How do you determine what a "safe" overweight condition is?

I wouldn't be surprised if a great many flights are above gross "accidentally".

A lot of people lie about their weight or quote their weight naked even though they presumably plan to fly clothed :rolleyes:. So you take three passengers each underweighing themselves by 10-15 lbs then bringing a bag which is really 45 lbs and not "about 30 lbs" as they told you. I know this from experience being a passenger on other flights. Add that all up and the pilot flying might think he is only at gross but could easily be 50-60 lbs over.

This guy was counted at 170, clothes, luggage, all in.:yes::)
 

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I wouldn't be surprised if a great many flights are above gross "accidentally".

A lot of people lie about their weight or quote their weight naked even though they presumably plan to fly clothed :rolleyes:. So you take three passengers each underweighing themselves by 10-15 lbs then bringing a bag which is really 45 lbs and not "about 30 lbs" as they told you. I know this from experience being a passenger on other flights. Add that all up and the pilot flying might think he is only at gross but could easily be 50-60 lbs over.

If I am at all concerned, everyone (including me) steps on the scale, bags too. I have yet to weigh the tool box we keep in the back of the plane....
 
... but otherwise no real additional forces?

False. Grab yourself a grocery bag. Hold it in your left hand, arm extended, about shoulder level. Now place 2 gallons of milk in the bag and hold it the same.

Did you feel any additional force?

I need to know why.

School was invented for us curious folk.

Aren't the structural elements all designed for loads that are 50% over the anticipated maximum? So being 10% still gives me some margin does it not?

False. Two different perspectives at play here.

As an operator of an aircraft the limits are fixed and exact. As an operator of an aircraft you should know nothing about materials and fatigue and how they can affect limits because you have indirectly hired an engineer to do that for you.

As an engineer of an aircraft you know that nothing is perfect, say inter-granular differences in aluminum, and that age changes the properties of the materials from which the aircraft is built so an engineer adds a margin so that the design limits are met for the operator.

The margin is the engineer's, it is not the operator's, it is not yours.
 
... Linked is an example STC (there are many) ...

You are in fact asking the very same question the OP has asked.

How can gross weight limits be increased sometimes?

Unfortunately I cannot answer yours but I can say that there is a reason. Engineering does not happen arbitrarily.

I could guess at the answer, but it would only be a guess.

My guess or your guess will do you no good if you arbitrarily decide that you will just do your own gross increase and the structure fails.
 
The FAA also has a regulation authorizing certain commercial and Federal operators in Alaska to operate as much as 15% over max gross (but not always that much), but there are a lot of other limitations associated with and special training required for that before you can get the specific FAA authorization to do that. See 14 CFR 91.323 for details.

Ron - what's the driving factor on the Alaska operations? The prevailing cold temps which allow higher aircraft performance?
 
...
My point is simply that there are many STC's for many types that require no serious modifications.

You are wrong. It's just modification that you cannot see.

Perhaps the modification stems from better understanding of the materials such that it can be shown that the original margin from the original engineer's calculations is greater than the original engineer understood.

STCs are not arbitrary bits of paper.
 
... They move the plane from utility to normal category...

Aha! And this is a modification of the design goal. This means that the limits for the operator have changed so when the engineer recalcs the margins then new weight limits for the operator emerge.
 
You are wrong. It's just modification that you cannot see.

Perhaps the modification stems from better understanding of the materials such that it can be shown that the original margin from the original engineer's calculations is greater than the original engineer understood.

STCs are not arbitrary bits of paper.

Take the classical GW increase that is available for PA28-161s. There are no modifications to the plane, only the AFM...basically buy a placard for your plane and presto...115 lbs of gross weight increase (less the weight of the placard itself of course)
 
Yes wings remaining attached would be nice!

So if I'm 200 lbs over max in a 172, that is about 10% over the limit. Aren't the structural elements all designed for loads that are 50% over the anticipated maximum? So being 10% still gives me some margin does it not?

In airplane design the structural safety margin is more like 10-15% over operational limits, no where near 50%.

Airplanes are not bridges.
 
Ron - what's the driving factor on the Alaska operations? The prevailing cold temps which allow higher aircraft performance?

The driving force ? The political clout of the AK congressional delegation.
 
Aha! And this is a modification of the design goal. This means that the limits for the operator have changed so when the engineer recalcs the margins then new weight limits for the operator emerge.

Right, but if you fly a regular Bo within normal category limits, the structural stresses on the airframe are the same, with or without the piece of paper in the AFM.

Different aircraft have MTOW limitations based on different limiting factors.
- some are limited by structural strength of the landing gear, e.g. the early DA40. Increasing MTOW requires replacement of the metal arch for the MLG.
- some are limited by go-around performance. Reducing flap limits to 30deg in some Cessnas will give a paper STC to increase MTOW.
- some are limited by go-around performance at 5000ft DA. Adding a turbocharger adds 400lb MTOW to the A36.
- some are limited by max supported weight of the airframe parachute (SR22). Increasing MTOW required re-engineering the chute.
- some are limited by wing bending moment during high-G maneuvers. Limiting to 'normal' category from 'utility' gets an increase in MTOW for the A36.
- some bump up against the 61kt stall limit. Adding Vortex generators to drop the stall speed a couple of kts gives an increase of a couple pounds in the A36.

The A36 is probably the plane that has the most available STCs to increase MTOW. The regulations treat them as additive, I am not sure that physics treats them the same way.
 
You are wrong. It's just modification that you cannot see.

Perhaps the modification stems from better understanding of the materials such that it can be shown that the original margin from the original engineer's calculations is greater than the original engineer understood.

STCs are not arbitrary bits of paper.

John, you seem to have all the answers, why don't you expand on the process required for an STC? How does the engineering and testing differ from certification and how much is required? It must be pretty simple for various companies to call up the manufacturers and get all of the base engineering, materials, testing, etc. data so they can just recalculate the values to suit them right?

I'm not nearly as smart as you, but last I checked 300hp is still 300hp, the wing area is fixed as is the lift provided, and a lb. of weight is still a lb. of weight. Sure some modifications improve certain characteristics in a certain aspect of operation, but that doesn't change the fundamentals. In the A36 example adding 60lb. Of tip tanks and 120lb. (Whatever the exact weight is) Of turbo-normalizing gear will not improve performance at 99% of the airports in NA, it will hurt it. Just as carrying another 180lb. of crap inside will, regardless of whether or not the STC says you can.

That is why the old LIGHT simply equipped A36's with the same motor perform so well. The notion that a piece of paper will change the basics and offer similar safety/performance across the full flight envelope is beyond me.
 
Here's an engineering question:

Assuming properly distributed loads, meaning the CG is perfectly centered in the sweet spot for that plane, it would seem the primary factors are stall due to load and structure due to force under G load... Does that seem to square up?

Lastly, is the MTOW similar to maximum demonstrated crosswind? The best CW the test pilots could find that day... the most they were willing to try to load into the plane?
 
Egads, one does not test structural limits with a pilot. Think for a moment about what a negative test would look like.

No, acceleration-induced structural loads are not the only limiting factor for MTOW. Gear collapsing has nothing to do with aerodynamic G-loads.

You're letting wishful thinking get in the way of reality. No, MTOW is not at all like a max demonstrated crosswind. Not even close. They aren't even in the same chapter of the POH. MTOW is really a limitation.
 
Egads, one does not test structural limits with a pilot. Think for a moment about what a negative test would look like.

No, acceleration-induced structural loads are not the only limiting factor for MTOW. Gear collapsing has nothing to do with aerodynamic G-loads.

You're letting wishful thinking get in the way of reality. No, MTOW is not at all like a max demonstrated crosswind. Not even close. They aren't even in the same chapter of the POH. MTOW is really a limitation.

Not suggesting a personal test, testy.

Personal limitation: Begin a long taxi at MTOW, burn off a few gallons in taxi and runup. ONLY if CG is in the middle of the envelope. Long runway with "options" at the other end. Known plane. Based on recent ramp weight by a certified shop, and with a precise fuel load measurement (Dip or burn computer).

But there is one other thing. I always go on the side of safety. So, if I am in doubt, I remove stuff or people. But I agree, taking off over MTOW is just bad. I'm not sure how those ferry pilots to do make it on their flight actually make it.
 
John, you seem to have all the answers, ...

I think I stated that I do not have the answers only that there is an answer, it is in the domain of an engineer, and that it is not arbitrary.

why don't you ... so they can just recalculate the values to suit them right?

Physics is fixed. Material properties are fixed. Understanding of either can change. Acceptable safety margins can change. Recalculation can only occur in the regions that change and may not provide results that "suit them" at all.

I'm not nearly as smart as you

This is a paradoxical statement. In order to truthfully make this statement, you would have to be smarter than me. ;)

... doesn't change the fundamentals.

I agree, the physics and the materials do not change...

The notion that a piece of paper will change the basics and offer similar safety/performance across the full flight envelope is beyond me.

I never said that this was the case. The piece of paper changes nothing physical. I said that there was a reason for the piece of paper and that the reason is in the domain of the engineer. The operator can only operate within the envelope as calculated by the engineer.

I'm also not saying that once some recalc has been done and it has been proven that some limit was unnecessarily low that it makes sense that one must spend a lot of money for a piece of paper. Legality doesn't have to make sense.
 
Some of the old ones are.

I was suprised how much the FAA relies on the DERs.

Politics often trumps common sense. Politics also does not change the physics or material properties.

And just, gulp, I hope one of the engineer's unknowns that played into his/her margin choice was idiot politicians. :yesnod:

No, MTOW is not at all like a max demonstrated crosswind. Not even close. ... MTOW is really a limitation.

That right there.

... I'm not sure how those ferry pilots to do make it on their flight actually make it.

By getting a waiver to operate within the margin and that means that sometimes they don't make it.
 
In airplane design the structural safety margin is more like 10-15% over operational limits, no where near 50%.

Airplanes are not bridges.

The POH for my C-172S states that the structural design limits were designed for 150% of the weights listed.

Why would they tell a foolish pilot something like that....
 
The POH for my C-172S states that the structural design limits were designed for 150% of the weights listed.

Why would they tell a foolish pilot something like that....

To keep you from panicking and doing something stupid like limiting bank while avoiding a midair 'cause you're afraid you might break it.

DESIGN limits are not the same as ACTUAL limits.
 
I wouldn't be surprised if a great many flights are above gross "accidentally".

A lot of people lie about their weight or quote their weight naked even though they presumably plan to fly clothed :rolleyes:. So you take three passengers each underweighing themselves by 10-15 lbs then bringing a bag which is really 45 lbs and not "about 30 lbs" as they told you. I know this from experience being a passenger on other flights. Add that all up and the pilot flying might think he is only at gross but could easily be 50-60 lbs over.
Which is why there was a scale in my hangar.
 
Hmmm, operating over gross. Ask the captain of the Sewol how that worked out for him. He allegedly did many runs over gross, but that unexpected sharp turn on the last run bit him. Will an unexpected maneuver bite you?
 
So I know next to nothing about aviation as many of you have probably figured out. But I am involved in the design and manufacture of some fairly complex equipment. Deciding what the acceptable specification for the final product in my industry comes down to a negotiation between the designers and engineers (who know it can do more), the manufacturing group (who want to cover their asses and produce product that will pass the spec so they always push to reduce the specifications to make their job easier), the support group (who don't want to deal with equipment support issues so would rather us be running somewhat detuned), the legal department (who are always concerned about product liability so also want to to run at a reduced operational level to minimize risks in their mind). The people who are trying to cover their asses always seem to win out in many companies which is a pity in my opinion.

So as I said I know nothing about aviation but there are some of the same elements there I assume, so looking from the outside in I strongly suspect that I can safely do things with my certified plane beyond the official spec.
 
So as I said I know nothing about aviation but there are some of the same elements there I assume, so looking from the outside in I strongly suspect that I can safely do things with my certified plane beyond the official spec.

Well, the way that reads, I strongly suspect you're just trolling now.

Good luck if you're not.
 
Well, the way that reads, I strongly suspect you're just trolling now.

Good luck if you're not.

:confused:

Did you read what I wrote or were you just reacting to that one sentence?

What I said is in my industry (which is admittedly not in aviation) we deliver detuned product all the time and that I suspect that something similar is happening in aviation. I may be wrong... I don't pretend to be an aviation expert (I am not). A few real world pilots who do this for a living have indicated that you can overload a plane and do quite well. Nobody will admit that on record here.
 
So I know next to nothing about aviation as many of you have probably figured out. But I am involved in the design and manufacture of some fairly complex equipment. Deciding what the acceptable specification for the final product in my industry comes down to a negotiation between the designers and engineers (who know it can do more), the manufacturing group (who want to cover their asses and produce product that will pass the spec so they always push to reduce the specifications to make their job easier), the support group (who don't want to deal with equipment support issues so would rather us be running somewhat detuned), the legal department (who are always concerned about product liability so also want to to run at a reduced operational level to minimize risks in their mind). The people who are trying to cover their asses always seem to win out in many companies which is a pity in my opinion.

So as I said I know nothing about aviation but there are some of the same elements there I assume, so looking from the outside in I strongly suspect that I can safely do things with my certified plane beyond the official spec.

Sounds about right to me. One thing about pilots and aviation boards the reactions are never consistent. Gross weight brings out a lot of absolutism, while something like exceeding the published service ceiling is cool. Something like a low pass will have all the people on the ground cheering and yet you'd get ripped apart here. While you have obviously figured out that aviation is like everything else, subjective, please don't decide to apply that knowledge without the benefit of some experience.
 
:confused:

Explain please.

Navy Humor said:
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]The aircraft G-limits are only there in case there is another flight by that particular airplane. If subsequent flights do not appear likely, there are no G-limits.[/FONT]

In structural design, there are serviceability limits (you haven't damaged the plane) and design or ultimate limits (the plane's bent/broken, but survives long enough to get the people on the ground).

There may very well be a 50% margin above legal limits before you rip the wings off the plane in-flight, but you're most likely going to start causing permanent damage at 5-10% above the POH limits- in a new plane. In an older plane that has seen heavy flying time, pushing the legal limits may be ill-advised.
 
A few real world pilots who do this for a living have indicated that you can overload a plane and do quite well. Nobody will admit that on record here.

In a new airplane, is the headroom fairly high? I would assume so, but on an older aircraft, maybe not so much.

You don't have access to the engineering and flight test documents, how far over gross is acceptable? Who knows until you break the airplane.

Gross weight figures are published for a reason, I'll observe them myself.
 
I think this thread can be summarized by: yeah, if you do something you've been advised not to do, you might (and even "will probably") come out just fine. But, it's not fine, for two important reasons:

First, That you walked away from your flight with no visible harm does not mean harm has not been caused; it means harm is not visible.

Second, and more insidious, is that you begin to develop a very hazardous attitude. You think "well, it worked fine before, we're fine to do it again" or, worse, "that worked fine before, so lets push it just a little -- not enough for real harm, but just to see what happens". It seems to work out fine, so you rinse and repeat -- until eventually it doesn't work out fine.

The real problem with both of these situations is the same: the specs were written for a reason* and if you abuse them repeatedly (read: once, or many times, or somewhere in between) you run the risk that not only will the harm you've been invisibly causing become visible, but that it will become visible in a most inconvenient way when you cannot do anything about it (such as in flight).

*specs were written for a reason.
If you haven't done it recently, you owe it to yourself and to your future passengers to read (not just scan, not just be able to make the right multiple choice answer, but read and understand) Aviation Hazardous Attitudes, specifically that of anti-authority.
 
:confused:

Explain please.

Design limits mean the structure in question is intended to fail at that load. It will actually fail at a different load, usually lower. There are a number of reasons, including age, weathering, variations in manufacture, storage, modification, fatigue, duration, location or repetition of load, temperature, salinity, etc. This is the reason for making a safety margin.
 
Second, and more insidious, is that you begin to develop a very hazardous attitude. You think "well, it worked fine before, we're fine to do it again" or, worse, "that worked fine before, so lets push it just a little -- not enough for real harm, but just to see what happens". It seems to work out fine, so you rinse and repeat -- until eventually it doesn't work out fine.

If you haven't done it recently, you owe it to yourself and to your future passengers to read (not just scan, not just be able to make the right multiple choice answer, but read and understand) Aviation Hazardous Attitudes, specifically that of anti-authority.

Well said. I continue to have a problem with anti-authority, and it bleeds over into aviation sometimes. A bad habit that I struggle with. Now I'm more temperate, and do my best to check my ego at the flight line.
 
So I know next to nothing about aviation as many of you have probably figured out. But I am involved in the design and manufacture of some fairly complex equipment. Deciding what the acceptable specification for the final product in my industry comes down to a negotiation between the designers and engineers (who know it can do more), the manufacturing group (who want to cover their asses and produce product that will pass the spec so they always push to reduce the specifications to make their job easier), the support group (who don't want to deal with equipment support issues so would rather us be running somewhat detuned), the legal department (who are always concerned about product liability so also want to to run at a reduced operational level to minimize risks in their mind). The people who are trying to cover their asses always seem to win out in many companies which is a pity in my opinion.

So as I said I know nothing about aviation but there are some of the same elements there I assume, so looking from the outside in I strongly suspect that I can safely do things with my certified plane beyond the official spec.

I'm reminded of the fresh-out-of-college design engineer that I used to be and of all those other brand new engineers that I've worked with over the years. People who tend to quote the simulations, the math, the pure analysis, the prototype's performance (The prototype which was hand built by the engineers and not by the folks on the assembly line) and talk about what a great design and contribution to the state of the art they've made. These youngsters tend to go on and on about how if only those manufacturing folks would get their act together and tighten up the process, or if the reliability engineers wouldn't be so gosh-darn ANAL about lifetime stress testing, or if the field application support engineers would just realize that this design is perfect and pure and won't NEED support, or if those marketing dweebs would stop adding needless feature requests, or if the legal department wouldn't needlessly point out that if a certain bit of the design failed it could mean ruin to the company, then boy, what a great and amazing product could be created. All those other folks are just so LAZY, aren't they? They just want to make their jobs easier because they're just fundamentally jealous of the almost god-like design engineers!

Look, the reality is this. The purpose of engineering is to create a product which will make money for the company. Companies lose money if the field failure rate is too high or if someone sues them because a flaw in their product caused bad things to happen. A prototype is just that; building a one-off is nice, but one must account for the actual manufacturing tolerances. Yes, manufacturing processes can be made tighter, but it costs money. It's a trade-off which the executives (and more experienced, more senior engineers) get paid to make. Simulations and analysis depend on imperfect models which attempt to model reality. Yes, the models can be made better at the expense of time and/or money. Again, a trade-off. Then too, things degrade with time, this includes electronics, mechanical mechanisms, etc. A company will go out of business rather quickly if their products don't meet some acceptable usable life. Yes, some products rely on early failure (Gillette would probably be out of business if their razor blades stayed sharp forever), but I doubt if Cessna would be in business if their planes just started falling out of the sky after some time limit. Paying for field support engineers to go support a fragile design costs money; it would be better to limit the number of trouble tickets they have to deal with.

Now, to airplanes.
Yes, there is margin in the design. It's there to account for things like manufacturing tolerances, fatigue, degradation, dumb or unlucky pilots who needed that margin to get out of a jam and over-stressed the plane, etc. You could probably safely get away with exceeding the limits once, twice, even several times, but each time you do, the plane's limits are exceeded, things start to build up (metal fatigues just a little bit more, bolt holes open up just a tiny bit, rivets become a little looser, cracks propagate just a little farther, etc.). At some point, there WILL be a catastrophic failure. Unless you've had the airplane brand new from the factory, you most likely won't KNOW its full flight history. How many times in the past did some previous pilot exceed the limit? How close are you to that bolt finally giving way, that crack suddenly propagating too far, that partially corroded spar to snapping? You don't know. THAT's why all those lawyers, manufacturing engineers, reliability engineers, senior designers, flight test engineers, etc. set the limits where they are. They do it so that the airplane will stay safe and reliable for a LONG time.

There's always the anti-authority, invincible, types out there who say it won't happen to me and why should I follow the rules. You don't want to be one of those types, and you don't want to make a habit of exceeding the limits.
 
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you most likely won't KNOW its full flight history. How many times in the past did some previous pilot exceed the limit? How close are you to that bolt finally giving way, that crack suddenly propagating too far, that partially corroded spar to snapping? You don't know.

Changed my mind. I don't want to fly anymore :hairraise:
 
Changed my mind. I don't want to fly anymore :hairraise:

Great, mission accomplished. More sky for me! :D :D

One aspect of flying and of being a good pilot, to me, is about proper risk management. Why needlessly contribute to the risk of failure by exceeding the limits? When I do aerobatics, I'm pretty sure I know how to do a loop, a roll, and spins, but I still wear a parachute in case the previous guy pulled 7G on the 6G rated airframe one too many times.
 
I think this thread can be summarized by: yeah, if you do something you've been advised not to do, you might (and even "will probably") come out just fine.

I would not agree with this statement. If you grossly exceed the limits, you are not likely to come out fine. Whether catastrophic failure occurs is not just some random roll of the die, with the probability of failure > 0.5. The probability is dependent upon how much you exceed the limits by, and how many factors combine against you. You simply cannot state with any certainty what the probability of catastrophic failure is without a comparison of the actual flight conditions to the actual limits. In other words, you cannot state whether the chance of failure is 0.0001 or 1.0 without knowing what the actual loads/flight conditions are compared to the actual limits.

Saying that failure is not probable without some consideration of actual conditions is like trying to determine the probability of rolling a 1 on a die without knowing how many different sides the die has.
 
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