Testing the Impossible Turn

Hey Dan, I went out yesterday and did some testing on my own in my Pitts on the turn around scenario. It quickly illustrated something I'd been meaning to bring up since your first post in this thread. You mentioned that you simulated your climb out at Vy. If you get a chance to go out and make some more attempts, try doing it at 1.2 Vy and see how it goes. Climbing at Vx or Vy might keep you slightly closer to the airport environment but it leaves you with no margin of energy and a greater altitude loss in the turn around and places too great an emphasis on your reaction time to get the nose down and the turn started. And, the difference in those few knots of actual ground speed between Vy and 1.2 Vy won't be much in terms of distance traveled, especially assuming that your faithful takeoff was in to a head wind and on a climbing angle.
 
Comments on the “Impossible Turn”
There has always been a considerable amount of discussion on the subject of the so-called “Impossible Turn”. We have heard about how one should perform the maneuver and how much altitude one needs to make a successful turnback maneuver. We have even heard about pilots and CFI’s experimenting with flying a turnback maneuver at different bank angles and different airspeed in an attempt to determine the optimum bank angle and airspeed for the maneuver. Much of this information is what I would call non-valued-added and in some cases dangerous. In fact, about 3 years ago the AOPA put on its website a video called “The Impossible Turn”, showing a pilot in a Mooney aircraft executing a successful turnback maneuver at an airport in Indiana. Right away, everyone was talking about the proper technique to perform this maneuver. As both a professional aerodynamicist for over 46 years and a CFII for over 35 years, I developed a 160 slide powerpoint presentation entitled “Single-Engine Failure After Take-Off; The Anatomy of a Turnback Maneuver”. It was given as a FAASTeam seminar at four locations in the Southern California region back in 2011. The seminar focused on every aspect of the turnback maneuver, including (1) Various turnback scenarios, (2) The complete aerodynamics of the turnback maneuver, delineating the key aerodynamic parameters which provide the exact altitude loss in each segment of the turnback. It provided the four key independent parameters that control the altitude loss in the turn. These are (1) Wing loading, (2) density of the air, (3) Bank angle, and (4) Angle-of-attack. None of these are usually discussed in these turnback discussions. I used a C-172 as an example in order to show how to determine the altitude loss in the turnback maneuver both with and without a wind. However, the only way to properly present this result is in a graph of the minimum altitude required versus distance from the departure end of the runway where the aircraft initiates the turnback maneuver. I then went on to show that even with the knowledge of the altitude necessary, the pilot would still have to make a decision whether to turn back or not to turn back. In order to mitigate the risk of not having to make that decision at the time the engine quits, I developed a simple chart which shows the required runway length versus distance from the departure end of the runway for which a “potentially successful” turnback maneuver can be initiated. I use the term “potentially successful”, since if the combination of aerodynamics and wind does allow for a successful turnback, it then will depend on the pilot skills in executing the turnback maneuver. The reason that this chart is so valuable is that the pilot can view this chart prior to takeoff and determine if there is sufficient runway to execute a “potentially successful” turnback maneuver prior to taxiing out for takeoff. Thus, the decision has been made before takeoff whether to consider turning back. What was shown was that in a C-172 at gross weight, sea level and a zero wind, the aerodynamics of the aircraft tells you that a teardrop turnback maneuver (which is the optimum turnback maneuver from the standpoint of minimum runway length required), will require about 5300 feet of runway in order to perform a “potentially successful” turnback maneuver within 1 nm of the departure end of the runway. However, there is a region within about 800 feet of the departure end of the runway, that one would be unsuccessful in attempting a turnback manuever. I also showed that for the 23 sea level airports in the LAX area, only 10 of those airports could one execute a “potentially successful turnback”. In addition, the aircraft may require different airspeeds in different segments of the turnback maneuver. Fortunately, in the case of a C-172 at gross weight the entire tunback maneuver can be flown at 65KIAS. I also discuss a number of pitfalls and misconceptions in the turnback maneuver, including attempting a turnback maneuver at a high density altitude airport. If any of this information is getting your attention, send me an email to lgtech@roadrunner.com, and I can provide you with a considerable amount of information that will help you understand the true complexity of executing such a so-called “simple maneuver”. One should always remember the old adage, “The Devil is in the Details”.
Les Glatt
 
For primary flight students, a few demonstrations at altitude, then again to actual landings at a wide-open airport, show in sobering and no uncertain terms, just what the critical altitude range is under ideal conditions.

Then to determine a realistic turn around altitude for practical applications in PIC flights, ADD a healthy amount of additional upwind altitude for reaction time, the aircraft model, weight, wind and DA and then stick to it.
 
I have been following this discussion with great interest. I also practice "The Impossible Turn" in every plane I fly, in all kinds of atmospheric conditions. I won't bore you with the details. Every plane is different, even within types. One thing remains the same. Most of my flying is out of DXR. Those of you who have been there know where this is going.
On three out of the four possible takeoff directions you are flying uphill into the hills. The fourth is into a Galleria Mall parking lot.
With a field elevation of 462 (ish) feet on 26/8 you have to climb to 1200 ft before you can begin your turn. On 17 you take off into a valley and have to get to 1700 feet before you can turn. In all three cases you are going left, right or straight ahead into prime Connecticut real estate: hills, trees and rocks. There is no "nose down, turns less than 45 degrees" as called for on the written test. In fact the written emergency procedure for those runways, written by true realist at one of the flight schools, actually says "kiss your a$$ goodbye."
For me, every takeoff is somewhere between Vx and Vy because if the engine quits and you don't have enough altitude to make the "Impossible Turn", it's all over. IF you can get enough altitude, and IF you can get past the hills, MAYBE you can make it to RT 84 or RT 7, but then the chances are that a big rig or some blue hair in a Mercedes is going to kill you even if you do survive the landing.
Anyway, my point is this: Every takeoff and every landing is dangerous. You don't make it any less dangerous by arguing against learning a technique or a skill that might give you a chance to survive an already deadly situation. Worse case scenario, for me at least, is they won't have to try to get into the mountains to recover my body. It will already be pre-packaged in a nice aluminum coffin on the edge of the runway.
 
I probably missed it - I just found this long thread and rather breezed through it. I assume that the expected end result is the same. That is, my assumption is that when you accept the straight in or slight turn you immediately write off the airplane and worry only about your survival.
Can someone confirm for me that the acceptable end of the "impossible turn" is also survival at the possible expense of the aircraft?
What I'm asking is whether we all agree that the "impossible turn" should be judged against the accepted likely end of the straight ahead off-airport landing? "Crashing" on the "impossible turn" is therefore no worse a result than the same crash would be on the straight in. In both cases we're writing off the airplane and hoping to escape alive and preferably unharmed. Is that the criteria we are using? Or are we expecting a wheels down, roll-out landing from the "impossible turn".
 
"Crashing" on the "impossible turn" is therefore no worse a result than the same crash would be on the straight in. In both cases we're writing off the airplane and hoping to escape alive and preferably unharmed. Is that the criteria we are using? Or are we expecting a wheels down, roll-out landing from the "impossible turn".

It is, because often the "impossible turn" results in a stall and spin, or an accelerated stall close to the ground resulting in an uncontrolled crash.
The idea of more or less straight ahead is to minimize banking close to ground.

Controlled off-field landings, even in hostile terrain or urban obstacles, are almost always survived.
Uncontrolled crashes (meaning you're a passenger at the most critical part of the operation) are very often fatal.

The most important thing is that the pilot is controlling where the aircraft goes and does immediately before and at the moment of impact.
 
So what exactly is the impossible turn...is it it just doing a 180 to land after an engine loss?

Thanks
 
So what exactly is the impossible turn...is it it just doing a 180 to land after an engine loss?

Thanks
In simplest terms it's describing any attempt to return to the takeoff runway after an engine failure at a relatively low altitude (typically in a single engine airplane). The optimal technique performance wise is a fairly steep bank (into the wind if it's from the side) at an airspeed very close to stall during the turn with a speed increase if there's any wings level flight. A decent compromise is to use a 45° bank and 1.3 * Vs.

The biggest issues are the typical deadly result of a stall at low altitude, the psychological impact of making steep turns while holding airspeed when the ground is filling the windscreen, and the fact that depending on wind, runway length, and climb rate the exact altitude where a return is possible isn't easy to determine. There are also plenty of scenarios where the turn is possible but you still can't make it to a runway.
 
It is, because often the "impossible turn" results in a stall and spin, or an accelerated stall close to the ground resulting in an uncontrolled crash.
The idea of more or less straight ahead is to minimize banking close to ground.

Controlled off-field landings, even in hostile terrain or urban obstacles, are almost always survived.
Uncontrolled crashes (meaning you're a passenger at the most critical part of the operation) are very often fatal.

The most important thing is that the pilot is controlling where the aircraft goes and does immediately before and at the moment of impact.

I'm talking about the termination of the flight in the form of the contact with the ground. I'm not talking about mishandling the airplane in the air. I can stall it on a a straight ahead. Is a full stall 50' above the ground any better than a stall spin 50' above the ground? I doubt it.

What are the sources for your assertion that controlled off field landings are often survivable and for saying that uncontrolled crashes are very often fatal?

Your own statement is contradictory. Do you mean the part in the air or the part on contact with the ground?

Some seem to assume that the down side result of an impossible turn necessarily means a stall spin. It seems to me that if you have an impossible turn and you find out you can't make it, your recourse is to level the wings and do the same straight ahead crash that everyone seems to think we're going to walk away from if it's two miles straight out from the runway.

Well, what do I know? I'm a glider pilot and I have done it from 200'. I've tested my own plane under idle conditions and it worked at 350' so I'm sure I can do it at 500'. I'll have to go out and do an engine shut off test at altitude and see what it reveals.

My observation is people get a position established and argue from that point of view without looking at any other possibility.
 
In simplest terms it's describing any attempt to return to the takeoff runway after an engine failure at a relatively low altitude (typically in a single engine airplane). The optimal technique performance wise is a fairly steep bank (into the wind if it's from the side) at an airspeed very close to stall during the turn with a speed increase if there's any wings level flight. A decent compromise is to use a 45° bank and 1.3 * Vs.

The biggest issues are the typical deadly result of a stall at low altitude, the psychological impact of making steep turns while holding airspeed when the ground is filling the windscreen, and the fact that depending on wind, runway length, and climb rate the exact altitude where a return is possible isn't easy to determine. There are also plenty of scenarios where the turn is possible but you still can't make it to a runway.

Gotcha

I just brought this up to my CFI about two weeks ago. We were at 200 and I asked him what would he do if we had engine failure right now. He pointed out all the lovely sugarcane fields that surround the airfield and said most pilots automatically want to turn around and lots don't make it. He took the controls and kind of leveled off pointing to all the areas that he thinks we could make a safe landing. I figured it was over. On the next touch and go right as we were taking off he called the tower and told them we would simulate engine failure. We were just over 200' again and he pulled power full off and leveled the aircraft and went into a very steep turn. All I did was look out the left side window at the ground and the runway. I could feel him on the rudder but I had let go of the yoke. When we landed all I said was "holy s__t, that was wild!" My CFI has to be in his mid 70's...he impressed me and I made it clear I would be going for the sugarcane fields.

thanks!
 
Is a full stall 50' above the ground any better than a stall spin 50' above the ground?

Well, it might be. The difference is that stall spin will move your forward motion into the spin and cause the nose to drop, probably result in you going face first into the ground. A stall, at least in the airplanes that most of us fly, will probably result in a really, really hard touch down.

The two items that come to mind are a) a mooney stall spin accident I've seen video of where the mooney stalls and then nose dives into a fireball vs b) the video of the military trainer that was posted around about a year ago where the airplane falls forward causing lots of damage but landing flat.


But isn't that like asking if you'd rather get shot in the head or in the leg? Well, I'd rather not get shot at all.

The issue with the impossible turn is that it requires a high degree of skill to perform at low altitudes and failure of that skill results in your death. A straight ahead off field landing requires much less skill and has a higher likelyhood of living.

If I'm in an airplane that just betrayed me on departure with less than 800' altitude, I care very little about saving that airplane. The insurance company can have it!
 
I saw a stall/spin from about 50 or so feet. The occupants survived the impact, but not the fire (fuel cap came off - aircraft was upside down sitting on the canopy).
 
So what exactly is the impossible turn...is it it just doing a 180 to land after an engine loss?

Thanks

Takes more than a 180 to get back to the runway. Think about it. At some airports, a 180 will put you will into the trees. At other wide open airports, you might be able to land in the open area to the side. But to get back to the runway will require more like 240-270 degrees of turning.
 
If I'm in an airplane that just betrayed me on departure with less than 800' altitude, I care very little about saving that airplane. The insurance company can have it!

Can you honestly say that you think that you or any other pilot can separate those two elements and/or modify his behavior accordingly when the rubber band breaks shortly after takeoff?
 
Comment on the “Impossible Turn” (This is a long post but it is packed with a lot of important information)
The so-called “Impossible Turn” was coined when pilots incurred an engine failure and attempted to turn back and land at the airport they had just departed. The reason it was termed the “impossible Turn” was the fact the pilots attempted to make the turnback without any understanding of (1) How much altitude was necessary to make the turnback successful and (2) If one new how much altitude was necessary for the turnback, what return flight profile was used to obtain that given altitude. Many flight instructors would go out and practice this turnback maneuver by reducing the power to idle and trying various bank angles and airspeeds to see what scenario would provide them with the least altitude loss. In some cases they would determine the altitude loss for a 180 degree turn and some would use a 270 degree turn. The problem is that without a true understanding of both the geometry of the turnback maneuver and the aerodynamics of the turnback maneuver, attempting to extrapolate this altitude loss from one set of conditions to another can be fatal. There are three variables that determine whether the turnback maneuver is “impossible” or “possible”. The first is the aerodynamics of the aircraft you are flying. The second is the environment (i.e. wind), and the third is the pilot skills. I am not going to address the issue of obstacles around the airport because this can be addressed after the first three issues above. If a combination of the aerodynamics and environment tells you that it is truly an “Impossible Turn” for the altitude you are at when the engine fails, then it is an “Impossible Turn” no matter how good your stick and rudder skills may be.

There are various types of turnback scenarios that one can utilize, but the one that is the optimal from the standpoint of the minimum runway length required, is the teardrop turnback maneuver. This maneuver has three segments starting at the point where the turnback is initiated. Under no wind conditions, the first segment is a turn from the upwind heading rolling out on a heading that points directly at the departure end of the runway. The second segment is a wings level glide toward the departure end of the runway (DER). The third segment is a final turn that aligns the aircraft over the centerline of the runway with the wings level. Each segment may have to be flown at different indicated airspeeds. Therefore, from an aerodynamics standpoint we have two segments involving gliding turns and one segment involving a wings level glide. If we all understand “basic aerodynamics” (i.e. what’s in the Handbooks of Aeronautical Knowledge, Chapters 3, 4, and 10), we know that the wings level glide should be flow at the angle-of-attack for maximum L/D.

In regard to the gliding turn segments, in order to minimize the altitude loss in the turns, one needs to minimize the altitude loss per degree of turn. Again, “basic aerodynamics” allows one to determine the altitude loss per degree of turn. It is obtained by dividing the aircraft rate of descent by the aircraft rate of turn. When you determine this quantity you find the following:
Altitude loss per degree of turn = (F1 * F3) /(F2*F4)
Where F1 is the wing loading (W/S)
F2 is the density of the air
F3 is the bank angle function
F4 is the aerodynamic function and is equal to CL *(L/D)
CL is the lift coefficient
L/D is the lift to drag ratio


The entire information on the altitude loss during the turning portion of the turnback maneuver is in this simple formula. These are four independent parameters that can be varied in any manner. If you want to minimize the altitude loss per degree of turn one, wants to minimize F1 and F3and maximize F2 and F4.. It is easy to see that lower aircraft weight and higher air density will reduce the altitude loss in the turn. However, all the information that we as pilots want to know about how to perform the turnback maneuver is contained in the bank angle function (F3) and the aerodynamic function (F4 ). One finds that to minimize the bank angle function the turnback maneuver must be flown at a bank angle between 45 and 46 degrees ( there is a slight dependence on the L/D ratio),. However, one also finds that the variation in F3 is very small between 40 and 50 degrees of bank (only varies by a few percent), so flying exactly a 45 degree bank angle is not very important (40 degrees will do just as well). The aerodynamic function is where the real issue comes into play. This function maximizes just as the aircraft approaches the accelerated stall speed for the bank angle being flown. Thus, if one really wants to minimize the altitude loss per degree of turn, one would need to fly just above the accelerated stall speed for the corresponding weight of the aircraft and bank angle used in the turnback. This is not practical from a safety standpoint, since I would suggest that if you flew at a hair below the stall angle-of-attack you would probably be attempting the “impossible turn”. If one flies at 5-10% above the accelerated stall speed you will only give up about a 5-10% increase in altitude loss per degree of turn. The importance of the formula for the altitude loss per degree of turn is that one can determine how much penalty in altitude loss per degree of turn you get by changing the aircraft weight, density altitude, bank angle, and angle-of-attack. With the above information you can now determine the altitude loss as a function of distance from the departure end of the runway.

The above covers just the basic aerodynamics of the tunback maneuver. If we now consider the geometry of the teardrop turnback maneuver in a no wind condition, it is easy to show that there are two important characteristics of the teardrop pattern. First, when the aircraft completes the first turning segment and is pointed directly at the departure end of the runway, the distance from that point to the runway is exactly equal to the distance from the departure end of the runway to the point that the turnback was initiated. Second, the angle of intercept between the aircraft heading and the runway centerline is only a function of the radius of the first turning segment divided by the distance from the departure end of the runway to the point at which the turnback is initiated. Thus, the geometry tells one that there is a region close to the runway equal to the diameter of the first segment that would force to aircraft to come in perpendicular to the runway right at the departure end of the runway. This is what is called the “region of impossible turn”, because the aircraft would require a 90 degree turn at very low altitude to get over the runway center (a very dangerous type of turn, especially when on a tailwind and very close to the ground).

With the above information one can estimate the minimum altitude required for a “potentially successful” turnback maneuver. This altitude will not be constant but will be a function of distance from the departure end of the runway. So determining some minimum altitude and using this for the turnback can be potentially fatal. If one asks is there a way to obtain an upper bound on what the required altitude would be the answer is “yes”. In order to get this estimate one must add the altitude loss in the two turns to the altitude loss in the wings level glide. If the pilot flies the aircraft at the angle-of-attack for maximum L/D (need to fly the correct speed for the weight of the aircraft), the altitude lost in the wings level glide is just the distance from the runway to the point where the turnback is initiated divided by the L/D ratio. Just as a point of information, the maximum L/D is achieved at a fixed pitch attitude and is independent of the weight of the aircraft or the altitude. So if you know the proper pitch attitude for maximum L/D, you just fly the pitch attitude and you will be at the proper airspeed for the weight of the aircraft.

That’s the easy part. The first and third segments are the gliding turns and there is where one needs to utilize the above formula for the altitude loss per degree of turn. Since the turnback maneuver will always involve a first segment turn of no more than 270 degrees, one can calculate the altitude loss by multiplying the altitude loss per degree of turn by 270 degrees. Since there are four variables in the formula, the best way to handle that is by assuming the aircraft is at gross weight, sea level density, bank angle of 45 degrees and angle-of-attack just above the accelerated stall speed. Then one can correct that for aircraft weight, air density, bank angle being utilized and how close to the accelerated stall you want to fly the maneuver. This would allow you to obtain the maximum altitude loss in the first turning segment. The last turning segment would be bounded by a 90 degree turn back to the runway heading. Thus, one could similarly determine the altitude loss in this 90 degree turn. Note that one might want to use a much shallower bank angle when close to the ground for this final turn. This would increase the altitude loss because the bank angle function will increase significantly.

Finally, I suppose that if you fly aircraft at high altitude and high speed you have heard the term “coffin corner”. There is an equivalent “coffin corner” for the turnback maneuver. It occurs on the third segment of the turnback maneuver, i.e the final gliding turn at low altitude. If the pilot finds himself beginning to overshoot the centerline of the runway, there is the urge to steepen the bank angle to prevent the overshoot. Without power, the only way to increase airspeed to prevent the aircraft from entering an accelerated stall is to lower the nose and thus give up the remaining precious altitude. Therefore, pilots must understand that the maximum bank angle in the final turn is going to be controlled by the wings level glide speed flown in the second segment. The bank angle must never exceed this value to prevent an accelerated stall from occurring. When we bring in the wind issue, the pilot will be on a tailwind on this final segment and thus the potential for overbanking and entering an accelerated stall will always be there.

Once you have calculated this altitude, you will now need to add a pad for both pilot skills and the fact that the aircraft is not aerodynamically perfect. One should add the same factor for the aerodynamic imperfection on both the turning segments and the wings level segment, however, pilot skills should be weighted more heavily on the turning segment than on the wings level segment. Finally, since this minimum altitude required for the turnback maneuver is based on flying a given teardrop pattern, the pilot must fly this teardrop pattern exactly, and only modify it slightly to dissipate excess altitude. If you change the geometry of the turnback pattern, all bets are off on the success of the turnback maneuver. There is additional information in regard to incorporating the effects of the wind that I will not discuss in this post. But if anyone is interested I can provide you that information.
As a final point of information, even if one new the minimum required altitude for the turnback as a function of the distance from the departure end of the runway (I doubt anyone can remember what that altitude would be at any distance from the runway after an engine failure), a decision would have to be made whether to turn back or not. This is not a good way to mitigate the risk of estimating the wrong required minimum altitude and actually flying an “Impossible Turn”. A way to mitigate the risk is to use the knowledge of the required minimum altitude for the turnback and convert that into a minimum runway length as a function of distance from the departure end of the runway at which the turnback is initiated. Thus, the pilot can view the minimum runway requirement prior to takeoff, and if it greater than the available runway length, you have an “Impossible Turn”. If the required runway length is shorter than the available runway length, one has a “potentially successful” turnback maneuver. However, one may find the runway is only long enough for turnback maneuver within a certain distance from the departure end of the runway. Thus, there would be a narrow envelope for a “potentially successful” turnback.
Although this is a very long post, I hope you can now understand how flying such a geometrically simple teardrop maneuver can be riddled with potentially “fatal gotcha’s”.
Les Glatt
 
I'm talking about the termination of the flight in the form of the contact with the ground.
...
My observation is people get a position established and argue from that point of view without looking at any other possibility.

My observation is that most pilots significantly overestimate their ability to fly the aircraft perfectly in time of crisis.

You're assuming that aircraft control will not be lost. There are lots of dead pilots who though that.
The turnback maneuver places the pilot is a position where they are playing Russian Roulette. It's a high-risk, high-reward maneuver. I prefer to mitigate risk, and not put myself in a corner of the performance envelope where I have no margin for error.

There's a saying in law enforcement. "When the bad things happen, you will not rise to occasion. You will default to your training."
People, as a whole, tend to think that they can pull off whatever is needed to to salvage or solve the crisis.
I am, at best, an average pilot. Making conservative choices give me room to correct for the unexpected. Leaving myself room for error increases my chances of having a net positive outcome.

I have dead friends who overestimated their abilities (both in aviation and in other fields of endeavor). I choose to not join them. So I choose to implement a strategy that gives me as much margin for error or unexpected complications as I can.
 
Last edited:
Can you honestly say that you think that you or any other pilot can separate those two elements and/or modify his behavior accordingly when the rubber band breaks shortly after takeoff?

Yes, I can honestly say that I can. Insurance will buy a new plane. It won't buy a new me. The airplane is expendable and if it's stupid enough to cross me like this, I will have no problem throwing it under the bus...figuratively speaking of course, I don't see landing and sliding under a bus to be very survivable.

The secret is recognizing it beforehand. If you commit to that attitude and what you're going to do before you even wind up the rubber band, it becomes a lot easier to follow through with it later.
 
Thanks, but FYI I don't believe any of it for a second. I can buy that leaving the gear up might be preferable, but as Alan said (and I know from experience) that when the chips are down the pilot is going to think the softest and best place for the airplane is also the softest place for his tender parts and he is going to try his best to put it there.

Yes, I can honestly say that I can. Insurance will buy a new plane. It won't buy a new me. The airplane is expendable and if it's stupid enough to cross me like this, I will have no problem throwing it under the bus...figuratively speaking of course, I don't see landing and sliding under a bus to be very survivable.

The secret is recognizing it beforehand. If you commit to that attitude and what you're going to do before you even wind up the rubber band, it becomes a lot easier to follow through with it later.
 
Yes, I can honestly say that I can. Insurance will buy a new plane. It won't buy a new me. The airplane is expendable and if it's stupid enough to cross me like this, I will have no problem throwing it under the bus...figuratively speaking of course, I don't see landing and sliding under a bus to be very survivable.

The secret is recognizing it beforehand. If you commit to that attitude and what you're going to do before you even wind up the rubber band, it becomes a lot easier to follow through with it later.

It's easy to speculate on how you might react in such situations. It's a different thing entirely to experience such situations. It doesn't seem you have much flying experience to begin with, and I'd imagine you have yet to experience an emergency. I don't think you're getting Wayne's point. Realize the vast chasm of experience difference between the two of you.
 
Last edited:
If Wayne's point is that you never know how you react under stress until you're there, then I do get it. I've been in serious stressful situations where failure to perform the right actions would have had serious consequences. You get out of them by having prepared through training. For me that includes a decision up front to being committed to landing straight ahead at less than 800' AGL (1050 MSL at my home airport) and that the airplane is expendable. There's no behavior to modify, that's the rule when the airplane breaks. I'm not speculating on this, I'm training on it. If that's not his and your point, then yes I am missing it.

People lose 90% of their mental capacity under stress. If you don't believe that, try to teach someone to shoot a pistol. As soon as you put it in their hand, they become an idiot. Pilots will lose 90% of their capacity under stress too.

That's why you train and figure out before hand without question that you will sacrafice the airplane if necessary to get yourself on the ground again. Now that probably coincides with a softer spot - say in a grass field rather than trees. It's just a coincidence that a softer landing for me is a softer landing for the airplane.

Are we saying the same thing, you just doubt that I would stick to my training?
 
Where will you be when this happens? What will you know about what's ahead, behind or on either side? The pilot in AK wisely chose to turn back and crash-land on the airport property rather than take the cold-water bath in any direction other than back to the airport.

If Wayne's point is that you never know how you react under stress until you're there, then I do get it. I've been in serious stressful situations where failure to perform the right actions would have had serious consequences. You get out of them by having prepared through training. For me that includes a decision up front to being committed to landing straight ahead at less than 800' AGL (1050 MSL at my home airport) and that the airplane is expendable. There's no behavior to modify, that's the rule when the airplane breaks. I'm not speculating on this, I'm training on it. If that's not his and your point, then yes I am missing it.

People lose 90% of their mental capacity under stress. If you don't believe that, try to teach someone to shoot a pistol. As soon as you put it in their hand, they become an idiot. Pilots will lose 90% of their capacity under stress too.

That's why you train and figure out before hand without question that you will sacrafice the airplane if necessary to get yourself on the ground again. Now that probably coincides with a softer spot - say in a grass field rather than trees. It's just a coincidence that a softer landing for me is a softer landing for the airplane.

Are we saying the same thing, you just doubt that I would stick to my training?
 
There's a saying in law enforcement. "When the bad things happen, you will not rise to occasion. You will default to your training."

Sounds like a logical reason to train for the damn things, so you'd really know what your airplane can and can't do.

The glider folk do it.
 
So can hawks and buzzards.

Sounds like a logical reason to train for the damn things, so you'd really know what your airplane can and can't do.

The glider folk do it.
 
Sounds like a logical reason to train for the damn things, so you'd really know what your airplane can and can't do.
The glider folk do it.

The point is, though, that this is NOT about what the plane can and cannot do, it's about what the PILOT will be able to do under immediate life-threatening stress.

The point was, the most insidious trap is the overconfidence of humans to perform intricate, precise, near-perfect actions, with no warning and under crushing stress.

I choose to plan to do what I KNOW I can do, which is keep the airspeed right, pick a landing spot (whether optimal or not) within 45* of heading, and put the plane down there. I can keep the nose up, and put the furselage between the light poles, trees, or buildings.
If, as Wayne points out, there are no survivable landing spots within 45* of heading, then we're in a spot where life or death will be determined by whether I can pull off a superior bit of piloting and turn back to somewhere behind me.

People go out the range and shoot bullseyes all day, but when there's someone shooting back or coming at them with a knife, the hit rate drops to less than 50%. I have seen that reliably for my whole career.
I don't want to be in a position where I have one shot for bullseye, and the consquesnce of a miss is death.
 
In my long post I tried to get the message across that if the combination of the aerodynamics of the aircraft and the environment is telling the pilot that no matter how fantastic their stick and rudder skills are and how adept they may function under super stress, it's an "Impossible Turn".

This is the key point which seems to be dismissed in the conversation on this subject..


If the aerodynamics and environment tells the pilot that it may be a "potentially successful" turnback, then the discussion should focus on pilot skills and decison making under stress and risk management. However, if pilots know that it's an impossible turn", then we have just reduced the fatality rate in the pilots attempting a turnback maneuver.

Think of it this way: "Why would any pilot in their right mind attempt the turnback maneuver if they new in advance that they did not have sufficient altitude to fly a "potentially sucessful" turnback maneuver?

If the pilot community want to focus on reducing the fatality rate in the turnback maneuver, we need to focus on what the real issues are.
"It's Pilot Education on the Subject"
 
In my long post I tried to get the message ... that no matter how fantastic their stick and rudder skills are and how adept they may function under super stress, it's an "Impossible Turn".
...
Think of it this way: "Why would any pilot in their right mind attempt the turnback maneuver if they new in advance that they did not have sufficient altitude to fly a "potentially sucessful" turnback maneuver?

Agreed. But the point I was trying to make, and that is illustrated by your post is:

1 - A pilot probably does not have a good grasp of what is possible and not possible.

2 - There's an altitude below which a turnback is flatly impossible under any circumstances.
There's an altitude above which a turnback is easily achievable with average skill and even with some adverse wind.
In the middle there's varying degrees of probability of success, the probabilities vary greatly with a given beginning altitude due to variables that a pilot probably cannot know or predict.

3 - Why would a pilot try a turnback when it's plainly not possible? Because he doesn't know it's not possible from his current starting position.

As I discussed above, a common human failing is the delusion that they can do more than is possible. Humans are horrifically bad to inferential physics, and at probabilities.

In inferential physics, they infer or intuit that something is possible that plainly is not. See "raise the nose to extend the glide". People regularly try it, and fail. Carnival midways survive from the human's inability to intuit physics.
The same is true in humans' inability to intuit probabilities. See "casino", no further explanation needed.

Combine attempts to intuit physics and probability, add extremely short time to assess, and add a heaping helping of crushing, life-threat-level pressure, and you have a recipe for human mind to truly and wholeheartedly believe that a turnback can be accomplished from the starting altitude, without any real idea of whether that is in fact true.

The only reliable way to win is not to play.
 
All your points drive to the conclusion at the end of my post.
"It's Pilot Education on the Subject".
As an example, after the AOPA posted Dave Keller"s video of a successful turnback maneuver in a Mooney 20C in 2009, and in 2010, how a student pilot and her instructor were attempting to show how easy the "Barry Schiff" turnback method worked, I decided to put together a 160 slide presentation discussing nearly every aspect of the turnback maneuver. I presented this FAASTeam seminar 4 times in the Southernn California area to over 200 pilots. At the end of each seminar, the comments I received were all in the form of "I am really going to have second thoughts about performing this turnback maneuver". However, not to my surprise, the folks preaching how easy the maneuver can be flown, never showed up. We all know that one can never reach 100% of the pilot population in educatiing them on the pitfalls of the turnback maneuver, but if you can reach 80% we willl keep a lot of pilots alive.
 
Critical altitude for an engine out turn back after sufficient in flight practice in make and model is academic, when properly adjusted for variable ambient conditions for each take off.

Possibly the most insidious variable in pilot performance is the realistic degree of accuracy of each pilot's mental assessment of, and proper allowance for, pilot reaction time between actual engine failure and conscious control inputs for an attempted course reversal in a glide.

Was it really 1, 2, or 3 seconds??? Or was it more like 5 or 10 seconds or more?!

The altitude lost during those additional seconds of congnition and/or denial at low level before decision making is huge and if not accurately assessed, will place the subsiquent aircraft accident in the "almost-made-it" category, even for well practiced pilots.
 
Last edited:
Your statement about how many seconds it really was, is not the main issue.
Consider a pilot who is so fabulous at the stick and rudder skills and could make that decision to initiate the turnback at the exact speed within less than 1 second.
All that greatness doesn't mean much if the altitude he is at is not enough to make it back. The risk management is in the pilot making the decision that he has the right amount of altitude for a "potentially successful" turnback. When the pilot experiences the engine failure there is a very low probability that he can estimate the distance from the runway and how much altitude he would need at that distance from the runway. Even if he had a chart in front of him telling him how much altitude he needed at a given distance from the runway. The risk management has to occur on the ground before the takeoff roll ever starts. The chart that a pilot needs is something that he can review on the ground that will tell him when "never to attempt a turnback maneuver", or when the chart tells the pilot that there is a "narrow envelope for a "potentially successful" turnback maneuver". One can create such a chart, which is the required runway length versus distance from the departure end of the runway from where the turnback will be initiated, which would allow for a potentially “successful turnback”. This is something a pilot can sink their teeth into on the ground. Once you filter out the "impossible or narrow turnback" cases, then one has to leave the "potentially successful" turnback cases to those pilots who feel their stick and rudder skills and their quickness of response to the situation would allow them to perform a successful turnback. This first filter will save a considerable number of lives.
However, all those pilots who make the attempt at the turnback need to understand in very much detail all the pitfalls that one can get themselves into during the turnback maneuver . Many of the pilots that preach the ease of the turnback maneuver do not really understand the actual complexity of this maneuer. If you don't believe me go onto the AOPA website and look for posts by Alyssa Miller of the AOPA on the “Impossible turn”. One is a video with her and her instructor performing the turnback maneuver. There is also a transcript posted by Miller in 2011. Listen to the audio and then you will understand what I am talking about. Relate that to my previous long post on the details of the teardrop turnback maneuver.
 
I've found Practice with flight students takes care of the maneuvering skills and the academics. A critical altitude should obviously be calculated on the ground prior to applying take off power on a case by case basis.

The judgement on ones reaction time is highly variable and will always remain highly significant towards a safe course reversal to landing with no power.

ALL factors need to be properly assessed by pilots at the proper times to maximize safety and success.

Your statement about how many seconds it really was, is not the main issue.
Consider a pilot who is so fabulous at the stick and rudder skills and could make that decision to initiate the turnback at the exact speed within less than 1 second.
All that greatness doesn't mean much if the altitude he is at is not enough to make it back. The risk management is in the pilot making the decision that he has the right amount of altitude for a "potentially successful" turnback. When the pilot experiences the engine failure there is a very low probability that he can estimate the distance from the runway and how much altitude he would need at that distance from the runway. Even if he had a chart in front of him telling him how much altitude he needed at a given distance from the runway. The risk management has to occur on the ground before the takeoff roll ever starts. The chart that a pilot needs is something that he can review on the ground that will tell him when "never to attempt a turnback maneuver", or when the chart tells the pilot that there is a "narrow envelope for a "potentially successful" turnback maneuver". One can create such a chart, which is the required runway length versus distance from the departure end of the runway from where the turnback will be initiated, which would allow for a potentially “successful turnback”. This is something a pilot can sink their teeth into on the ground. Once you filter out the "impossible or narrow turnback" cases, then one has to leave the "potentially successful" turnback cases to those pilots who feel their stick and rudder skills and their quickness of response to the situation would allow them to perform a successful turnback. This first filter will save a considerable number of lives.
However, all those pilots who make the attempt at the turnback need to understand in very much detail all the pitfalls that one can get themselves into during the turnback maneuver . Many of the pilots that preach the ease of the turnback maneuver do not really understand the actual complexity of this maneuer. If you don't believe me go onto the AOPA website and look for posts by Alyssa Miller of the AOPA on the “Impossible turn”. One is a video with her and her instructor performing the turnback maneuver. There is also a transcript posted by Miller in 2011. Listen to the audio and then you will understand what I am talking about. Relate that to my previous long post on the details of the teardrop turnback maneuver.
 
Last edited:
I've found Practice with flight students takes care of the maneuvering skills and the academics. A critical altitude should obviously be calculated on the ground prior to applying take off power on a case by case basis.

The judgement on ones reaction time is highly variable and will always remain highly significant towards a safe course reversal to landing with no power.

ALL factors need to be properly assessed by pilots at the proper times to maximize safety and success.

How do you recommend assessing the difference between the climb angle and the descent angle under the prevailing conditions?
 
The point is, though, that this is NOT about what the plane can and cannot do, it's about what the PILOT will be able to do under immediate life-threatening stress.

The point was, the most insidious trap is the overconfidence of humans to perform intricate, precise, near-perfect actions, with no warning and under crushing stress.

I choose to plan to do what I KNOW I can do, which is keep the airspeed right, pick a landing spot (whether optimal or not) within 45* of heading, and put the plane down there. I can keep the nose up, and put the furselage between the light poles, trees, or buildings.
If, as Wayne points out, there are no survivable landing spots within 45* of heading, then we're in a spot where life or death will be determined by whether I can pull off a superior bit of piloting and turn back to somewhere behind me.

People go out the range and shoot bullseyes all day, but when there's someone shooting back or coming at them with a knife, the hit rate drops to less than 50%. I have seen that reliably for my whole career.
I don't want to be in a position where I have one shot for bullseye, and the consquesnce of a miss is death.

I understand that, Alan. I'm saying that maybe we put people under the specific stress under controlled conditions, they learn.

The glider folks, and what I was alluding to, do it. Commercial Glider rating requires a very real (albeit done by pulling the handle) "200' rope break" still, doesn't it?

When was the last time you saw a power pilot trainee saying their CFI pulled the power on takeoff at an altitude where they COULD make the turn-back, and EXPECTED them to do it?

I don't see that mentioned much, if at all. I see power pulled downwind (easy), and power pulled in the practice area (pick-a-spot training), and power pulled TOO LOW to make the turn (don't do it this low), but that leaves out teaching half the "topic at hand", right? Where's the "you have the altitude and this airplane can do it, make the turn NOW" training?

Too dangerous? I dunno. But it's missing from the typical powered curriculum and happening every day in the glider curriculum.

Or was... last time I was hanging out with the glider crowd, a decade ago.

Tony might be able to confirm or give more current information.

Why mandate it in one aircraft type and not the other?
 
(1) I am curious to understand your definition of "academics"
(2) What exactly is your definition of "practice"? What are you teaching your students in regard to the turnback maneuver?
(3) Prior to my posting of the information on the basic aerodynamics of the turnback maneuver, what were you teaching your students in regard to how one would determine the critical altitude for the turnback. In addition,what information were you providing to your students in regard how to scale your results for the critical altitude from one set of conditions to another?
 
To better understand this drill I'd want to know if glider CFI's, especially those at city-airport gliders practice rope breaks at 100'.

I understand that, Alan. I'm saying that maybe we put people under the specific stress under controlled conditions, they learn.

The glider folks, and what I was alluding to, do it. Commercial Glider rating requires a very real (albeit done by pulling the handle) "200' rope break" still, doesn't it?

When was the last time you saw a power pilot trainee saying their CFI pulled the power on takeoff at an altitude where they COULD make the turn-back, and EXPECTED them to do it?

I don't see that mentioned much, if at all. I see power pulled downwind (easy), and power pulled in the practice area (pick-a-spot training), and power pulled TOO LOW to make the turn (don't do it this low), but that leaves out teaching half the "topic at hand", right? Where's the "you have the altitude and this airplane can do it, make the turn NOW" training?

Too dangerous? I dunno. But it's missing from the typical powered curriculum and happening every day in the glider curriculum.

Or was... last time I was hanging out with the glider crowd, a decade ago.

Tony might be able to confirm or give more current information.

Why mandate it in one aircraft type and not the other?
 
Does your Chief really require a 1000 ' ground roll with take-off power to reach flying speed ? On a hard surface runway in a no- wind condition ?
 
I know most of you don't believe anything I say is worth its weight in salt but....

When talking about these lite airplanes. Not GA style airplanes but more for fun flying airplanes here is what I do and others I have spoke with do this also.

After you lift off and build a little speed, climb out at a 45 degree angle to the runway keeping the runway close in.

Now after the fields are planted and there is no safe landing in those fields as I approach the end of the runway from my 45 degree flight path I am turning back and crossing the end of the runway. I fly just off the other side of the runway. I hold this pattern and as I go higher I slowly move farther out from the runway always keeping the runway within what I think is glide distance if I loose an engine. I never fly passed the ends of the runway.

I do this on a 4000' non towered grass strip. One day doing this it saved my butt for indeed I did have an engine out. But on this day something in my head was telling me...Turn back early and I did, just as I made my turn and lined up on the opposite side of the runway my engine quit. It was a non issue I just landed. If I would have not done this, today I would not own an airplane for it would have been ruined by the 10 foot high corn stalks and I could have been killed. Its happened to others.

I always fly my pattern this way, no one will ever get me to stop, not when the fields are planted and the plants are tall or grown.

I do not trust these little airplanes enough not to keep the runway within gliding distance until up and cruising for a little bit. But that is just me..you do as you see fit.
 
Where will you be when this happens? What will you know about what's ahead, behind or on either side? The pilot in AK wisely chose to turn back and crash-land on the airport property rather than take the cold-water bath in any direction other than back to the airport.

Well, it's doubtfull I'll be in Alaska.

Are you suggesting that it's a good idea to look at the terrain and possible offsite landing locations using satellite pictures prior to take off? I agree, although I don't do this very often.

Are you suggesting that it's a good idea to take everything into account when making a decision? I also agree with that too and I play that game on every take off.

Are you suggesting that there are bad situations where a pilot must demostrate superior skill in order to account for inferior planning or luck? I agree there too.

If you're saying that I have to stick with what I said and you've come up with a gotcha example, then I don't agree. A take off out over a 33 degree ocean is not a normal occurance for me, nor for 99% of the people on this board. But what I would probably do in that situation is pitch down to best glide, make a 90 degree turn and try to land on the beach or in very shallow water. I might head for a field if one is in a good position. I really don't know because I've never been to Alaska, nor to the west coast but twice in my life. But at less than 800', I would not attempt to make the turn back to the airport...it simply is still statistically improbable that I will make it.
 
When was the last time you saw a power pilot trainee saying their CFI pulled the power on takeoff at an altitude where they COULD make the turn-back, and EXPECTED them to do it?

Maybe because they don't want to be doing agressive maneuvers too close to the ground to recover? I wouldn't want to be in the right seat with a student pulling 45* banks below 500 feet (or 1500 feet for that matter).

The 'engine out over the practice area' allows level of near level flight when near the ground. Sorta 'stabilized' :rofl:
 
Back
Top