captain went into TEB ? Heck I have flown ils6 circle 1 !

I was wondering if it was his first time flying on the east coast. For crissakes, PHL to TEB is a fast, intensive flight in a prop plane given the airspace.

“We’re hundreds of miles away”. No, just hundreds of miles behind.




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However ultimately, while both pilots have faults, I think the PIC in this crash has significantly more fault in this and was destined to crash anyway. Reality is, neither should've been hired.


True, but I'd take it even farther. He was pilot in command. The responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight was his, and that included the responsibility to understand the skills and limitations of the FO and to have taken over control when necessary. From that point of view, the crash was completely the PIC's fault.
 
True, but I'd take it even farther. He was pilot in command. The responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight was his, and that included the responsibility to understand the skills and limitations of the FO and to have taken over control when necessary. From that point of view, the crash was completely the PIC's fault.

Agreed.
 
You can second guess every step of the way from the business model (ValueJet Lite?) to the hiring decisions to the instructor sign-offs to the PIC letting the SIC fly, but this accident doesn't happen if the PIC has two standard operating procedures:

  1. Never bank over 30°, and
  2. Consider all circling approaches should, ideally, start from over the center of the airport. From that mindset you can decide if you need to:
    1. Get permission from the tower to actually do it (you do),
    2. Join local VFR traffic at an uncontrolled airport (you do), or
    3. Break off early at the request of the tower (you do, but there are risks).
Here, when #1 obviously couldn't be accomplished they should have got permission to over-fly and circle around from the east which is what they should have been preferring to do all along anyway.
 
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While technically a circling approach it's more of a LDA approach using the ILS just to get sewhat close to the airport followed by a shallow S-turn at approach speed. When done right there is no need to crank it around close to the airport.
 
While technically a circling approach it's more of a LDA approach using the ILS just to get sewhat close to the airport followed by a shallow S-turn at approach speed. When done right there is no need to crank it around close to the airport.
Only "techncally" a circling maneuver? It was almost twice the maximum allowable offset for LDA straight-in minimums, 50° vs. 30°max.
 
Only "techncally" a circling maneuver? It was almost twice the maximum allowable offset for LDA straight-in minimums, 50° vs. 30°max.

But you are not reversing a course. You zig at torby and zag at the stadium and the airport is in front of you. It's just not the same as dodging lit obstacles with the airport behind you.
 
Not any more wild than a visual base to final turn. This happened in visual conditions. It was not a procedural problem, it was a pilot problem period.
 
I’m late to this tread but reading that NTSB report of the flight recorder interaction was rough. Sounded behind from word go...at times tried to sound a bit more professional but clearly was not aware of how behind they were in a jet that will not allow that.
Sad. Hopefully ppl learned from the mistakes though. That’s all we can do.
 
... but this accident doesn't happen if the PIC has two standard operating procedures:

Correct. But the P wasn’t IC. Nor did he have situational awareness to be.

ETA: I’m sure their GOM/OpSpecs said use the checklists, or something to that effect. None were used. I know it said SIC-0, which meant the SIC couldn’t manipulate the controls at all, yet he did. Most of the way to the ground.

Why is that important? The reason you’re analysis is correct isn’t why they crashed. They crashed because neither was actually flying the airplane. Both were along for the ride.
 
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You can second guess every step of the way from the business model (ValueJet Lite?) to the hiring decisions to the instructor sign-offs to the PIC letting the SIC fly, but this accident doesn't happen if the PIC has two standard operating procedures:

  1. Never bank over 30°, and
  2. Consider all circling approaches should, ideally, start from over the center of the airport. From that mindset you can decide if you need to:
    1. Get permission from the tower to actually do it (you do),
    2. Join local VFR traffic at an uncontrolled airport (you do), or
    3. Break off early at the request of the tower (you do, but there are risks).
Here, when #1 obviously couldn't be accomplished they should have got permission to over-fly and circle around from the east which is what they should have been preferring to do all along anyway.

That way you will never get in to KTEB.
ILS 6 circle 1 is the only thing they will give you on a day like that. You ask for an overhead entry and they will die laughing at you.
 
But you are not reversing a course. You zig at torby and zag at the stadium and the airport is in front of you. It's just not the same as dodging lit obstacles with the airport behind you.

This.
It's actually a fun maneuver to fly, and not dramatic at all. It's more of a dogleg base to final from an ILS.
I'd love to see how these guys would've flown the river visual to DCA...
 
I was wondering if it was his first time flying on the east coast. For crissakes, PHL to TEB is a fast, intensive flight in a prop plane given the airspace.

“We’re hundreds of miles away”. No, just hundreds of miles behind.




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Exactly the quote that blew me away.
 
I was wondering if it was his first time flying on the east coast. For crissakes, PHL to TEB is a fast, intensive flight in a prop plane given the airspace.

“We’re hundreds of miles away”. No, just hundreds of miles behind.




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To be fair. I’ve been on downwind abeam the PHL airport on a CAVOK day and still have flown nearly 100 miles until touchdown.

But, yeah, they were definitely behind. Way behind. PHL to TEB... you have to be ready for that, both mentally and administratively. Know what’s coming and get as much done as you can before you start engines. At work, one of the legs I routinely fly is between two cities that are 65 miles apart. It comes quick, and if you’re not prepared it’ll jam you up at the end.
 
That way you will never get in to KTEB.
ILS 6 circle 1 is the only thing they will give you on a day like that. You ask for an overhead entry and they will die laughing at you.
Read my advice again, please, I'm talking about an ideal mindset from which it is necessary to improvise sometimes. Over the years, day and night, I've been to Teterboro (and all the other airports around there) often enough to have memorized some of the SIDs. These guys were newcomers. They misidentified the airport visually and blew through TORBY. So? A mistake, sure, but not a fatal one. Here's the chart: https://skyvector.com/files/tpp/1903/pdf/00890IL6.PDF
Nothing mentioned about MetLife Stadium. It isn't a "Charted Visual Approach", like at DCA or JFK. If you're unfamiliar with an airport, "get it under you first, then start your circle," is the best way to handle it in my experience (which is considerable), but it isn't always practical (see my second SOP) such as in this case. When TSHTF it's a default fallback reaction, though, that will save your bacon.

EDIT: For an example of good planning, see how the crew from Brazil that landed prior to the crash prepared for the flight. It's in the accident docket under interviews.
 
But, yeah, they were definitely behind. Way behind. PHL to TEB... you have to be ready for that, both mentally and administratively. Know what’s coming and get as much done as you can before you start engines. At work, one of the legs I routinely fly is between two cities that are 65 miles apart. It comes quick, and if you’re not prepared it’ll jam you up at the end.
It was a 20-minute flight that was entirely within busy airspace. In those 20 minutes, they needed to accomplish all the same tasks that they would in a 5-hour flight halfway across the country, just without a spare second to relax and catch up. If I'm flying that short of a flight in my Arrow, I spend longer planning it than I do flying it, including briefing any likely instrument approaches before I start the engine. That's why this short flight was a bad one for the trainee/pilot-rated-passenger to fly.

The PIC could have saved this flight at any time right until he yanked back on the yoke turning final. He could have briefed the flight before taking the runway in Philadelphia, which would have given him a chance at staying ahead of the airplane during the flight. He could monitored where they were well enough to know when they got to TORBY so they could turn base. He could have confessed to Teterboro that they were late on the turn to base and needed to overfly and circle or resequence. He could have declared an emergency and landed straight in on runway 6. (I'm frankly surprised that they didn't land on 6 simply by mistaking it for their assigned runway, given how unaware they were of their surroundings.) He could have recognized just before yanking back on the yoke that he was about to do the thing that he was told before his first solo flight not to do, a base-to-final stall/spin.

No doubt about it, he was not as good of a pilot as his ego believed and he was far behind the airplane on this flight. Following the company's policies or not has little to do with it. The pilot-rated passenger in the right seat probably could have landed the plane if the PIC had any situational awareness at all or a modicum of humility.

But it would be easy to fall into the same trap. All you have to do is think that you are better than this guy and infer from that fact that it can't happen to you. That's wrong, and is almost certainly the first step on the road he took to get there: I'm a better pilot than the NTSB ever deals with, so it can't happen to me. The way to keep it from happening to you is to make a conscious choice before and during each flight to do better than he did.
 
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I have a problem with ATCs instruction "circle at Torby". There is a lot of information missing from the video, and maybe that instruction was further clarified in the ATIS announcement, but if it wasn't then I think that instruction by ATC was lacking. I'm not absolving the captain and ATC didn't cause the crash, but that instruction would have had me going WTF. It looks like the lear was flying the approach as a cat b aircraft and with the enhanced the circling procedures normal procedure is to fly to within 1.7 miles of the airport, THEN begin your circle. Torby is 3.8 from the airport so that's early to begin a circle. I'm thinking turn to a four mile left base for 01 at Torby would be a better instruction.
 
EDIT: For an example of good planning, see how the crew from Brazil that landed prior to the crash prepared for the flight. It's in the accident docket under interviews.

Jeez. Went to look that up, and found some other tidbits. This one from the interview with the pilot's wife:

"Asked whether there was anything she could think of that could be relevant to the investigation that she had not been specifically asked about, she said that after the accident, neither she nor the copilot’s family were contacted by Trans-Pacific and she had learned about the accident on the news about 1630 or 1700 mdt. As of the date of the interview, the company had still not initiated any contact with her. The only time she had spoken with someone from the company was when she called the owner on the day of the accident and when she called him on May 17 to obtain contact information for the copilot’s family. The owner had not provided any additional information during either of those calls." :eek:

I think this is what @dtuuri was referring to, the interview with the FO of a Challenger that landed in front of the Lear (and they saw the crash happen):

"They flew to New York about once each year. The circle to land approach at TEB is different from what they were used to in Brazil since there they rarely had runways that were that offset. They were typically just circling to the opposite threshold. They had found an approach briefing on the internet for TEB that was very helpful. He said smaller airports in Brazil usually had an RNAV to runways to avoid circling, but not at TEB. They have done several circling approaches during various training sessions at FlightSafety, CAE and Bombardier training facilities.

Coming toward TEB, they briefed their circle to land procedure. The procedure they had was tostart the circling from TORBY and go around the Giant’s stadium to line up with runway 01.They knew it was windy and ATC liked to talk fast in the New York area. The New York area was also very busy with lots of restrictions regarding airspace, air traffic management, etc, so they briefed early and paid attention during the approach."

Man, so many people thought these pilots were substandard. Continuing to read the interviews, it turned out that they were supposed to have passengers on the accident flight, but after the BED-PHL leg, the passengers decided to drive to TEB instead! :eek:

"He said they had planned to return with the pilots, but then his brother and he looked at each other and said that they did not want to take another flight on that plane. It was not that nice of a plane, and the landing in PHL was about as scary as he had ever experienced on an airplane."

Overall, this is a fascinating read:

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/60000-60499/60373/611461.pdf
 
I have a problem with ATCs instruction "circle at Torby". There is a lot of information missing from the video, and maybe that instruction was further clarified in the ATIS announcement, but if it wasn't then I think that instruction by ATC was lacking. I'm not absolving the captain and ATC didn't cause the crash, but that instruction would have had me going WTF. It looks like the lear was flying the approach as a cat b aircraft and with the enhanced the circling procedures normal procedure is to fly to within 1.7 miles of the airport, THEN begin your circle. Torby is 3.8 from the airport so that's early to begin a circle. I'm thinking turn to a four mile left base for 01 at Torby would be a better instruction.
A “four mile left base” could just as easily mean a base that will result in a four-mile final, which is clearly not the intent.

Any problems with the circling instruction given really revolve around the premise that PTS or ACS circling requirements represent reality IMO.
 
A “four mile left base” could just as easily mean a base that will result in a four-mile final, which is clearly not the intent.

Any problems with the circling instruction given really revolve around the premise that PTS or ACS circling requirements represent reality IMO.

But from the flight paths of previous flights, about 4 mile finals appears to be what most flew. My main point is that the instruction, while probably perfectly clear to people who fly there regularly, might be confusing to someone who is actually thinking I need to fly a circling approach. I think that is what was in the captain's head when he flew the flight path he flew. Unfortunately he screwed the pooch with poor basic flying skills.

I'm fine with reality versus the ACS, but communication is key. In reality I would have asked for clarification and I have no problem asking to overfly the airport if it makes more sense, it didn't in this case in my opinion. I couldn't give a flying F as to whether controllers laugh at me or get mad at me as they sit in their cushy chair, safe on the ground. Too many pilots are worried about keeping controllers happy and that can be deadly, I don't think many controllers laugh, more likely they get concerned as I think the controller handling this guy was due to the pilots previous responses.
 
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But from the flight paths of previous flights, about 4 mile finals appears to be what most flew. My main point is that the instruction, while probably perfectly clear to people who fly there regularly, might be confusing to someone who is actually thinking I need to fly a circling approach. I think that is what was in the captain's head when he flew the flight path he flew. Unfortunately he screwed the pooch with poor basic flying skills.
But again, “thinking I need to fly a circling approach” is based on the false premise that a circling approach has to look like what it does on a checkride.
 
But again, “thinking I need to fly a circling approach” is based on the false premise that a circling approach has to look like what it does on a checkride.

I've flown many circling approaches in my training and my recent check ride approach was to the opposite runway circle to land. So I ended up on a downwind, easy peasy. The controller just told me cleared to land, so I told him I'd fly the left down wind, could have gone either way. I think the dpe liked that. I have no premise as to what the circle will look like until I talk to the tower controller.

All of the other circles I've flown the tower was very specific as to how they wanted me to circle, there was no doubt as to where they wanted me to go. "Circle at Torby" is unclear to me. Begin your circle by turning right at Torby, would probably have been ok for me.
 
I don't see any problem with the instruction of "Circle at Torby" and it makes perfect sense to me. When you look at all the other aircraft flying in, they flew essentially the same pattern. Don't see where there's confusion there.

The captain did NOT start the circle at an intentional time, he lost SA (well more accurately he never had SA) and was way behind, trying to salvage a circling approach he should not have. No two ways around that.
 
I don't see any problem with the instruction of "Circle at Torby" and it makes perfect sense to me. When you look at all the other aircraft flying in, they flew essentially the same pattern. Don't see where there's confusion there.

The captain did NOT start the circle at an intentional time, he lost SA (well more accurately he never had SA) and was way behind, trying to salvage a circling approach he should not have. No two ways around that.

I believe you've done it before and have experience there, technically start the circle at torby could also cover what the pilot did, getting within the circle distance before turning is part of the CTL procedure. He would have no idea what the other aircraft were doing at the time.

I do agree with the pilot being behind the airplane and more importantly, killing himself with poor basic flying skills.
 
I believe you've done it before and have experience there, technically start the circle at torby could also cover what the pilot did, getting within the circle distance before turning is part of the CTL procedure. He would have no idea what the other aircraft were doing at the time.

To me "start the circle at TORBY" means you start your turn at TORBY. I don't think what he did was understood in the instructions.

I have not personally flown into TEB, but I've flown into plenty of other NYC airports that mostly have multiple runways, are very busy, and you get the New York Approach instructions that are sometimes different from standard. I do agree that if you aren't used to New York Approach, there are aspects of flying there that can be problematic. I blame that in part for the Commander that crashed in CT a few years ago, killing the Microsoft exec and his son as they were off looking at colleges.

In this case, though, I don't think their instructions were ambiguous at all. Maybe it's because I'm a New Yorker. Now that you know that, fugghetabutit and get me some kwowfee.
 
I've flown many circling approaches in my training and my recent check ride approach was to the opposite runway circle to land. So I ended up on a downwind, easy peasy. The controller just told me cleared to land, so I told him I'd fly the left down wind, could have gone either way. I think the dpe liked that. I have no premise as to what the circle will look like until I talk to the tower controller.
In your prior post, you mentioned the 1.7 mile protected radius for a Cat B circle...that’s a checkride requirement, not a real world requirement. There’s nothing that says you can’t circle higher than minimums for your category...and starting the circle at Tory implies beginning the circling maneuver at 1300 feet, putting you firmly in Cat D protected airspace with a 3.7 mile radius. A quick look at the chart shows no obstacles should be encountered above 675 feet in that maneuvering area, so a nice, relaxed, nearly-pattern-altitude circle is easily done....a circle that would result in a checkride bust.
 
To me "start the circle at TORBY" means you start your turn at TORBY. I don't think what he did was understood in the instructions.

I have not personally flown into TEB, but I've flown into plenty of other NYC airports that mostly have multiple runways, are very busy, and you get the New York Approach instructions that are sometimes different from standard. I do agree that if you aren't used to New York Approach, there are aspects of flying there that can be problematic. I blame that in part for the Commander that crashed in CT a few years ago, killing the Microsoft exec and his son as they were off looking at colleges.

In this case, though, I don't think their instructions were ambiguous at all. Maybe it's because I'm a New Yorker. Now that you know that, fugghetabutit and get me some kwowfee.

I mostly agree Ted, and honestly, if you brief the that approach, the instruction makes sense in VMC conditions, IMC, maybe not so much. I flew to Teterboro on an IFR training mission on New Year's eve. It was an IMC day with ceilings at like 900 or 1000 feet. I had been working under the premise you ask for what you want, they were advertising ILS 19, I wanted the rnav 19 so that's what I briefed. Got to the final controller, about 8 miles from the final approach course, told him I wanted the RNAV 19, he wouldn't give it to me, lol. So I slowed down, and with the help of my instructor did a quick brief and loaded the ils 19 procedure. Had a good approach, but it was a lesson learned, if they are advertising it, take it and save yourself some aggravation.

In your prior post, you mentioned the 1.7 mile protected radius for a Cat B circle...that’s a checkride requirement, not a real world requirement. There’s nothing that says you can’t circle higher than minimums for your category...and starting the circle at Tory implies beginning the circling maneuver at 1300 feet, putting you firmly in Cat D protected airspace with a 3.7 mile radius. A quick look at the chart shows no obstacles should be encountered above 675 feet in that maneuvering area, so a nice, relaxed, nearly-pattern-altitude circle is easily done....a circle that would result in a checkride bust.

Not sure I'm following you here Maule, the checkride bust part. I'm thinking the instruction works for VMC conditions, but not IMC conditions. Also, I know the path that the captain chose to fly would work for my pokey 100 knot approach speed airplane, and I'm thinking it would work for a lear too, if flown correctly, but don't know enough about that jet to say for sure.
 
I mostly agree Ted, and honestly, if you brief the that approach, the instruction makes sense in VMC conditions, IMC, maybe not so much. I flew to Teterboro on an IFR training mission on New Year's eve. It was an IMC day with ceilings at like 900 or 1000 feet. I had been working under the premise you ask for what you want, they were advertising ILS 19, I wanted the rnav 19 so that's what I briefed. Got to the final controller, about 8 miles from the final approach course, told him I wanted the RNAV 19, he wouldn't give it to me, lol. So I slowed down, and with the help of my instructor did a quick brief and loaded the ils 19 procedure. Had a good approach, but it was a lesson learned, if they are advertising it, take it and save yourself some aggravation.

This is where local knowledge and also understanding what you can and cannot do comes in handy, and of course that only comes with experience (or sometimes from talking to others who have that knowledge). You can always ask for what you want. In busy airspace, you likely won't get it... like New York. You also have to understand when to say "unable."

If New York is advertising a particular approach, that's what you're going to get. Same for Chicago. When you're there, they'll give certain instructions to keep everyone streamlined and keep things moving. Here in Kansas City, I basically get whatever I want, usually without having to ask for it.
 
This is where local knowledge and also understanding what you can and cannot do comes in handy, and of course that only comes with experience (or sometimes from talking to others who have that knowledge). You can always ask for what you want. In busy airspace, you likely won't get it... like New York. You also have to understand when to say "unable."

If New York is advertising a particular approach, that's what you're going to get. Same for Chicago. When you're there, they'll give certain instructions to keep everyone streamlined and keep things moving. Here in Kansas City, I basically get whatever I want, usually without having to ask for it.

Yes, I'm in the Boston area and mostly can get what I want. Had I been by myself in the TEB situation I would have told him I need to reload the approach (yes I know I don' t need to tell him that, but I like to share my pain) and asked for delay vectors, which I'm sure would have been interesting, but I briefed while my instructor loaded the approach, so it worked out. It was a good learning experience.
 
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Yes, I'm in the Boston area and mostly can get what I want. Had I been by myself in the TEB situation I would have told him I need to reload the approach (yes I know I don' t need to tell him that, but I like to share my pain) and asked for delay vectors, which I'm sure would have been interesting, but I briefed while my instructor loaded the approach, so it worked out. It was a good learning experience.

What's also funny is the lack of communication between Boston Center and NY Center. When flying home I was approach DNY VOR, which is about where Boston hands off to NY. I was asking for direct destination, and Boston said NY wouldn't allow that, they had to give me a routing. So I get a full routing all the way to Ohio on airways.

Of course, I knew what would happen. "Contact New York Center on..."

"New York Center, Mitsubishi 228-whiskey-papa level 1-6 thousand, any chance direct destination?"
"228-whiskey-papa proceed direct destination."
 
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